Excess and mimesis in organization theory: emancipation from within?

In organizational analysis it can be argued that 'radical separatism'—in the guise of the original 'agenda' for Radical Organization Theory (see Benson, 1977a; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980) or more recently that for Critical Management Studies (see Alvesson and Willmott, 1992; Fournier and Grey, 2000; Casey, 2002; Grey, 2004)—has failed to breach the hegemony of functionalist orthodoxy, and notably so when it comes to practice. Given this failure, we speculate, upon the potential for a different emancipatory approach, one based theoretically on the fluid process of 'undecidability'. Unusually our approach attempts to undermine the conventions of functionalist organization theory from within. In brief, we speculate upon the adoption and enactment of Luce Irigaray's (1985, 1991) strategy of mimicry as a means to illuminate the notion of 'excess' in organization theory. To liberate the feminine, Irigaray mimics the symbolic representation of the female body to excess so as to expose the contradictions of phallocentric discourse. When applied to organization theory, this sees a deliberate mimicking of critiques of radical separatism so as to make explicit the latter's imprisonment within functionalism. Through excessive mimicking of the functionalists' critique, the radical/critical organization theorist may become cognizant of, but perhaps not so subjugated by, the hegemony of functionalist discourse.

Beyond mimesis : place, interpretation and response

My study examines the subjective nature of artistic interpretation through the notion of mimesis as process or transformation of material. Influential factors that mediate in the artistic process, such as memory, reflection and an awareness of cultural analogy and metaphor, are examined and related to a specific project in the studio, where the mediation process is further influenced by the materials used to produce the images. My studies of the concept of mimesis have revealed an intermediary realm that exists in the space between empirical reality and its interpretation. Throughout history the process of mimesis has been integral to all forms of the arts. In Plato's time the production of an image that simulated things as they appeared to the eye was considered a desired ideal. Aristotle later introduced developments which extended this concept to include a refiguring or reforming of material derived from the original source, making new connections between existing factors and in this transformation bringing new meanings to a symbolically constituted world. This discussion of the representation of reality, the influence of a dialogue between notions of imitation and the recreation of material continues throughout the exegesis. My study emphasises the interpretive stage of the mimetic process where a consideration of these themes is most relevant and some of the factors that can influence its outcome. It is my opinion that the production of images in response to the particularities of place can be defined in three stages. Firstly, the experience of the place; secondly, the beginning and maturation of the idea or concept; where mimesis takes place, and thirdly, the production of the art work in response. This process is illustrated in Part 2 of the exegesis, where the development of the studio work is documented and linked with the themes discussed in Part 1. The geographic site or place I selected to study is adjacent to Mt. Noorat, a volcanic site in the Western district of Victoria; the surrounding plains are littered with scoria that has been thrown out of the volcano thousands of years ago. Early British, Scottish and Irish settlers to this region used the stone to construct fences reminiscent of their homeland, through this activity they cleared the land and confined and protected their stock. My interests are in factors that include - the material of the stone, notions of enclosure and safety, of boundaries and circumscribed space, and of the cultural reflection that has taken place in this reconstruction of Eurocentric vision. These walls also represent the means by which land was enclosed and property defined, moving from a situation of public access to notions of ownership and the annexation of land for individual gain. Around each point of eruption, the craggy volcanic scoria has been used to create a constructed landscape which both symbolises and mirrors the Anglo - Celtic origins of the people. I have used the legend of Narcissus to illustrate the self-reflective and introspective processes that the settlers invoked in their attempts to come to terms with a strange land. I consider that the story of Narcissus, who fell in love with his own reflection, finds a parellel in the creation of the walls. The re-creation of artifacts from their own cultural environment provided the settlers with a familiar 'face' in an alien world; a reassurance of the familiar in an unfamiliar terrain. Part of this study is an investigation of this notion of landscape as cultural reflection. Geographers have long known that landscape is a cultural construct, an historically evolving ideal manifested in painting, prints and drawings as well as poetry, gardens and parks. One can view these constructions as illustrations or images of meaning which constitute representations of cultural ideals. The neo-classical influence reflected in the paintings of artists who accompanied the early expeditions to Australia demonstrates these themes. The medium of the mirror provides the opportunity to suggest aspects of a cultural reflection and an awareness of identity that has relevance to contemporary Australian culture, therefore, I have allowed it to play a major role throughout this study. Its role in mimesis, firstly, as a reflection in an imitative sense is established, then in its refigurative role, in which the similarities between the original and the reformed rely more on correlative factors than representation. I have used examples from the history of art to illustrate this potential. The formation and development of a narrative involving reflection threads throughout the thesis, both in the visual presentation and in the exegesis. The production of a body of paintings, drawings and sculpture reflect my interpretation and response to the particular site. The correspondences between these works and my theoretical concerns is articulated in the exegesis. The metaphor implied by the use of the walls as agents of enclosure also refers to the capacity of the individual to be confined by notional boundaries and restrictive practices where totalising systems of thought dominate theoretical debate and restrict its freedom. I have used images where gaps in the walls represent the potential implicit to the concept of liminal space, where the spectator moves from one physical space to another and from one stage of development to another. The threshold of this opening in the walls becomes the site where transformation can take place, a metaphor for the mimetic process where the initial experience is translated and transformed into the final product. The paintings, drawings and other works in this series fulfil the role of marks on the surface of the mirror, separating the initial experience from the processes of memory, reflection and speculation. The works draw attention to the materiality that they represent and yet provide the opportunity for new insights and experiences, allowing the subjective nature of artistic activity to combine symbolic elements relating to the site, resulting in the production of meaning.

Inspiration and mimesis in Plato's criticism of poetry

Plato criticizes poetry in several of his dialogues, beginning with Apology, his first work, and ending with Laws, his last. In these dialogues, his criticism of poetry can be divided into two streams: poetry is criticized for either being divinely inspired, or because it is mimetic or imitative of reality. However, of the dialogues which criticize poetry in these ways, it is not until Laws that Plato mentions both inspiration and mimesis together, and then it is only in a few sentences. Furthermore, nowhere in the dialogues does Plato discuss their relationship. This situation has a parallel in the secondary literature. While much work has been done on inspiration or mimesis in Plato’s criticism of poetry, very little work exists which discusses the connection between them. This study examines Plato’s treatment - in the six relevant dialogues - of these two poetic elements, inspiration and mimesis, and shows that a relationship exists between them. Both can be seen to relate to two important Socratic-Platonic concerns: the care of the soul and the welfare of the state. These concerns represent a synthesis of Socratic moral philosophy with Platonic political beliefs. In the ‘inspiration’ dialogues, Ion, Apology, Meno, Phaedrus and Laws, poetic inspiration can affect the Socratic exhortation which considers the care of the individual soul. Further, as we are told in Apology, Crito and Gorgias, it is the good man, the virtuous man - the one who cares for his soul - who also cares for the welfare of the state. Therefore, in its effect on the individual soul, poetic inspiration can also indirectly affect the state. In the ‘mimesis’ dialogues, Republic and Laws, this same exhortation, on the care of the soul, is posed, but it is has now been rendered into a more Platonic form - as either the principle of specialization - the ‘one man, one job’ creed of Republic, which advances the harmony between the three elements of the soul, or as the concord between reason and emotion in Laws. While in Republic, mimesis can damage the tripartite soul's delicate balance, in Laws, mimesis in poetry is used to promote the concord. Further, in both these dialogues, poetic mimesis can affect the welfare of the state. In Republic, Socrates notes that states arc but a product of the individuals of which they are composed Therefore, by affecting the harmony of the individual soul, mimesis can then undermine the harmony of the state, and an imperfect political system, such as a timarchy, an oligarchy, a democracy, or a tyranny, can result. However, in Laws, when it is harnessed by the philosophical lawgivers, mimesis can assist in the concord between the rulers and the ruled, thus serving the welfare of the state. Inspiration and mimesis can thus be seen to be related in their effect on the education of both the individual, in the care of the soul, and the state, in its welfare. Plato's criticism of poetry, therefore, which is centred on these two features, addresses common Platonic concerns: in education, politics, ethics, epistemology and psychology.

Organization, decoration

While organizational decoration has been of interest to those who study organizational artefacts, we suggest four ways in which decoration is worthy of fuller attention in organizational studies. First, decoration, ornament and embellishment are not only what we see, but also what we do as managers, consultants, writers and designers of both physical and project spaces. Second, and drawing on the art/craft debate, we note that decoration occupies contested and even liminal aesthetic position and that ‘decorative art’ lies betwixt and between fine art and craft. Neither fully accepted nor fully marginalized, decoration is ‘only applied’ and embodies shifting tensions between form and function. Third, we review the particular negotiations of these tensions at the Bauhaus, a controversial and highly influential aesthetic organization in early 20th century Germany. Fourth, we suggest that decoration, like disorganization, provides a source of complication for organizational studies that are neither pure nor parsimonious.

Second person : a point of view? The function of the second person pronoun in narrative prose fiction

This thesis looks at the functions and effects of the ‘second-person’ pronoun in narrative prose fiction, with particular focus on the fluidity and ambiguity of the mode that I will call Protean-'you.' It is a mode in which it is unclear whether the ‘you’ is a character, the narrator, a reader/narratee, or no-one in particular—or a combination of these—so that readers find ‘second-person’ utterances at once familiar and deeply strange. I regard the ‘second person’ as a special case of narrative ‘person’ that, at its most fluid, can produce an experience of reading quite unlike that of reading traditional ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ narrative. Essentially, this unique experience comes about because Protean-‘you’ neglects to constitute the stable modes of subjectivity that readers expect to find within narrative textuality. These stable modes of subjectivity, modelled on what I will refer to as Cartesianism’s hegemonic notion of the self, have been thoroughly formalised and naturalised within the practices of ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ narrative. The Protean-‘you’ form of ‘second-person’ narrative, conversely, is a mode of narrative discourse that puts readers in a place of doubt and uncertainty, its unsettling equivocations forcefully disrupting accustomed, mimetic explanations of narrative and denying us access to the foundational, authorising subject of classical Cartesian thought. Rather than founding a notion of ‘second-person’ narrative and narrative ‘person’ generally on Cartesianism's ‘self-ish’ logic of unified, privatised identity, I turn to C.S, Peirce's notion of the semiotic self and to developments in post-structuralist thought. Essentially, the conception of subjectivity underpinning my arguments is Peirce's proposition that the self is to be conceived of not as a cogito, but as a sign by which the conscious entity knows itself. It is a sign, moreover, that is constantly being re-read, reinterpreted, so that identity is never self-complete. This reconception of subjectivity is necessary because 1 will argue that the effects of Protean-‘you’ arise in some part from a tension between Cartesianism's hegemony and what philosophical pragmatism and post-structuralism glimpse as the actual condition of the human subject—the subject as dispersed and contingent rather than unified and authoritative. Most discussions of ‘second-person’ narrative conceive of the mode in terms of implicit communicative relations, in some measure instituting Cartesianism's notion of the intentionalist self at the centre of literary meaning. I contrast the paradigmatic address model that arises from this conception against a model that approaches the analysis of ‘second-person’ narrative modality in terms of a referential function, that is, in terms of the object or objects referred to deictically by the ‘second-person’ pronoun. Two principal functions of ‘second-person’ textuality are identified and discussed at length. The first is generalisation, which is rarely dissipated altogether, a situation that contributes to the ambiguities of the pronoun's reference in much ‘second-person’ fiction. The second principal function is that of address, that is, the allocutionary function. Clearly, although stories that continually refer to a ‘you’ can seem quite baffling and unnatural, not all ‘second-person’ narratives unsettle the reader. In order to make the ‘second person's’ outlandish narratives knowable and stable, we bring to bear on them in our habits of reading whatever hermeneutic frames, whatever interpretive keys, come to hand, including a large number of unexceptional forms of literary and ‘natural’ discourse that employ the ‘second-person’ pronoun. These forms include letter writing and internal dialogue (i.e., talking to one's self), the language of the courtroom, the travelogue, the maxim, and so on. In looking at the ways in which the radicalising potentials of ‘second-person’ discourse are contained or recuperated, I focus on issues of vraisemblance and mimesis. Vraisemblance can be described as the ‘system of conventions and expectations which rests on/reinforces that more general system of ‘mutual knowledge’ produced within a community for the realisation and maintenance of a whole social world’. All of the forms of the vraisemblable are already instituted within social, cultural relations, so that what vraisemblance describes is the way we fit the inscriptions we read-that is, the way in which we naturalise what we read-into those given cultural and social forms. I also look at the conventionalising and naturalising work done by notions of mimesis in explaining relations between the world, our being in it, and texts, proposing that mimesis provides a principle buttress by which the good standing of the metaphor of ‘person’ is preserved in traditional and pre-critical modes of analysis. Indeed, the critic’s recourse to ‘person’ is in some measure always an engagement with mimesis. Any discussion that maintains that mimesis is in some way productive of meaning-which this thesis in fact does-must identify mimesis as a merely conventional category within practices of reading and semiosis more generally, and at the very least remove that term from its traditional position of transparent primacy and authority. Some of the most interesting and insightful arguments about ‘second-person’ narrative propose that the ‘second person’s’ most striking effects derive from the constitution of an ‘intersubjective’ experience of reading in which the subject positions of the ‘you’-protagonist, reader-narratee and narrator are combined into a fluid and indeterminate multiple subjectivity. Notions of intersubjectivity frequently position themselves as liberating the reader from Cartesianism's fixed, authoritative modes of subjectivity, Frequently, however, they tend implicitly to reinstate Cartesianism's notion of the self at the centre of textual practice and subjectivity. I look at Daniel Gunn's novel ‘Almost You’, at length in this context, illustrating the constant overdetermination of the ‘you’ and the novel's narrating voice, and demonstrating that this overdetermination leaves the origin of the narrative discourse, the identity of the narrator, and the ontological nature of both principal protagonists utterly ambiguous. The fluidity and ambiguity of Protean-‘you’ in ‘Almost You’ is discussed in terms of ‘second-person’ intersubjectivity, but with a view to demonstrating the indebtedness by the notion of intersubjectivity to Cartesianism's hegemony of ‘person’. I then turn to a discussion of what might be a more ‘old fashioned’ if perhaps ultimately more far-reaching approach to the ‘second person’s’ often startling ambiguities. This is Keats's notion of negative capability, a capacity or quality in which a person ‘is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.’ I suggest that Protean-‘you’ texts will license all of the readings of ambiguity and fluidity proposed in my discussion of ‘Almost You’, but conclude that the instances of indeterminacy illustrate no more than that: the fluidity and deep ambiguity, and thus, finally, the lack of coherence, of Protean-‘you’ discourse. This has particular implications for how we are to consider readers’ experiences of narrative texts. More fundamentally, it has implications for how we are to consider readers as subjects. I suggest that unstable, ambiguous instances of ‘second-person’ narrative can tear the complex and systematic embroidery of ideological suture that unifies Cretinism’s experience or sense of subjectivity, leaving the reader in a condition of epistemological and ontological havoc. I go on to argue that much of the deeply unsettling effect of Protean-‘you’ discourse anises because its utterances explicitly gesture towards Cretinism’s notion of self. Protean-‘you’ involves a sense of address that is much more pronounced than we are accustomed to facing when reading literary narrative, alerting us to the presence of inscribed anthropomorphic subjects. At the very same time, protean-‘you’ leaves its inscribed subjects indeterminate, ambiguous. This conflict generates a tension between the anticipation of the emergence of speaking and listening selves and our inability to find them. I go on to propose that Protean-‘you’ narrative's lack of coherence is also to be understood as the condition of narrative actuality generally, but a condition that is vigorously mediated against by dominant practices of reading and writing, hocusing my discussion in this respect on the issue of narrative ‘person,’ I argue that narrative ‘person’ is constituted within texts as an apparent unity, but that it is in fact, produced as unitary solely within the practice of making sense, that is, Within our habits of reading, and so is never finally unified. I propose that this is the case for ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ modes no less than for the ‘second.’ Where ‘second-person’ narrative at its most radical and Protean differs from conventional ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ narratives is the degree to which each has been circumscribed by practices of tantalization, containment and limit, and, in particular, Cretinism’s hegemony of ‘person.’ It may be that the most significant insights ‘second-person’ narrative has to offer are to be found within its capacity to reveal to the engaged reader the underlying condition of narrative discourse, and more generally, its capacity to reveal the actual condition of the human subject-a condition in which, exactly like its textual corollary of narrative ‘person,’ the self is glimpsed as thoroughly dispersed and contingent.

Disciplining the discipline: understanding postcolonial epistemic ideology in marketing

In this study, conducted in two top ranked business schools in India, we examine pedagogy and doctoral research in marketing and show that the discipline is characterised by dependency on the West. We offer an understanding of postcolonial epistemic ideology that is contributing to the creation of unreflexive and dependent subjectivities in the discipline. We show that the marketing discourse in postcoloniality is characterised by mimesis of the West and silencing of local subaltern stakeholders. We further show that epistemic ideology disciplines through the deployment of devices developed in the West to create a compradorian theatre.

Humaniversity: remembering the moral soul of education

The higher institutions nowadays faced extreme competition from others institutions, in which they also need to cope with the demand and the expectation of the people surrounding them. Some of the value that is used to be held in the higher institutions seems to be forgotten just for the sake of profit or even for self advancement. This book will discuss “the Humaniversity”, a concept that highlights the humanity, knowledge and balance in the higher institutions. Through the concept of “Humaniversity”, readers will be exposed to the correlation between “Humaniversity” and theory, spiritual philosophy and historical discourse. This will introduce readers to the Islamic concepts of Adab, which will be briefly discussed in the book.