Baker v The Queen & Fardon v Attorney General for the State of Queensland

In 2004, the High Court of Australia had cause to revisit its 1996 decision in Kable, as well as to consider the nature of judicial power as it relates to the deprivation of liberty, outside of the parameters of conventional criminal sentencing. The resulting decisions of Fardon and Baker demonstrate the lack of constitutional protections afforded to people who become the focus of governmental campaigns to be "tough on crime". The so-called "Kable principle", as construed by the High Court in 2004, may prove to be the "constitutional watch dog that barks but once".

Commonwealth legislative power and "non punitive" detention: a constitutional roadmap

In 2004 The High Court handed down a number of decisions concerning detention imposed for purposes allegedly unrelated to punishment. This paper outlines the way the Federal Constitution restricts (and also facilitates) the imposition of "non punitive detention" by our governments. Such laws (as passed by the Federal Legislature) are constitutionally valid provided they can be characterised as falling within a legislative head of power under  section 51 off he Constitution. The power to detain for non punitive purposes can be reposed by the Legislature in the either the Executive or Judicial arms of government. Detention by the Executive is non punitive (and therefore does not offend the separation of powers) even though it involves a deprivation of liberty, provided it is imposed for “legitimate non punitive purposes”.  Legitimacy is in turn determined by reference to the section 51 heads of power. Detention for non punitive purposes by the judicial arm of government is constitutionally valid provided that (i) a “judicial process ” is adopted and (ii) (arguably) there is some link (albeit tenuous) with a previous finding of criminal guilt. The continuing existence of the “constitutional immunity ”from being detained by other than judicial order identified by the High Court in its 1992 decision in Lim v Minister for Immigration is called into question.

Beyond the separation of powers : judicial review and the regulatory proscription of terrorist organisations

Administrative law remains the key defence against an over-zealous executive arm of government, but administrative law needs to be understood in an international context. Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in relation to legislation designed to counter terrorist activities. The co-ordination of terrorist activities knows no borders, and state-centered executive action designed to address the threat of terrorism necessarily operates in a broader global environment. An important but controversial part of Australia's counter-terrorism legislation suite is the power to proscribe terrorist organisations. The authors contend that the scope of judicial review available in relation to decisions of the Commonwealth executive to proscribe terrorist organisations is inadequate and may jeapordise Australia's compliance with international standards, such as those provided in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Now is an opportune time to reassess the structure and operation of the power to proscribe organisations in Australia.

The natural death of the Supreme Judicial Commission of Bangladesh and the consequent patronage appointments to the Bench: advocating the establishment of an Independent Judicial Commission

In order to strengthen the constitutional process of appointment of judges in Superior Courts, Bangladesh established a Supreme Judicial Commission in 2008 by promulgating an Ordinance. This Ordinance was neither promulgated in pursuance of any provisions of the Constitution nor by introducing any amendment to the provisions of the Constitution. The recommendations of the Commission were not given binding force on the executive. The power of the executive to accept or reject the candidates recommended by the Supreme Judicial Commission at his pleasure defeated the very objective of establishing the Commission for appointing the most competent and suitable persons as judges of the superior courts in Bangladesh. However, following the general elections held on 29 December 2008, the newly elected Government of Bangladesh Awami League dispensed with the Supreme Judicial Commission by not placing the Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance before the parliament for its approval. This resulted in restoring the previous system of appointing judges on the satisfaction of the executive, which has resulted in patronage appointments. Thus, the establishment of an independent judicial commission in Bangladesh is an imperative necessity for strengthening the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.

The establishment of the Judicial Appointments Commission in Malaysia to improve the constitutional method of appointing the judges of the superior courts : a critical study

The Judicial Appointments Commission was established in Malaysia in 2009 to ensure unbiased selection of judicial candidates for the consideration of the Prime Minister, who has the final say regarding the appointment of judges to the superior courts. But the provisions concerning Prime Minister’s power to appoint the majority of the members of the Commission and his unfettered power of removing four of the five appointed members without assigning any reason, have calculatedly been devised for ensuring the selection of judicial candidates having right political patronage in accordance with the covert wishes of the Prime Minister. Furthermore, the Prime Minister’s power of rejecting the Commission’s recommendations of multiple candidates renders the undertaking of a lengthy process of selection unproductive and useless. Thus the Judicial Appointments Commission has become a superfluous body with an ineffective modus operandi to attain the stipulated objectives of improving and complementing the constitutional method of appointing judges to the superior courts. Since the Federal Constitution of Malaysia has not empowered the Parliament to enact a law providing for the establishment of a Judicial Appointments Commission, it also appears that the Judicial Appointments Commission Act 2009 is an invalid piece of legislation.

What do you do with a High Court decision you don’t like? Legislative, judicial and academic responses to Gambotto v WCP Ltd

The decision of the High Court of Australia in Gambotto v WCP Ltd wasboth controversial and widely debated. Some saw the decision as radically altering the balance of power in corporate law by granting minority shareholders extensive new powers to prevent the compulsory acquisition of their shares and thereby impeding commercial transactions that would benefit companies. There was also concern that the principles developed by the High Court for compulsory acquisition of shares undertaken by way of amendment of the corporate constitution would apply to other forms of compulsory acquisition, and corporate law more generally, again impeding many types of corporate transactions.We analyse the responses to the High Court decision. The decision had the potential to have a significant influence on Australian corporate law and the way corporate transactions involving compulsory share acquisitions are conducted. In particular, Gambotto was considered in more than 50 subsequent judgments giving many judges the opportunity to extend the Gambotto principles into new areas.We show that the responses to Gambotto were largely negative. Initial commentary in themedia and subsequent academic commentary was mostly critical. Almost uniformly, courts decided that the principles should not be extended.Parliament responded by enacting new provisions in the corporationslegislation facilitating the compulsory acquisition of shares and limiting the application of Gambotto. We document how courts and Parliamentresponded to a decision they did not like — a decision that had the potential to have major implications for corporate law and commercial transactions.We also analyse Gambotto by placing it in the broader political context ofthe role of the High Court at the time of the decision. Gambotto was decided when the High Court was in a period of unprecedented judicial activism.Subsequently, the High Court retreated from this judicial activism and weobserve similarities in how other courts restricted the application ofGambotto.