Russia’s anti-gay laws: the politics and consequences of a moral panic

The issue of LGBT rights in Russia first properly came to mainstream international attention in March 2012, when the St Petersburg Duma passed a law prohibiting “public acts aimed at the propaganda of sodomy, lesbianism, bisexualism and transgenderism amongst minors“. The law provoked an international outcry, including calls for tourists to boycott St Petersburg, sister-cities to consider cut off ties with Russia’s “window on Europe”, and condemnation from the EU, with the European Parliament passing a resolution noting that it was “gravely concerned by developments which restrict freedom of expression and assembly on the basis of misconceptions about homosexuality and transgenderism” and calling on Russia and other countries considering the adoption of similar legislation to “demonstrate, and ensure respect for, the principle of non-discrimination”.

Putting “traditional values” into practice : the rise and contestation of anti-homopropaganda laws in Russia

This article explores how “traditional values” are being used by the Russian government to refute the claim that “LGBT rights are human rights” and justify the introduction of anti-homopropaganda laws, and how members of the Russian LGBT community have sought to contest it. Centrally, it traces the development of a discourse that refutes the essentialization of sexual identity and, in doing so, seeks to challenge the focus on individual identity-based rights of contemporary human rights norms. This discursive shift has meant that opponents of the legislation have had to develop contestation strategies that collectively seek to present an alternative interpretation of “traditional values.” The article concludes by considering the implications of the Russian case for human rights norms and for the notion of universal human rights more widely, arguing that it represents a serious challenge to the viability of identity-based LGBT rights claims as a basis on which to advance observance of fundamental human rights due to their homonormativity.

What’s in a name? The personal and political meanings of 'LGBT' for non-heterosexual and transgender youth in Kyrgyzstan

In this article, we focus on the ways in which non-heterosexual and transgender youth involved with the non-governmental organization ‘Labrys’ in Kyrgyzstan have begun to demand the protection of their basic civil and human rights on the basis of self-identification as ‘LGBT’. This acronym, which stands for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender, is relatively new to Kyrgyzstan and other post-Soviet states, and represents a change in the terms used by non-heterosexual and transgender people to describe themselves. We frame our discussion using the concepts of sexual citizenship, private/public divides and stigma and base our discussion on debates amongst the staff and community of Labrys about the purpose and scope of the organization. Centrally, we suggest that the strategic use of ‘LGBT’ as a public and politicized identity represents a new, pro-active form of stigma management. By employing this strategy, young LGBT people become ‘would-be’ sexual citizens and challenge traditional societal norms that seek to keep discussion of sex and sexuality in the private sphere and restrict rights to heterosexual, cisgender citizens.

The moral rights of authors and performers: an international and comparative analysis

This book is a comprehensive guide to the development and utilization of authorial moral rights across the key jurisdictions of the English-speaking world and in France and Germany. In recent years, the copyright statutes of the common law countries have been expanded by the introduction of provisions dealing with purely authorial rights - moral rights.
The Moral Rights of Authors and Performers discusses the historical development of the rights in Europe, with particular reference to France and Germany, and shows the growth of moral rights theory and legislative coverage up to the late 1930s. During the 1920s the moral rights of authors became the subject of international protection, particularly through the operation of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. The book explores the adoption of moral rights into this and other international instruments, explaining the functions that moral rights were intended to perform.
The author gives detailed accounts of the operation of moral rights in France and Germany today, addressing both statutory interpretation and doctrinal issues. The provision of case studies gives an impression of the rich jurisprudence associated with the rights in these countries.
The book also contains a detailed discussion of the versions of moral rights that have become entrenched in Canada, the UK, the US and Australia, with each country considered independently. It deals separately with the introduction of the rights into each country and their operation and interpretation by courts and commentators. Material on common law analogues to the rights is provided, which indicates alternative actions that practitioners might take. Problems of cross-jurisdictional legal proceedings (especially arising from technological transfer of information) are also addressed, with moral rights protection elsewhere in the world summarized in tabular form.

Minority rights with Chinese characteristics

The growing influence of liberalism in China has made it important to determine the response of traditional Chinese political thought to Western liberal ideas of multicultural citizenship, and the impact of the Western liberal model of minority rights on China’s ethnic minority policy. This chapter begins by discussing the basic characteristics of the Confucian approach to minority questions and minority rights. It examines the influence of Marxism on minority rights, in general, and on Chinese practice, in particular. It then discusses China’s policies on ethic minorities, and compares current Chinese practices with the Western liberal model of minority rights.

Moral rights: a brief excursion into Canadian history

In 1931, Canada was the first of the copyright countries to adopt a moral rights provision, closely modeled on Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, into its legislation. But this was not the first step that Canada had taken towards the legislative protection of moral rights. Not only had certain provisions protective of the non-economic interests of authors been included in the federal Criminal Code and in the legislation of Quebec prior to 1920, but during the 1920s a sustained effort had been made to give these interests more explicit and systematic protection under the Copyright Act. The present article focuses on a series of bills put to the Canadian Parliament from 1924 onwards. Not only would they have provided increased protection for the non-economic interests of authors but they would have given a legislative definition to the term "moral right". These bills, framed in the absence of any influence from Article 6bis, provide a glimpse of what "moral rights" might have been. They support the view that Canada was moving towards the express legislative protection of these rights significantly earlier that is commonly thought.

Moral rights and substantiality: some questions of integration

Now that Australia has its long awaited legislation protecting the moral rights of authors, a new phase in the development of the rights begins. It must be asked how the incorporation of the rights into the existing copyright legislation, and their subjection to existing doctrines, will affect their operation. And how will existing doctrines be challenged and extended by the existence of the rights? Ultimately these questions will be worked out in the courts. The present article offers a consideration of one area where the legislature has purported to integrate moral rights into the existing scheme but where the practicalities oftheir integration are still unclear. It examines the interplay of moral rights with the doctrine of substantiality, suggesting that any clarification of what substantiality means in the moral rights context will be contingent upon the emergence of more precise definitions of what moral rights are and what interests they are intended to protect.

Basic Needs, Property Rights and Degradation Of Commons

A major problem in many developing countries is the degradation of commons. This degradation has occurred on account of the lack of fulfilment of the basic needs of the poor, free riding and ill–defined property rights. As these goods are essential for the survival of these people, they have to access these items from commons. This results in regular raids to common land for resources and also to private houses (for example, in New Delhi) which are not guarded for water. A variant of the agricultural household model is used to analyse the above problem. Several propositions are established and it is demonstrated that degradation can occur at both a low and high price of basic needs. This result has important policy implications as it demonstrates that land or common degradation cannot be solved by just using the price system. Properly defined property rights and provision of basic goods in kind may resolve the problem of degradation of commons.

Communicating the ethos of codes of ethics in corporate Australia, 1995-2001: whose rights, whose responsibilities?

This paper considers the commitment to business ethics of the top 500 companies operating in the Australian private sector and communicates the results of a longitudinal study conducted from 1995 to 2001. Primary data was obtained (in 1995 and again in 2001) via a self-administered mail  questionnaire distributed to a census of these top 500 Australian  companies. This commitment of each company to their code of ethics was indicated and measured via a range of methods used by organizations to communicate the ethos of their codes to employees. Just as they were in  1995, it would appear that companies in 2001 still are good at ensuring that their rights are protected, but at the same time they do not seem to take on the responsibility to ensure that employees'' rights are just as well protected. This double standard leads to cynicism towards the current business ethics processes inherent in Australian companies.