Mental health diversion courts: a two year recidivism study of a South Australian mental health court program.

The need to develop specialized judicial processes to deal with offenders with mental illnesses is now widely recognized and has led to the introduction of mental health court diversion programs around the world. At present, however, there is only limited evidence from which to assess the impact of these initiatives. This paper describes the South Australian model of diversion, with specific reference to the relationship between identified participant characteristics, program compliance rates, and re-offending outcomes. The results of a two-year recidivism study suggest that involvement with the program has a positive impact on recidivism, but that this is independent from the individual's level of success in the program. Lower risk offenders were more likely to achieve successful outcomes than those in the higher risk categories. The implications of these results, as well the factors that might inform the ongoing development of mental health court programs, are discussed.

Opening up a can of worms: how do decision-makers decide when witnesses are telling the truth?

Correctly determining witness credibility is integral to a fair trial. Assessments of credibility made by the triers of fact are made, amongst other things, by reference to behavioural stereotypes that are commonly thought to be associated with lying and truth-telling. These stereotypes are worthless but pervasive. In this study, potential jurors were given information such as would be given by way of judicial direction and/or expert testimony on those behavioural indicia that are useful in detecting deception. Major changes in perceptions of what does and does not work were found. This has significant implications for the conduct of criminal trials. Recommendations are presented which, it is argued, can be of real, practical, assistance in enabling decision-makers to assess the credibility of witnesses. © 2013 The Australian and New Zealand Association of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law.

Positive psychology and the demise of defamation

Defamation is one of the more complex and fluid areas of the law and varies considerably across the Australian jurisdictions. There are moves to unify defamation law. The threshold issue that is raised in any such process is whether there is in fact a justification for continuation of defamation law. Recent advances in happiness studies and positive psychology suggest that the chief interest protected by defamation law, reputation, is over-rated and is not in fact conducive to human well-being. What others think of us is not relevant to our well-being. Anecdotally it seems that people spend much time and energy in a bid to impress others in the hope that they will grow in the estimation of others and the world at large. Hence, the results of the studies into human well-being so far as reputation is concerned may appear counter-intuitive. Nevertheless, the studies are far more convincing than lay assumptions. People are often wrong about what is in their interests. This is recognised in the concept of regret. Individuals yearn for some things, but sometimes when they acquire them they discover that the journey was wasted. Reputation is one such thing. Defamation law perpetuates the myth that reputation is intrinsically important. Defamation should be abolished. In its place, a new cause of action should be introduced whereby damages are awardable for misleading and deceptive communications which cause damage to the individual who is the subject of the communication. This cause of action should be modelled on the misleading and deceptive conduct provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).

Tolling for the luckless, the abandoned and forsaked : therapeutic jurisprudence and international human rights law as applied to prisoners and detainees by forensic psychologists

Objectives. There has been an explosion of interest in therapeutic jurisprudence as both a filter and lens for viewing the extent to which the legal system serves therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. However, little attention has been paid to the impact of therapeutic jurisprudence on questions of international human rights law and the role of forensic psychologists. The paper aims to provide an intersection between human rights, therapeutic jurisprudence, and forensic psychology.

Method. Human rights are based on legal, social, and moral rules. Human rights literature generally considers legal rights but such policy statements do not provide principles to guide forensic psychologists in addressing moral or social rights. Therefore, a framework to guide forensic psychologists is required.

Conclusion. As duty-bearers, forensic psychologists need to address the core values of freedom and well-being in rights holders (in this instance, prisoners and detainees with a mental illness). The paper proposes that human rights principles can add to the normative base of a therapeutic jurisprudence framework, and in-turn, therapeutic jurisprudence can assist forensic psychologists to actively address human rights.

'The witness who saw, /He left little doubt' : a comparative consideration of expert testimony in mental disability law cases in common and civil law systems

The question of how courts assess expert evidence - especially when mental disability is an issue - raises the corollary question of whether courts adequately evaluate the content of the expert testimony or whether judicial decision making may be influenced by teleology (cherry picking evidence), pretextuality (accepting experts who distort evidence to achieve socially desirable aims), and/or sanism (allowing prejudicial and stereotyped evidence). Such threats occur despite professional standards in forensic psychology and other mental health disciplines that require ethical expert testimony. The result is expert testimony that, in many instances, is at best incompetent and at worst biased. The paper details threats to competent expert testimony in a comparative law context - in both the common law (involuntary civil commitment laws and risk assessment criminal laws) and, more briefly, civil law. We conclude that teleology, pretextuality, and sanism have an impact upon judicial decision making in both the common law and civil law. Finally, we speculate as to whether the new United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is likely to have any impact on practices in this area. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.