Corporate governance, board responsibilities and financial performance : the National Bank of Australia

This paper examines board responsibilities and accountability by management and Board of Directors in relation to the National Australia Bank's (NABs) performance. The NAB, an international financial service provider within the top thirty most profitable banks in the world, is compared with the Australian major banks. The evidence suggests that NABs poor performance was consistent with a lack of accountability, poor corporate governance and board dysfunction associated with fraudulent currency trading and the subsequent AUD360 million foreign currency losses. The NAB's performance is investigated by utilising accounting-based measures of profitability and cost efficiency as proxies for performance. Following the foreign currency trading losses in 2004 the NAB under-performed the other major Australian banks in terms of profits, cost to income ratio and growth in assets. In terms of profitability and cost efficiency NAB had the lowest ROE and ROA with a 19.7% fall in net profit and the highest cost to income ratio of 5 7.4% of any of the five largest banks. This case study provides an Australian example of poor corporate governance and suggests that financial institutions and regulators can learn from the NAB's experience. Failure to have top-down accountability can have significant impact on over-all performance, profitability and reputation. In particular, it suggests that management and Boards need to review their risk management procedures and regulators need to be more pro-active in their prudential oversight of financial institutions.

Does government linked companies (GLCs) perform better than non-GLCs? Evidence from Malaysian listed companies

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of an alternative ownership/control structure of corporate governance on firm performance. Specifically, we investigated the governance system of government linked companied (GLCs) in Malaysia. In this paper, we examine governance mechanism and firm performance of Malaysian GLCs and non-GLCs over a 11 year period from 1995 to 2005. We only select a sample of companies which are listed in Main Board. We chose a sample of 210 firms. We used Tobin’s Q which is an indicator of market performance is used as a proxy for company’s performances; meanwhile ROA is used to determine accounting performance. This paper is to determines whether after controlling firm specific characteristics such as corporate governance, agency cost, growth, risk and profitability, GLCs perform better than non-GLCs. Findings highlight that non-GLCs performance is better GLCs in term of corporate governance, and other firm specific characteristics. The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been issue of interest among academics, investors and policy makers as one of key issues in understanding the effectiveness of alternative governance systems where government ownership serves as a control mechanism.

Political connection and leverage: Some Malaysian evidence

This paper extends prior work on the linkage between politically connected (PCON) firms and capital structure in developing countries. Specifically, this paper focuses on the association between Malaysian PCON firms and leverage, and is motivated by the results of Fraser et al. (2006) who report a positive association between leverage and political patronage. Controlling for a potential misspecification in that paper, this study documents that a significant proportion (almost 12%) of the Malaysian PCON firms have negative equity, and builds on the previous paper by providing fresh evidence that market to book ratio is positively associated with leverage, and that borrowing PCON firms have significantly lower ROA compared to non-PCON firms. © 2012.