Optimal second best taxation of addictive goods in dynamic general equilibrium: a revenue raising perspective

In this paper we derive conditions under which optimal tax rates for addictive goods exceed tax rates for non-addictive consumption goods within a rational addiction framework where exogenous government spending cannot be financed with lump sum taxes. We reexamine classic results on optimal commodity taxation and find a rich set of new findings. Two dynamic effects exist. First, households anticipating higher future addictive tax rates reduce current addictive consumption, so they will be less addicted when the tax rate increases. Therefore, addictive tax revenue falls prior to the tax increase. Surprisingly, the optimal tax rate on addictive goods is generally decreasing in the strength of tolerance, since strong tolerance strengthens this tax anticipation effect. Second, high current tax rates on addictive goods make households less addicted in the future, affecting all future tax revenues in a way which depends on how elasticities are changing over time. Classic results on uniform commodity taxation emerge as special cases when elasticities are constant and the addiction function is homogeneous of degree one. Finally, we also study features of addictive goods such as complementarity to leisure that, while not directly related to the definition of addiction, are nonetheless properties many addictive goods display.

Optimal tax mix with merit goods

This paper deals with optimal taxation in a two‐class economy with two private commodities and labour. We derive optimal non‐linear income and linear commodity taxes in the presence of merit goods. We formulate merit good arguments via a pathology of individual choice. We assume weak separability between consumption and leisure and show how the standard optimal tax results are modified due to merit good considerations.

Interjurisdictional allocation of multinational banking income : aligning taxation principles with economic activity

This thesis argues that one type of multinational entity – the multinational bank – poses particularly significant challenges to the international tax regime in terms of its current profit allocation rules. Multinational banks are a unique subset of multinational entities, and as a consequence of their unique traits, the traditional international tax regime foes not yield an optimal interjurisdictional allocation of taxing rights. The opportunity for tax minimisation, achievable because of the unique traits, and realised through exploitation of the traditional source and transfer pricing regime, results in a jurisdictional distribution of taxing rights which does not reflect economic reality. There are two distinct ways in which the traditional international tax regime fails to reflect economic activity. The first way that economic activity may not be reflected in the distribution of the taxing rights to income from multinational banking is through the application of traditional source rules. The traditional sources rules allocate income where transactions are completed rather than where the intermediation services are arranged. As a result of their unique commercial role as financial intermediaries, by separating intermediary economic activity from legal transactions with third parties, multinational banks may distort the true location of the activity giving rise to income. The second way in which the traditional tax regime may fail to reflect economic activity is through the traditional transfer pricing regime requiring related or internal transaction to be undertaken at an arm’s length price. The arm’s length pricing requirement is theoretically deficient in its failure to recognise the highly integrated nature of multinational banking. In practice, the arm’s length pricing requirement is also difficult, if not impossible, to apply to multinational banks because of the requirement of comparability. The difficulties associated with the current model have resulted in a subtle move by multinational banks towards global formulary apportionment. This thesis concludes that, for the international taxation of multinational banks, the current source regime should be replaced with a system that allocates profits for tax purposes on the basis of income source, with source determined using a unitary taxation or global formulary apportionment system. It is argued that global formulary apportionment is a theoretically superior model that provides both jurisdiction to tax and allocated profits on the basis of the economic activity that generates the income.

Optimal redistribution when educational background matters

Higher education plays an important role in determining individuals lifetime
earnings. In turn, the decision to become educated depends to a large extent on innate ability and on family characteristics, including both family
wealth and educational background. In this paper, we abstract from family
income differences to concentrate on the effects of fiscal policies on the
decision to undertake higher education when the educational background
matters. In a dynamic framework, where successive generations are linked by educational background, we consider a government that uses both linear income taxation and a lump-sum subsidy to education. Conditions for
optimality of each policy are derived. The factors that determine the sign
and magnitude of the tax rate and the subsidy are identified and include
concerns for redistribution, efficiency and the educational externality on
future generations

The holy grail : the search for the optimal gaar

The sustainability of a taxation system relies in part in reducing effective tax avoidance as far as is possible. Tax avoidance impacts on the economy both because it results in revenue loss and because it diverts people into devising, marketing and implementing avoidance arrangements, rather than engaging in economically productive activities. Revenue losses in turn weaken the government's ability to formulate and implement fiscal policies. Moreover, the very integrity of a tax system, necessary for its long-term sustainability, is attacked by tax avoidance. The goal of equity is undermined by tax avoidance as typically these schemes are accessed by the wealthy. Thus, tax avoidance results in an unfair shift in the tax burden to the less wealthy in society. As one commentator recently noted, combating 'tax avoidance ... will serve to lessen the overall burden on all taxpayers'. Further, legislative responses to tax avoidance increase the complexity of a taxation scheme. Tax avoidance schemes also undermine the neutrality of a taxation system by distorting trade and investment decisions. Thus, tax avoidance attacks every aspect of a fair, and hence, sustainable, taxation system.