Agency theory and accounting research : an overview of some conceptual and empirical issues

This chapter aims to give the reader an overview of agency theory (AT) and its application in accounting research. It delineates the basic assumptions and concepts of AT and identifies the various measures that can be undertaken to minimise agency costs. The chapter also provides a summary of the commonalities and differences across the three major paradigms adopted by accounting researches when using an agency framework: Principal-Agent, Transaction Cost Economics and Positivist (Rochester) model. Further, a review of some recent theoretical and empirical studies on the design of optimal contracts, namely those relating to implicit contracts, multi-agents and multi-period issues is undertaken. Several suggestions are made for future studies adopting an AT-based approach.

Dynamic price discrimination with customer recognition

This paper studies a general two-period model of product line pricing with customer recognition. Specifically, we consider a monopolist who can sell vertically differentiated products over two periods to heterogeneous consumers. Each consumer demands one unit of the product in each period. In the second period, the monopolist can condition the price-quality offers on the observed purchasing behavior in the first period. In this setup, the monopolist can price discriminate consumers in two dimensions: by quality as well as by purchase history. We fully characterize the monopolist's optimal pricing strategy when there are two types of consumers. When the type space is a continuum, we show that there is no fully separating equilibrium, and some properties of the optimal contracts (price-quality pairs) are characterized within the class of partitional perfect Bayesian equilibria.