From crystals to pixels: new technology in the documentary work of John Hughes

Film technology, in the broadest sense, embraces a vast array of knowledge, skills, tools, and systems. These include the codes and conventions of screen representation at the centre of much screen scholarship. The electro-mechanical tools of filmmaking are less often the focus of academic study than these codes and conventions, but they are central to them and to the daily work of artists and educators in the field of screen production. This paper traces the scope and significance of technical change, for independent film making, over the past four decades. Melbourne documentary filmmaker John Hughes provides a varied and expansive oeuvre through which to arrange an historical equipment list.

William Wardell's St John's College within the University of Sydney, 1858-59

Ursula wrote the essay for the catalogue of the Wardell Exhibition.

John Shaw Neilson : 'something of a mystic'

Competing post-Federation representations of mysticism as bold or passive, masculine or effeminate, dogmatic or independent, Australian or foreign, drove the shifting critical notions of this era culminating in the generalist designations of John Shaw Neilson (1872–1942) as Australia’s all-purpose mystical poet. Neilson is a mystical poet; yet the basis for this has been subject to a number of distortions from Neilson’s time until the late 1990s. This article examines how an understanding of both Western Christian mysticism and its often erroneous critical applications in Australia might inform new studies of the mystical Neilson.

An epistemically distant God? a critique of John Hick's response to the problem of divine hiddenness

God is thought of as hidden in at least two ways. Firstly, God's reasons for permitting evil, particularly instances of horrendous evil, are often thought to be inscrutable or beyond our ken. Secondly, and perhaps more problematically, God's very existence and love or concern for us is often thought to be hidden from us (or, at least, from many of us on many occasions). But if we assume, as seems most plausible, that God's reasons for permitting evil will (in many, if not most, instances) be impossible for us to comprehend, would we not expect a loving God to at least make his existence or love sufficiently clear to us so that we would know that there is some good, albeit inscrutable, reason why we (or others) are permitted to suffer? In this paper I examine John Hick's influential response to this question, a response predicated on the notion of 'epistemic distance': God must remain epistemically distant and hence hidden from us so as to preserve our free will. Commentators of Hick's work, however, disagree as to whether the kind of free will that is thought to be made possible by epistemic distance is the freedom to believe that God exists, or the freedom to choose between good and evil, or the freedom to enter into a personal relationship with God. I argue that it is only the last of these three varieties of free will that Hick has in mind. But this kind of freedom, I go on to argue, does not necessitate an epistemically distant God, and so the problem of divine hiddenness remains unsolved.

Review of John D. Caputo : On religion, London and New York : Routledge, 2001, paperback 0-415-23332-1, 147 pages lncluding lndex

This is a review of John Caputo’s recent Routledge book on religion. Caputo’s central idea is captured by the phrase ‘religion without religion’, by which he means a religious stance or attitude that is not circumscribed by allegiance to any specific creed.

Liberty in key works of John Locke and John Stuart Mill

The ideas of liberty presented in the important works of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, The Second Treatise of Government (1689) and On Liberty (1859), are often viewed as belonging to the same conceptual tradition, that of English liberalism. This thesis is an articulation of the diversity between the theories of liberty expressed by Locke and Mill in the Second Treatise and On liberty. \ am aiming to provide a corrective to the tendency to ignore or to gloss over very significant differences between the two men. The work concentrates on the philosophical aspects of each theory of liberty, arguing that they differ in four respects. These are; definitions of liberty; justifications of liberty; how much liberty and for whom they recommend it, and finally, who they believe threatens liberty and how this threat is to be curbed. It is the purpose of this thesis to show that in terms of these areas Locke and Mill are pursuing different ends. I conclude that Locke and Mill present strikingly different theories of liberty and cannot be thought of as belonging to the one conceptual tradition in terms of the definition, the justification, the prescription and the threat to liberty. Ultimately, I question the value of including Locke and Mill in the one conceptual tradition of liberty solely on the basis that they argue ‘freedom from.’