Politicised pagodas and veiled resistance : contested urban space in Burma.

The urban landscapes of Yangon and Mandalay in Burma (Myanmar) exhibit a rich cultural layering and complex blending of urban forms and architectural styles. But while both cities today are shaped by contemporary economic and political realities, they also clearly reflect
their historical origins—Yangon as the British colonial capital and Mandalay as the last seat of the monarchy. Burma’s ancient religious monuments, monarchical and colonial heritage on the one hand, and new religious edifices, international standard hotels, commercial enterprises, new public buildings and satellite towns on the other hand, represent the two poles of the dialectic of tradition and modernity. The landscapes, as symbolic representations, have been appropriated by
the authoritarian military regime, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) for nation building purposes. But the urban landscapes are also contested and appropriated in symbolic ways and invested with meanings as sites of resistance and struggle by those in opposition, and
are thus contested sites where the power relations of domination and resistance intersect. The paper illustrates these themes with examples drawn from Yangon and Mandalay.

Australian and commonwealth republicanism

When republics, beginning with India in 1949, were first admitted to the Commonwealth of Nations, Australia remained strongly attached to the Crown and the King’s (later the Queen’s) role as Head of the Commonwealth. Indeed, many Australians had seen a shared Crown as axiomatic, and a symbol of Commonwealth unity. Despite bursts of republicanism in Australia during the 19th and 20th centuries, it was not until the 1990s that a republic appeared likely. One historic driver of anti-British Australian republicanism has been the Irish heritage of many Australians. As republicanism grew, it was important that Australia could remain in the Commonwealth as a republic. The past decade has seen a stronger sentiment in Australia than in the other ‘old Dominions’—New Zealand and Canada—that national independence and identity require the symbol of a home-grown head of state, rather than one seen as British. The growth of republicanism in such countries, and in Britain itself, would be likely to encourage republicanism in Australia. Australia’s republican majority has been frustrated by its inability to agree on a model for parliamentary selection or direct election of the president. No Commonwealth country provides a model which Australians find compelling.

Democracy building in post-Saddam Iraq : 'historical memory' and 'primitive democracy'

Iraq’s long and complex past has played a particularly poignant role in establishing and legitimating the various political movements that have ascended to power since the nation state was first created by the British in the early 1920s (Davis, 2005b). For example, the installed Hashemite monarchy that ruled Iraq until the 1958 revolution utilised their ancestral connection to the Prophet Muhammad to legitimate their claim of being the rightful legatees of the Arab lands, while later Saddam Hussein invoked the power of Iraq’s Mesopotamian past to build nationalism and unite the people against ancient enemies such as during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s.What is problematic about these examples of ‘historical memory’ in Iraq is that they have also been used to justify a series of autocratic and despotic regimes that have attempted to quash Iraq’s civil society and curtail any semblance of democratic reform. However, this paper argues that such ‘historical memories’ may well be useful in reinvigorating the Iraqi public sphere and enabling the transition from despotism to democracy. To do this, this paper focuses on the ancient Mesopotamian practise of ‘Primitive Democracy’ and argues that reinvigorating such histories may serve to legitimate and promote democratic governance within Iraq.

Running on empty : 'modernising' the British and Australian labour parties

Australia's cultural cringe towards Britan does not just focus on the monarchy. Many in the ALP and the media pay undue deference to Tony Blair's so-called new Third Way. This book shows why the ALP needs to reassess its own history and examines the complex reality of how it compaes with the British Labor Party.

Iraq and the Arab revolutions : protesting the failure to democratise governance

As the Arab Revolutions swept across the Middle East and North Africa in late 2010 and into 2011, Iraqis were confronted with the failures of their own democracy to deliver on the many promises made to them since 2003. This led to weeks of scattered protests across Iraq, culminating in the “Day of Rage” (February 25, 2011) in which thousands of protestors took to the streets in at least 17 separate demonstrations across the country following Friday prayers. On the surface, these protests shared much in common with others across the region: the use of Facebook and other social media to promote the protests, and the focus on corruption, unemployment and poor public infrastructure. Also similar was the reaction of key Iraqi political figures such as Maliki and Barzani who met Iraqi protests with a mixture of brutal suppression and modest political and economic concessions. However, as this paper will demonstrate, upon closer inspection the Iraqi protests are in fact very different to others across the MENA and are therefore among the most significant for the future of democracy in the region. The Iraqi people were not protesting against an autocratic regime or an entrenched monarchy that had held power for decades, but a relatively new – and supposedly ‘democratic’ - political elite who had been brought to power in the wake of the US invasion. Indeed, while protestors across the region called for more democracy in the form of a written constitution, free and fair elections, a robust media sphere and the rule of law, Iraqis were protesting against the failures of the Iraqi government to democratise such mechanisms of governance (all of which they more or less have). They felt routinely disenfranchised by a state that has manipulated the very institutions and discourses of democracy to retain, rather than diffuse, power.

The Assyrians

This chapter seeks to extend earlier works on Mesopotamian democracy to a civilisation that is not only typically excluded from such discussions of democracy in the ancient Near East, but generally considered to be among the region’s most bloodthirsty and bellicose: the Assyrians. On the one hand it cannot be denied that the Assyrians went through periods of aggressive expansion, that they were cruel to at least some of their enemies and that the more militant Assyrian kings struck fear into the hearts of men and women across the region (I:106-110, 113; II:1, 54-6 in: Grayson 1991: 201). On the other hand, however, it is peculiar that the intermittent war-mongering of the Assyrians is seen not only as ‘a modern myth exaggerated beyond all proportion’ (Parpola 2003: 1060), but also seen to exclude them from practicing any form of democracy. This is starkly inconsistent with the contemporary assessment of other societies of the ancient world, such as the Greeks or Romans who were both belligerent and at least nominally democratic. To give one example of this double standard, Jana Pecirkova argues that while the Greek polis enabled the birth of science, philosophy and the rule of law, the Assyrians were not able to distinguish ‘between the rational and the irrational, between reality and illusion’ (Pecirkova 1985: 155). The reason for this, according to Pecrikova, is simple: their ‘only alternative to monarchy … was anarchy … Political decisions were arbitrary in character and not governed by any laws or generally acknowledged and accepted rules’ and the ‘people were the passive subjects of political decision-making’ (Pecirkova 1985: 166-8). This chapter, while cautious not to over-state the democratic tendencies of the Assyrians, takes Pecirkova’s argument to task by examining the complex functioning of power and politics, the checks and balances on monarchical authority, the rule of law and the sophisticated intellectual scene of the three key epochs of ancient Assyrian civilisation.

The Assyrians

This chapter seeks to extend earlier works on Mesopotamian democracy to a civilisation that is not only typically excluded from such discussions of democracy in the ancient Near East, but generally considered to be among the region’s most bloodthirsty and bellicose: the Assyrians. On the one hand it cannot be denied that the Assyrians went through periods of aggressive expansion, that they were cruel to at least some of their enemies and that the more militant Assyrian kings struck fear into the hearts of men and women across the region (I:106-110, 113; II:1, 54-6 in: Grayson 1991: 201). On the other hand, however, it is peculiar that the intermittent war-mongering of the Assyrians is seen not only as ‘a modern myth exaggerated beyond all proportion’ (Parpola 2003: 1060), but also seen to exclude them from practicing any form of democracy. This is starkly inconsistent with the contemporary assessment of other societies of the ancient world, such as the Greeks or Romans who were both belligerent and at least nominally democratic. To give one example of this double standard, Jana Pecirkova argues that while the Greek polis enabled the birth of science, philosophy and the rule of law, the Assyrians were not able to distinguish ‘between the rational and the irrational, between reality and illusion’ (Pecirkova 1985: 155). The reason for this, according to Pecrikova, is simple: their ‘only alternative to monarchy … was anarchy … Political decisions were arbitrary in character and not governed by any laws or generally acknowledged and accepted rules’ and the ‘people were the passive subjects of political decision-making’ (Pecirkova 1985: 166-8). This chapter, while cautious not to over-state the democratic tendencies of the Assyrians, takes Pecirkova’s argument to task by examining the complex functioning of power and politics, the checks and balances on monarchical authority, the rule of law and the sophisticated intellectual scene of the three key epochs of ancient Assyrian civilisation.

Her Majesty moves: Sarah Bernhardt, Queen Elizabeth and the development of motion pictures

Sarah Bernhardt, the greatest theatrical star of the late nineteenth century, enabled and even promoted the association of early film with the British monarchy. She did this literally, by playing the role of Queen Elizabeth in Queen Elizabeth (Les Amours de la Reine Elisabeth, Henri Desfontaines and Louis Mercanton, 1912). Bernhardt also promoted the association of the cinema with monarchy symbolically, making the medium a new empathetic vehicle for the development of celebrity mystique and global power.