The emergency powers in Bangladesh: means for subversion of the rule of law?

The Constitution of Bangladesh empowers the President to proclaim an emergency on the actual or imminent ground of war or external aggression or internal disturbance. However, the insertion of ‘internal disturbance’ in the Constitution as a ground for invoking emergency has provided the executive with the opportunity to proclaim all the five emergencies in Bangladesh on this vague ground for purposes other than that of securing the life of the nation. Furthermore, in the absence of any effective constitutional mechanisms for scrutinising the exercise of emergency powers and a time limit on the continuation of a state of emergency, some of the proclamations of emergency continued even after the alleged threat posed to the life of the nation was over to perpetuate the survival of the party in power by repressing any political threat to the regime. This Article, therefore, recommends for insertion in the Constitution of Bangladesh detailed norms providing for legal limits on the wide power of the executive concerning the proclamation, administration and termination of emergency with a view to ensure that emergencies can no longer be resorted to as the effective means of discarding the rule of law.

Directors' duty to use their powers for proper or permissable purposes

This article focuses generally on the interaction among several internal company law doctrines such as the supremacy of the articles of association; that other organs cannot interfere with powers exclusively conferred upon a particular organ; that courts will not readily interfere with internal company matters; that directors are under a duty to act in good faith and in the best interest of the company as a whole and under a duty to use their powers for proper or permissible purposes; and that there are some remedies available to shareholders if directors did not perform their powers for a proper or permissible purpose. The specific aim with the article is to establish when and why the courts will be prepared to set aside decisions by directors if they have taken them for an improper or impermissible purpose. The article concludes that the courts will be prepared to set the decisions of directors aside when they have used a particular power substantially or primarily for an improper or impermissible purpose. When the exercise of directors' powers is challenged under circumstances where there were both permissible and impermissible purposes for exercising a particular power, there is no alternative for the court but to inquire into the complex area of the state of mind of those who acted and the motive on which they acted. This is, in fact, second-guessing the decisions of directors.

Opting out of shareholder governance rights: a new perspective on contractual freedom in Australian corporate law

One of the classic debates in corporate law relates to whether the rules of corporate law are ar should be 'mandatory', in that companies must comply, or 'enabling' - meaning a set of default rules which companies have the choice of adopting or 'opting out' of through alternative contractual arrangements. The so-called 'mandatory/enabling' debate has been especially prominent in the United States fro numerous reasons, yet has also received some attention in Australia. That said, the extent to which companies can 'opt out' of corporate law has rarely been considered as a practical issue in Australia - particularly whether Australian companies can 'opt out' of provisions under the Corporations Act ("the Act"). However, just recently, two high-profile events in Australia have made 'opting out' of corporate law a relevant issue, especially the question of whether companies are free to 'opt out' of provisions of the Corporations Act  which provide express governance rights to shareholders. These events were Boral's constitutional amendment in 2003 to restrict the ability of shreholders to propose amendments to the company's constitution, and the contemplation and introduction of so-called 'pre-nuptial' agreements- designed to by-pass the right of shreholders to vote on removing directors in public companies. In the light of these two recent events, in this article the authors revisit the mandatory/enabling debate. However, rather than going over old ground as to whether a mandatory or enabling approach to corporate regulation is desirable, the authors approach the issue from a fresh perspective: that Australian Securitiesand Investments Commission's ("ASIC") existing relief powers under the Act should be extended to provide a means for companies to opt out of provisions containing shareholder governance rights.

Prevention of suicide : police powers, parliamentary intent and judicial interpretation

While in most countries suicide is no longer a crime, it is also acknowledged that the state has an interest in the preservation of human life, prevention of suicide, and protection of vulnerable persons from harming themselves. In a civil, secular and democratic society, however, the public law principle of state protective powers has to be balanced against the private law principle of personal autonomy (personal self-determination). Under the doctrine of autonomy, competent adults of sound mind can make legally binding voluntary choices, including the so-called ‘death-choice’ (refusal of life-sustaining or life-prolonging treatment as well as suicide). To add to the complexity, whereas the powers of the state in relation to suicide and its prevention have been codified, the concepts of personal autonomy and personal liberty are grounded in common law. Stuart v Kirkland–Veenstra [2008] VSCA 32, which is at present being considered by the High Court of Australia, exemplifies tensions that arise in the suicide-prevention area of jurisprudence. This article explores powers and duties of police officers in relation to suicide prevention and the notion of mental illness by reference to the Kirkland–Veenstra case, the relevant statutory framework and the common law.

The status of using drug detection dogs under Australian law

In recent years it has become increasingly common for drug detection dogs to be active in and around public transport, busy nightclub precincts, music festivals and dance parties. However, the legal status of police using drug detection dogs is anything but clear in many parts of Australia. The aim of this article is to outline the nature and scope of the powers available to police at common law and under statute that allow their use.

Beyond the separation of powers : judicial review and the regulatory proscription of terrorist organisations

Administrative law remains the key defence against an over-zealous executive arm of government, but administrative law needs to be understood in an international context. Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in relation to legislation designed to counter terrorist activities. The co-ordination of terrorist activities knows no borders, and state-centered executive action designed to address the threat of terrorism necessarily operates in a broader global environment. An important but controversial part of Australia's counter-terrorism legislation suite is the power to proscribe terrorist organisations. The authors contend that the scope of judicial review available in relation to decisions of the Commonwealth executive to proscribe terrorist organisations is inadequate and may jeapordise Australia's compliance with international standards, such as those provided in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Now is an opportune time to reassess the structure and operation of the power to proscribe organisations in Australia.

Wielding the big stick – Lessons for enforcing anti-discrimination law from the Fair Work Ombudsman

Anti-discrimination law is enforced by a person who has experienced discrimination by lodging a complaint at a statutory equal opportunity agency. The agency is responsible for receiving and resolving discrimination complaints and educating the community; it does not play a role in enforcing the law. The agency relies on ‘carrots’ to encourage voluntary compliance, but it does not wield any ‘sticks’. This is not the case in other areas of law, such as industrial relations, where the Fair Work Ombudsman is charged with enforcing the law — including the prohibition of discrimination in the workplace — and possesses the necessary powers to do so. British academics Hepple, Coussey and Choudhury developed an enforcement pyramid for equal opportunity. This article shows that the model used by the Fair Work Ombudsman reflects what Hepple, Coussey and Choudhury propose, while anti-discrimination law enforcement would be represented as a flat, rectangular structure. The article considers the Fair Work Ombudsman’s discrimination enforcement work to date and identifies some lessons that anti-discrimination law enforcement can learn from its experience.

Surveillance, criminal law and sovereighty

Seeking better understanding of the relationship between criminal law and surveillance demands investigating the evolving nature of sovereignty in an era of transnational digital information flows. While territorial boundaries determine the limits of police investigative and surveillance powers under the criminal law, several recent United States (US) examples demonstrate how new forms of extraterritorial surveillance that enable police to access online communications by foreign citizens and digital information stored in offshore locations are authorized by US courts. This discussion outlines how the processes of mutual legal assistance that ordinarily govern the search, seizure and transfer of digital evidence from one jurisdiction to another are increasingly considered to undermine police efficiency, even though they protect the due process rights afforded to crime suspects under established principles of sovereignty (Palmer and Warren 2013).

Upholding whose right? Discretionary police powers to punish, collective 'pre-victimisation and the dilution of individual rights

This article uses the example of Victoria’s alcohol-related banning notice provisions to explore the changing conception of balance within criminal justice processes. Despite the formalisation of individual rights within measures such as Victoria’s Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, the discretionary power of the police to issue on-the-spot punishments in response to actual or potential criminal behaviour has increased steadily. A key driver, evident across the parliamentary debates of the banning legislation, is a presumed need to protect the broader community of potential victims. As a result, the individual rights of those accused (but not necessarily convicted) of undesirable behaviours are increasingly subordinated to the pre-emptive protection of the law-abiding majority. This shift embodies a largely unsubstantiated notion of collective pre-victimisation. Significantly, despite the expectations of Victoria’s Charter, measures such as banning notices have been enacted with insufficient evidence of the underlying collective risk, of their likely effectiveness and without meaningful ongoing scrutiny. The motto of Victoria Police – Uphold the Right –appears to belie a growing uncertainty over whose rights should be upheld and how.