Meursault (and Caligula) avec de sade: on the relations between the literary absurds and Camus’s philosophical discourses

This article considers the relation between L'Etranger and Caligula, with Camus' philosophical discourse. It aims at mediocra firma between the idea that the literary 'absurds' just illustrate Camus' philosophy; and the idea that they are wholly autonomous from that philosophy. Following threads from Camus' own responses to Melville, du Gard and others, we argue that Meursault and the crazed emperor Caligula are not illustrations of the absurd, let alone Camusian ethical ideals. They embody 'temptations' to forms of philosophical suicide and murder Camus systematically opposed in his philosophical writings, whose paradigm in The Rebel is the Marquis de Sade. Rather than rebelling against the unjust irrationality of the world, these figures (either passively or actively) become agents of this irrationality. Camus the man, or his thinking, should not be identified with them, as such, any more than Shakespeare should be identified with his Iago, or sundry other villains.

Meta-philosophy of religion : the analytic-continental divide in philosophy of religion

How is the philosophical study of religion best pursued? Responses to this meta-philosophical question tend to recapitulate the analytic-Continental divide in philosophy in general. My aim is to examine the nature of this divide, particularly as it has manifested itself in the philosophy of religion. I begin with a comparison of the stylistic differences in the language of the two traditions, taking the work of Alvin Plantinga and John Caputo as exemplars of the analytic and Continental schools respectively. In order to account for these stylistic divergences, however, it is necessary to delve further into meta-philosophy. I go on to show how each philosophical school models itself on different theoretical practices, the analytic school mimicking the scientific style of inquiry, while in Continental philosophy it is the arts and humanities rather than the sciences that provide the model for philosophical discourse. By situating themselves in such different genres,  analytic and Continental philosophers have developed contrasting, if not mutually exclusive, methods for pursuing the philosophy of religion.

Pierre Hadot (1922-2010)

Pierre Hadot, classical philosopher and historian of philosophy, is best known for his conception of ancient philosophy as a bios or way of life (manière de vivre). His work has been widely influential in classical studies and on thinkers, including Michel Foucault. According to Hadot, twentieth- and twenty-first-century academic philosophy has largely lost sight of its ancient origin in a set of spiritual practices that range from forms of dialogue, via species of meditative reflection, to theoretical contemplation. These philosophical practices, as well as the philosophical discourses the different ancient schools developed in conjunction with them, aimed primarily to form, rather than only to inform, the philosophical student. The goal of the ancient philosophies, Hadot argued, was to cultivate a specific, constant attitude toward existence, by way of the rational comprehension of the nature of humanity and its place in the cosmos. This cultivation required, specifically, that students learn to combat their passions and the illusory evaluative beliefs instilled by their passions, habits, and upbringing. To cultivate philosophical discourse or writing without connection to such a transformed ethical comportment was, for the ancients, to be as a rhetorician or a sophist, not a philosopher. However, according to Hadot, with the advent of the Christian era and the eventual outlawing, in 529 C.E., of the ancient philosophical schools, philosophy conceived of as a bios largely disappeared from the West. Its spiritual practices were integrated into, and adapted by, forms of Christian monasticism. The philosophers’ dialectical techniques and metaphysical views were integrated into, and subordinated, first to revealed theology and then, later, to the modern natural sciences. However, Hadot maintained that the conception of philosophy as a bios has never completely disappeared from the West, resurfacing in Montaigne, Rousseau, Goethe, Thoreau, Nietzsche, and Schopenhauer, and even in the works of Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and Heidegger.

Hadot’s conception of ancient philosophy and his historical narrative of its disappearance in the West have provoked both praise and criticism. Hadot received a host of letters from students around the world telling him that his works had changed their lives, perhaps the most fitting tribute given the nature of Hadot’s meta-philosophical claims. Unlike many of his European contemporaries, Hadot’s work is characterized by lucid, restrained prose; clarity of argument; the near-complete absence of recondite jargon; and a gentle, if sometimes self-depreciating, humor. While Hadot was an admirer of Nietzsche and Heidegger, and committed to a kind of philosophical recasting of the history of Western ideas, Hadot’s work lacks any eschatological sense of the end of philosophy, humanism, or the West. Late in life, Hadot would report that this was because he was animated by the sense that philosophy, as conceived and practiced in the ancient schools, remains possible for men and women of his era: “from 1970 on, I have felt very strongly that it was Epicureanism and Stoicism which could nourish the spiritual life of men and women of our times, as well as my own” (PWL 280).

‘A cataclysm of truth from the crisis of falsehood’: reading Habermas on Calvino

Interest in the possibility of a Habermasian approach to literary criticism has recently been sparked by several book-length contributions from scholars working in the field of Frankfurt School Critical Theory. This article seeks to clarify the conceptual stakes in the current debate, which concern whether literature makes truth claims or merely imaginatively discloses new perceptions with a truth potential, by returning to Habermas’s most extended encounter with a literary work since the 1970s. Against the background of the philosophical issues, I re-read to Calvino’s highly self-reflexive If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller to show that in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas has managed to get everything backwards. Literature here reads philosophy alright, but not in the sense of the ludic deconstruction of rational argumentation into rhetorical play that Habermas supposes. Using the notion of an ontological poetics of self-reflexive literature, and with some help from Lacanian psychoanalysis, I interpret Calvino’s novel as a sustained meditation on the connection between authentic literature and the desire to read. In this light, it not only looks like Habermas has missed his polemical target, but, also, and more significantly, it becomes clear that abandonment of the link between literature and truth is misguided.

On a neglected argument in French philosophy: Sceptical humanism in Montaigne, Voltaire and Camus

This paper wants to draw out a common argument in three great philosophers and littérateurs in modern French thought: Michel de Montaigne, Voltaire, and Albert Camus. The argument makes metaphysical and theological scepticism the first premise for a universalistic political ethics, as per Voltaire's: "it is clearer still that we ought to be tolerant of one another, because we are all weak, inconsistent, liable to fickleness and error." The argument, it seems to me, presents an interestingly overlooked, deeply important and powerful contribution to the philosophical discourse of modernity. On one hand, theological and post-structuralist critics of "humanism" usually take the latter to depend either on an essentialist philosophical anthropology, or a progressive philosophy of history. The former, it is argued, is philosophically contestable and ethically contentious (since however we define the human "essence," we are bound to exclude some "others"). The latter, for better or worse, is a continuation of theological eschatology by another name. So both, if not "modernity" per se, should somehow be rejected. But an ethical universalism - like that we find in Montaigne, Bayle, Voltaire, or Camus - which does not claim familiarity with metaphysical or eschatological truths, but humbly confesses our epistemic finitude, seeing in this the basis for ethical solidarity, eludes these charges. On the other hand, philosophical scepticism plays a large role in the post-structuralist criticisms of modern institutions and ideas in ways which have been widely taken to license forms of ethics which problematically identify responsibility, with taking a stand unjustifiable by recourse to universalizable reasons. But, in Montaigne, Voltaire and Camus, our ignorance concerning the highest or final truths does not close off, but rather opens up, a new descriptive sensitivity to the foibles and complexities of human experience: a sensitivity reflected amply, and often hilariously, in their literary productions. As such, a critical agnosticism concerning claims about things "in the heavens and beneath the earth" does not, for such a "sceptical humanism," necessitate decisionism or nihilism. Instead, it demands a redoubled ethical sensitivity to the complexities and plurality of political life which sees the dignity of "really-existing" others, whatever their metaphysical creeds, as an inalienable first datum of ethical conduct and reflection. After tracking these arguments in Montaigne, Voltaire, and Camus, the essay closes by reflecting on, and contesting, one more powerful theological argument against modern agnosticism's allegedly deleterious effects on ethical culture: that acknowledging ignorance concerning the highest things robs us of the basis for awe or wonder, the wellspring of human beings' highest ethical, aesthetic, and spiritual achievements.

An historical critique of philosophical universalism through Foucault and Rorty

This thesis examines the critiques of modern philosophy by Foucault and Rorty, which use genealogical and philosophical arguments against the notion of universal truths being fundamental to knowledge. They promote the idea of the autonomy of the self, and the use of discourse to generate pragmatic action within society.

Being philosophical regarding the evidence of 'what works'.

In this paper I am arguing that the debate regarding ‘what works’ in education practice should become more philosophical. By becoming more philosophical professional educators will be enabled to further recognise how unscientific and undemocratic the research which claims to represent ‘what works’ currently is by understanding more clearly the nature of its ‘evidence-base’ and its relation to education. This paper is structured into three parts. The first will address the philosophical aspect which is intrinsic to the discourse of education itself. The second section will offer a differentiation between empiricism and science which is important if we are to recognise the limitations of empirical ‘evidence’ regarding ‘what works’. The third and final section will draw upon Biesta’s notion of the ‘democratic deficit’ to make the case that if the evidence regarding ‘what works’ is only empirical rather than scientific then it is not the sort of evidence appropriate to the discourse of education.

Beyond the rational museum : toward a discourse of inclusion

Museum discourse is not inclusive in that it neglects or negates the affective potential of museums. Affect is precognitive sensation, it is unexpected, and leaves a more lasting impression than re-cognition. The museum’s role in the shaping of histories, and its origins in class and gender exploitation are important areas of discourse, however, the focus on these issues also limits discourse. Ideologically driven critique seems unable to explain the experiential affect of exhibits of art and material culture. Arguably, an alternative museum with a contradictory set of meanings has always existed alongside the rational museum of critical discourse. Some critics do acknowledge that their disciplines seem unable to grapple with this ‘alternative museum’, however, there is not a critical vocabulary of affect with which to give it appropriate expression. Gilles Deleuze’s philosophical ideas give relevance to affect, and are useful in shaping or ‘shocking’ a way toward a more inclusive critical discourse, which might lead toward more inclusive museum practices.

Facilitating post traumatic growth

Background: Whilst negative responses to traumatic injury have been well documented in the literature, there is a small but growing body of work that identifies posttraumatic growth as a salient feature of this experience. We contribute to this discourse by reporting on the experiences of 13 individuals who were traumatically injured, had undergone extensive rehabilitation and were discharged from formal care. All participants were injured through involvement in a motor vehicle accident, with the exception of one, who was injured through falling off the roof of a house.
Methods: In this qualitative study, we used an audio-taped in-depth interview with each participant as the means of data collection. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed thematically to determine the participants' unique perspectives on the experience of recovery from traumatic injury. In reporting the findings, all participants' were given a pseudonym to assure their anonymity.
Results: Most participants indicated that their involvement in a traumatic occurrence was a springboard for growth that enabled them to develop new perspectives on life and living.
Conclusion: There are a number of contributions that health providers may make to the recovery of individuals who have been traumatically injured to assist them to develop new views of vulnerability and strength, make changes in relationships, and facilitate philosophical, physical and
spiritual growth.

Foucault's 'What is an author' : towards a critical discourse of practice as research

A vexed issue for many artistic researchers is related to the need for the artist/researcher to write about his or her own work in the research report or exegesis. In the creative arts, the outcomes that emerge from an alternative logic of practice are not easily quantifiable and it can be difficult to articulate conclusions objectively given the emotional and ideological investments and the intrinsically subjective dimension of the artistic process. How then, might the artist as researcher avoid on the one hand, what has been referred to as 'auto-connoisseurship', the undertaking of a thinly veiled labour of valorising what has been achieved in the creative work, or alternatively producing a research report that is mere description or history?

In this paper I suggest that a way of overcoming such a dilemma is for creative arts researchers to shift the critical focus away from the notion of the work as product, to an understanding of both studio enquiry and its outcomes as process. I’d like to draw on Michel Foucault’s essay ‘What is An Author ‘ to explore how we might move away from art criticism to the notion of a critical discourse of practice-led enquiry that involves viewing the artist as a researcher, and the artist/critic as a scholar who comments on the value of the artistic process as the production of knowledge.

Foucault’s essay provides artistic researchers with a template for more objective and distanced discourse on the practice-led research process and its writing. It allows researchers to locate themselves within contexts of theory and practice and provides an analytical framework though which researchers might locate themselves and their work within the broader social arena and field of research, As I will show with reference to the work of Donna Haraway and a number of commentaries on Pablo Picasso’s Demioselles d’Avignon, an application of Foucault’s ideas need not negate those subjective and situated aspects of practice as research.

Depression and its expression : art as problem solver

This workshop will focus on the ways in which ollr Journal Double Dialogues dealt with the question of the 'Anatomy of Pain'. In this workshop, by a process of demonstration and interaction, we will look at the theme of the representation of pain and engage with the ways in which different disciplines (psychological. visual, performative, philosophical. aesthetic and literary) explored this question. Emphasis will be given to the 'double dialogue' nature of the discourse in which practitioners of the arts have found a 'language' from aesthetics, history, theory, and philosophy that has succeeded in establishing a dialogue between the art-work and the discourse that might spring from the work itself or provide a relevant context. This session will draw on the e.xpertise of the audience for discussions and experiment within the Double Dialogue model.