Effective and strategic use of electronic reverse auctions

This paper reports the findings of an empirical study of Electronic Reverse Auctions (e-RAs). This study seeks to better understand the underlying and emerging issues in e-RAs to comprehend the implications of e-RAs on organizational procurement. The study contributes to practice and research by providing insight into emerging e-RA adoption issues, and by discussing strategies for improving e-RA processes, thus improving the effectiveness of e-RAs.

A winner determination algorithm for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with reserve prices

Combinatorial auction mechanisms have been used in many applications such as resource and task allocation, planning and time scheduling in multi-agent systems, in which the items to be allocated are complementary or substitutable. The winner determination in combinatorial auction itself is a NP-complete problem, and has attracted many attentions of researchers world wide. Some outstanding achievements have been made including CPLEX and CABOB algorithms on this topic. To our knowledge, the research into multi-unit combinatorial auctions with reserve prices considered is more or less ignored. To this end, we present a new algorithm for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with reserve prices, which is based on Sandholm's work. An efficient heuristic function is developed for the new algorithm. Experiments have been conducted. The experimental results show that auctioneer agent can find the optimal solution efficiently for a reasonable problem scale with our algorithm.

Trading in open marketplace using trust and risk

In this paper, we propose buying and selling models for agents to trade in the open multi-agent marketplace. Unlike auctions, we take into account of the fact that agents trading in such open environments has to maximize their profits and at the same time, protect themselves from fraud and deception. We attempt to address this issue by incorporating the element of trust and risk management into our proposed buying and selling model. During buying, agents learn to select their partners based on the trustworthiness of the potential partner as well as its personal risk attitude. During selling, agents learn to increase the chances of winning a deal by adjusting their profit rate, which is a measure that considers both trust and risk. The novelty of this proposal is that it ensures agents continuing to seek maximum expected utility in a dynamic trading environment. Our experimental results confirm the feasibility of our approach.

The adverse effect of dummy auction bids on market value

The popularity of an auction as a means of selling residential real estate has increased markedly in recent years. The effectiveness of an auction program is heavily promoted by most real estate agents, claiming it to be the best means of attracting the best price from the highest bidder, It is based on the theory of gathering all buyers together at a publicised time, and then offering the property for sale to the open market.

In theory, the person most willing to buy the property will have the highest bid, supposedly agreeing at market value with the vendor (although above the vendor's reserve I. Unfortunately, the practice of dummy bidding has recently resurfaced and highlights serious flaws in the auction system, with hundreds of residential auctions conducted across Australia every weekend.

Clearly, it is in the vendor's best interests land the auctioneer's best interests, who is paid even more by the vendor if the price is higherl to achieve the highest offer from the last bidder. The tactic of dummy bids is designed to deceive genuine purchasers into a false sense of perception, where there appears to be more competition for the property than there actually exists.

This paper examines the auction process with the emphasis placed on the practice of dummy biding, It considers the broad implications for the definition of market value and also the overall residential market. Useful advice is also included for real estate valuers relying upon auction sale properties in their market analysis. As well as strongly supporting the auction concept, the authors suggest improvements to the overall auction process to ensure relevance to the definition of market value is maintained.

Property transactions : a note on ethics

Some activities that are applied in the property market to facilitate transactions have the potential to lead to unethical behaviour. Two conditions required for a sale price to be acceptable as market value are that the transaction is at arm’s length and the parties to the transaction are knowledgeable and prudent. The well-known difficulties associated with access to market pricing information are exacerbated by several of these activities including dummy bidding at auctions, two-tier marketing and the provision of lease incentives. Added to these is a common requirement that any negotiation be commercial-in-confidence. The lack of information has the potential to distort the market and this has been well publicised in recent times particularly in the residential market.
The definition of market value is visited and the nature of ethics in property transactions is outlined. Several examples of activities that could lead to unethical behaviour are described. It is concluded that unethical behaviour is hard to identify. Some recommendations are included for consideration and discussion.

Residential auction clearance rates – what do they really mean?

The residential market in Melbourne is often referred to as the ‘auction capital of the world’ with approximately 30-35% of housing transfers undertaken via the auction process, most of which are conducted on the weekend and then reported in the media the following day. The most quoted measurement of auction success is via the clearance rate which simply indicates the proportion of signed contracts of sale within the auction process. At the same time the clearance rate can have a relatively large variance where the residential market can traditionally range from very good (i.e. a high clearance rate) to very poor (i.e. a low clearance rate). The subsequent effect on the market can directly increase or decrease demand, predominantly based only on this single measure of the perceived level of auction clearance rates only.

This paper examines the concept of the auction clearance rates and the heavy reliance on the only one measure of success (i.e. the clearance rates), regardless of other variables. The emphasis is placed on the auction clearance rate as one measure of demand in the housing market but within the context of the definition of market value i.e. willing buyer-willing seller. This is supported by a discussion about other variables including the asking price, the auction process itself, marketing considerations and seasonal adjustments. The findings provide an insight into how to correctly interpret the auction clearance rate in the context of the overall supply-demand interactions. Whilst the auction process is clearly an integral part of the residential transfer process it is essential that the auction clearance rate is used with caution and also in conjunction with other variables.

Congestion and optimal immigration policy

This paper presents a model to explain the stylized fact that many countries have a low ratio of migrants in their population while some countries have a high ratio of migrants. Immigration improves the income of the domestic residents, but migrants also increase the congestion of public services. If migrants are unskilled and therefore pay low taxes, and the government does not limit access to these services, then the welfare of the domestic residents decreases with the number of migrants. Visa auctions can lower the cost of immigration control and substitute legal migrants for illegal migrants. If the government decides to limit the access of migrants to public services, immigration control becomes unnecessary and the optimal number of migrants can be very large.

Robot coordination for energy-balanced matching and sequence dispatch of robots to events

Given a set of events and a set of robots, the dispatch problem is to allocate one robot for each event to visit it. In a single round, each robot may be allowed to visit only one event (matching dispatch), or several events in a sequence (sequence dispatch). In a distributed setting, each event is discovered by a sensor and reported to a robot. Here, we present novel algorithms aimed at overcoming the shortcomings of several existing solutions. We propose pairwise distance based matching algorithm (PDM) to eliminate long edges by pairwise exchanges between matching pairs. Our sequence dispatch algorithm (SQD) iteratively finds the closest event-robot pair, includes the event in dispatch schedule of the selected robot and updates its position accordingly. When event-robot distances are multiplied by robot resistance (inverse of the remaining energy), the corresponding energy-balanced variants are obtained. We also present generalizations which handle multiple visits and timing constraints. Our localized algorithm MAD is based on information mesh infrastructure and local auctions within the robot network for obtaining the optimal dispatch schedule for each robot. The simulations conducted confirm the advantages of our algorithms over other existing solutions in terms of average robot-event distance and lifetime.