Preventive detention and the right to personal liberty and security under Article 5 ECHR

'Preventive detention' refers to detention by executive order as a  precautionary measure based on predicted criminal conduct. Detention is without criminal charge or trial as detention is based on the prediction of a future offence. This paper examines Article 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ('ECHR'), in particular Article 5(1)(c) and Article 5(3). To explore this issue, this paper conducts a textual analysis of Article 5 and examines both the travaux preacuteparatoires of the ECHR, as well as jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. This article argues that preventive detention is specifically provided for under the second ground of detention in Article 5(1)(c). A person in preventive detention, however, must be brought promptly before judicial authority under Article 5(3).

Preventative detention and the right of personal liberty and security under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966

Preventive detention enables a person to be deprived of liberty, by executive determination, for the purposes of safeguarding national security or public order without that person being charged or brought to trial. This paper examines Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 to assess whether preventive detention is prohibited by the phrase 'arbitrary arrest and detention '. To analyse this Article, this paper uses a textual and structural analysis of the Article, as well as reference to the travaux preparatoires and case law of the Human Rights Committee. This paper argues that preventive detention is not explicitly prohibited by Article 9(1) ofthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. If preventive detention is 'arbitrary', within the wide interpretation of that term as argued in this paper, it will be a permissible deprivation of personal liberty under Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. Preventive detention will, however, always be considered 'arbitrary' if sajeguards for those arrested and detained are not complied with, in particular the right to judicial review of the lawfulness of detention.

The compliance of Australian preventative detention law with article 9(1) ICCPR

This thesis found that a provision of Australia's counter-terrorism policy, preventative detention, does not comply with a major international treaty, the ICCPR. This thesis provides an alternative model by which the Australian Government could achieve the legitimate purposes of preventative detention within the existing constraints of the Australian criminal law.

Sex offender risk assessment : consideration of human rights in community protection legislation

ObjectivesRisk assessments provided to judicial decision makers as a part of the current generation of legislation for protecting the public from sexual offenders can have a profound impact on the rights of individual offenders. This article will identify some of the human rights issues inherent in using the current assessment procedures to formulate and communicate risk as a forensic expert in cases involving civil commitment, preventive detention, extended supervision, or special conditions of parole. MethodBased on the current professional literature and applied experience in legal proceedings under community protection laws in the United States and New Zealand, potential threats to the rights of offenders are identified. Central to these considerations are issues of the accuracy of current risk assessment measures, communicating the findings of risk assessment appropriately to the court, and the availability of competent forensic mental health professionals in carrying out these functions. The role of the forensic expert is discussed in light of the competing demands of protecting individual human rights and community protection. ConclusionActuarial risk assessment represents the best practice for informing judicial decision makers in cases involving sex offenders, yet these measures currently demonstrate substantial limitations in predictive accuracy when applied to individual offenders. These limitations must be clearly articulated when reporting risk assessment findings. Sufficient risk assessment expertise should be available to provide a balanced application of community protection laws.

Preventive strategies against weight gain and obesity

A well-resourced, comprehensive, population-based set of strategies is needed to
attenuate and eventually reverse the current trends of increasing obesity prevalence
now apparent in most countries. The Epidemiological Triad (host, vector,
environment) has proven to be a robust model for other epidemics and is applied
to obesity. Host-based strategies are primarily educational and these tend to
be most effective among people with higher incomes and higher educational
attainment. The main vectors for a high-energy intake are energy-dense foods and
drinks and large portion sizes and, for low energy expenditure, machines that
promote physical inactivity. Vector-based strategies that alter food formulation
can have a significant impact, particularly through influencing common, highvolume
foods. The increasingly ‘obesogenic’ environments are probably the main
driving forces for the obesity epidemic. There are many environmental strategies
that can influence the physical, economic, policy or socio-cultural environments,
but the evidence base for these potentially powerful interventions is small.
Children should be the priority population for interventions, and improving the
general socio-economic conditions for disadvantaged, marginalized or poor population
sectors is also a central strategy for obesity prevention. The key settings
for interventions are schools, homes, neighbourhoods, primary health care services
and communities. The key macroenvironments for interventions are the
transport and infrastructure sector, the media and the food sector.

Home truths about home detention

The Victorian Parliament has recently introduced a Bill which implements home detention as a sentencing option. Home detention is an intuitively appealing reform. The logic behind the proposal seems obvious. Prisons are expensive to run. There are too many offenders in prison. So let's take the cost out of prison by turning the homes of offenders into prisons: classic, user-pays, cost-shifting economics. The level of superficial appeal of the argument in favour of home detention is matched only by the depth of the fallacies underpinning some of the fundamental premises. The most basic of which is the assumption that offenders who are candidates for the new sanction should be in detention (of any kind) in the first place. Further, the narrow objective of reducing imprisonment is misguided. It should not be elevated to a cardinal sentencing objective?otherwise total success could be achieved by simply opening the prison gates. There are also other concerns about the appropriateness of home detention. The degree of pain it inflicts in many cases is questionable and it may also violate the principle that punishment should not be inflicted on the innocent. After examining the arguments for and against home detention, this article suggests the approach that should be adopted to achieve enlightened and meaningful sentencing reform.

Commonwealth legislative power and "non punitive" detention: a constitutional roadmap

In 2004 The High Court handed down a number of decisions concerning detention imposed for purposes allegedly unrelated to punishment. This paper outlines the way the Federal Constitution restricts (and also facilitates) the imposition of "non punitive detention" by our governments. Such laws (as passed by the Federal Legislature) are constitutionally valid provided they can be characterised as falling within a legislative head of power under  section 51 off he Constitution. The power to detain for non punitive purposes can be reposed by the Legislature in the either the Executive or Judicial arms of government. Detention by the Executive is non punitive (and therefore does not offend the separation of powers) even though it involves a deprivation of liberty, provided it is imposed for “legitimate non punitive purposes”.  Legitimacy is in turn determined by reference to the section 51 heads of power. Detention for non punitive purposes by the judicial arm of government is constitutionally valid provided that (i) a “judicial process ” is adopted and (ii) (arguably) there is some link (albeit tenuous) with a previous finding of criminal guilt. The continuing existence of the “constitutional immunity ”from being detained by other than judicial order identified by the High Court in its 1992 decision in Lim v Minister for Immigration is called into question.