84 resultados para Riparian rights.
em Deakin Research Online - Australia
Resumo:
The abolition of riparian entitlements in the early stages of colonial Australia and the vesting of these rights in the Crown represented a turning point for the evolution of private water rights. The extinguishment of common law rights connected to vested land interests and the introduction of new, unaligned statutory entitlements provided a new and fundamentally different system for the creation and regulation of private water entitlements. Unlike riparian entitlements, in the absence of express definition, statutory water entitlements may only be verified as property where such a construction is consistent with the nature and scope of the entitlement. In this respect, the statutory framework has disaggregated the propertisation of water rights from land ownership and linked the process to broader statutory interpretation principles. The shift away from institutional property has generated concerns about the interpretive approaches appropriate for the verification of legislative water entitlements. This article examines the existing interpretive approaches and argues that the blurring of the propertisation process with the separate issue of whether any change or modification of such water rights attracts s 51(xxxi) of the Commonwealth Constitution has produced a situation where core property indicia is increasingly overshadowed by legislative defeasibility. In the recent High Court decision of ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth, the focus of the majority judgements upon the inherent susceptibility of legislative entitlements to variation or extinguishment acted as a catalyst for the non-propertisation of statutory bore water licences in New South Wales. The emphasis the majority judgements gave to legislative defeasibility precluded a full and balanced assessment of other highly relevant property indicia, in particular the expectation interests of the holders. Conflating property and constitutional evaluation in this way is inappropriate in an era where entitlements to natural resource interests are increasingly statute based and the verification process has significant social and economic repercussions. Determining whether a statutory entitlement constitutes property requires a careful balancing of legislative intent, social and environmental context and individual expectation and the vicissitudes of a regulatory context should not eclipse this process.
Resumo:
This book is a comprehensive guide to the development and utilization of authorial moral rights across the key jurisdictions of the English-speaking world and in France and Germany. In recent years, the copyright statutes of the common law countries have been expanded by the introduction of provisions dealing with purely authorial rights - moral rights.
The Moral Rights of Authors and Performers discusses the historical development of the rights in Europe, with particular reference to France and Germany, and shows the growth of moral rights theory and legislative coverage up to the late 1930s. During the 1920s the moral rights of authors became the subject of international protection, particularly through the operation of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. The book explores the adoption of moral rights into this and other international instruments, explaining the functions that moral rights were intended to perform.
The author gives detailed accounts of the operation of moral rights in France and Germany today, addressing both statutory interpretation and doctrinal issues. The provision of case studies gives an impression of the rich jurisprudence associated with the rights in these countries.
The book also contains a detailed discussion of the versions of moral rights that have become entrenched in Canada, the UK, the US and Australia, with each country considered independently. It deals separately with the introduction of the rights into each country and their operation and interpretation by courts and commentators. Material on common law analogues to the rights is provided, which indicates alternative actions that practitioners might take. Problems of cross-jurisdictional legal proceedings (especially arising from technological transfer of information) are also addressed, with moral rights protection elsewhere in the world summarized in tabular form.
Resumo:
The growing influence of liberalism in China has made it important to determine the response of traditional Chinese political thought to Western liberal ideas of multicultural citizenship, and the impact of the Western liberal model of minority rights on China’s ethnic minority policy. This chapter begins by discussing the basic characteristics of the Confucian approach to minority questions and minority rights. It examines the influence of Marxism on minority rights, in general, and on Chinese practice, in particular. It then discusses China’s policies on ethic minorities, and compares current Chinese practices with the Western liberal model of minority rights.
Resumo:
In 1931, Canada was the first of the copyright countries to adopt a moral rights provision, closely modeled on Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, into its legislation. But this was not the first step that Canada had taken towards the legislative protection of moral rights. Not only had certain provisions protective of the non-economic interests of authors been included in the federal Criminal Code and in the legislation of Quebec prior to 1920, but during the 1920s a sustained effort had been made to give these interests more explicit and systematic protection under the Copyright Act. The present article focuses on a series of bills put to the Canadian Parliament from 1924 onwards. Not only would they have provided increased protection for the non-economic interests of authors but they would have given a legislative definition to the term "moral right". These bills, framed in the absence of any influence from Article 6bis, provide a glimpse of what "moral rights" might have been. They support the view that Canada was moving towards the express legislative protection of these rights significantly earlier that is commonly thought.
Resumo:
Now that Australia has its long awaited legislation protecting the moral rights of authors, a new phase in the development of the rights begins. It must be asked how the incorporation of the rights into the existing copyright legislation, and their subjection to existing doctrines, will affect their operation. And how will existing doctrines be challenged and extended by the existence of the rights? Ultimately these questions will be worked out in the courts. The present article offers a consideration of one area where the legislature has purported to integrate moral rights into the existing scheme but where the practicalities oftheir integration are still unclear. It examines the interplay of moral rights with the doctrine of substantiality, suggesting that any clarification of what substantiality means in the moral rights context will be contingent upon the emergence of more precise definitions of what moral rights are and what interests they are intended to protect.
Resumo:
A major problem in many developing countries is the degradation of commons. This degradation has occurred on account of the lack of fulfilment of the basic needs of the poor, free riding and ill–defined property rights. As these goods are essential for the survival of these people, they have to access these items from commons. This results in regular raids to common land for resources and also to private houses (for example, in New Delhi) which are not guarded for water. A variant of the agricultural household model is used to analyse the above problem. Several propositions are established and it is demonstrated that degradation can occur at both a low and high price of basic needs. This result has important policy implications as it demonstrates that land or common degradation cannot be solved by just using the price system. Properly defined property rights and provision of basic goods in kind may resolve the problem of degradation of commons.
Resumo:
This paper considers the commitment to business ethics of the top 500 companies operating in the Australian private sector and communicates the results of a longitudinal study conducted from 1995 to 2001. Primary data was obtained (in 1995 and again in 2001) via a self-administered mail questionnaire distributed to a census of these top 500 Australian companies. This commitment of each company to their code of ethics was indicated and measured via a range of methods used by organizations to communicate the ethos of their codes to employees. Just as they were in 1995, it would appear that companies in 2001 still are good at ensuring that their rights are protected, but at the same time they do not seem to take on the responsibility to ensure that employees'' rights are just as well protected. This double standard leads to cynicism towards the current business ethics processes inherent in Australian companies.
Resumo:
In the matter of Re Patrick, Guest J of the Family Court of Australia held that a sperm donor, known to the lesbian mother of the child, had a right under Australian law to regular contact with the child to the extent that this was in the child's best interests. However, his Honour also held that due to the way in which particular provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) are drafted, a sperm donor cannot be regarded as the "parent" of the child, and accordingly called for legislative reform to recognise the rights of known sperm donors wanting involvement with the child. In this article, the authors will first explore the facts and decision in Re Patrick, and then outline a proposal to amend the Family Law Act 1975 so that sperm donors can apply for an order to be a 'parent' under the Act.
Resumo:
In this article it is contended that state practice, as evidenced in the declarations of the judiciary and the many treaties and conventions guaranteeing human rights, reveals a consensus of opinion acknowledging the individual to be an international juristic entity. So extensive is this practice that it could be seen as marking the emergence of a new customary international norm; or at least a general principle of international law, yet to crystallise into a custom; acknowledging the individual as the beneficiary of international rights. This is important for individuals and minority groups because if they possess international rights independently of the State, enforcement of their rights will no longer depend on the interests of the State. Where the State is often the offender of human rights, international law will not effectively confer any real rights unless the individual is so recognised as an international juristic entity.