Civil society after Saddam: oil unions and democracy in Iraq

Following the intervention in Iraq by coalition forces one decade ago, the Bush Administration underwent an enormous and unprecedented project to bring the ‘Western’ liberal model of democracy to Iraq. For the first few years the project to bring democracy to Iraq had its share of successes as the Iraqi people proved themselves capable of understanding and utilizing democratic mechanisms and institutions. This culminated in a series of nation-wide elections from 2005 onwards that brought a democratically elected government to power (Isakhan, 2012). However, one of the unfortunate consequences of the war and the US effort to bring democracy to Iraq was that many key ethno-religious political factions viewed it as an opportunity to pedal their own relatively narrow and very divisive political rhetoric (Davis, 2007). This meant that the Iraqi government was constituted not so much by a body who wanted to draw Iraq together behind a common ideology and to work towards a collective and egalitarian future, as it was by representatives who would fight on behalf of their ethno-religious constituencies. Not surprisingly, a great deal of academic literature has emerged which has analysed and criticised the formal political parties and institutions of the post-Saddam era (Dawisha, 2009). Indeed, the bulk of contemporary scholarship on Iraqi politics focuses on issues such as: the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the Iraqi government; the obstinacy and ineptitude of many elements of Iraq’s political elite; the systemic corruption that is hollowing out the coffers of the state; the moribund bureaucracy that are struggling to deliver basic services and; of course, the deep-seated divisions within and between those that represent Iraq’s three main ethno-religious blocks: the Shia Arabs, the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds.

Self-determination and collective responsibility in the secessionist struggle

The often violent emergence of new independent states following the end of the Cold War generated discussion about the normative grounds of territorial separatism. A number of opposing approaches surfaced debating whether and under which circumstances there is a right for a community to secede from its host country. Overwhelmingly, these studies placed emphasis on the right to secession and neglected the moral stance of secessionist movements as agents in international relations. In this book Costas Laoutides explores the collective moral agency involved in secessionist struggles offering a theoretical model for the collective responsibility of secessionist groups. Case-studies on the Kurds and the people of Moldova-Transdniestria illustrate the author’s theoretical arguments as he seeks to establish how, although the principle of self-determination was envisaged as a means of gradually bestowing political power upon the people, it never managed to realize its full potential because it was interpreted strictly within a framework of exclusionary politics of identity.