Countering Islamophobia : Muslim participation in multifaith networks

In recent years a heightened awareness of global risks has produced an unprecedented interest in global peace and security initiatives. This article discusses the impact of international crisis events on religiously diverse communities in Australia, in particular rising Islamophobia, migrantophobia and attacks on multiculturalism. Religious communities have been far from passive in their responses to the impact of these events, initiating dialogue and educational activities to dispel negative stereotypes and attitudes. In addition, state actors, including police, have prioritized engagement with religious leaders, and this has resulted in a rise of state supported multifaith peacebuilding activities. The article argues that, in response to global risks of terror and exclusion, multifaith movements and multi-actor networks, including religious leaders, state actors, educators and the media, have the potential to advance common security. In response to conflicts both local and global, these examples of cooperation between religious and non-religious actors in Australia can be instructive to other increasingly multifaith societies.

Response to Islamophobia in the Arabic Islamic discourse: a critical discourse analysis

In the aftermath of September 11, Muslim scholars made numerous attempts to explain Islamophobia from the Islamic perspective; they presented arguments that are not addressed in the Western narrative. Two texts in Arabic by the prominent Muslim preacher, Mohammad Hassan and by the Muslim orator Fadhel Sliman are analysed from a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) viewpoint. This analysis aims to demonstrate how language is inextricably linked with ideology. This paper demonstrates that textual strategies in the Arabic Islamic discourse and their ideological implications show distinct characteristics some of which add to the present literature on discourse. The aim of the chosen texts is to educate and create solidarity between the speakers and the audience in fighting Islamophobia. The reliance of the speakers on tactics such as quoting from the Holy Qur’ān and ḥadīth to defend Islam, and choice of words and sentence structures may instigate discussions about the persuasive power of the Arabic Islamic narrative.

Disrupting (gendered) Islamophobia: the practice of feminist ijtihad to support the agency of young Muslim women

Muslim feminist scholars highlight, and seek to transform, racist, sexist and Islamophobic discourses through feminist interpretations of their religion. This paper reports on data gathered from an interview-based study involving four young Muslim women from the same Brisbane (Queensland) community. The focus is on how these young women are understanding, and finding spaces of agency, within these discourses with reference to their faith. The Islamic principle of ijtihad (jurisprudential interpretation of religious text) and the practice of feminist ijtihad are theorized as powerful tools in supporting the young women to counter the Islamophobia and gendered Islamophobia in their lives. Using these tools, however, as this paper argues, is not unproblematic and can reinscribe disempowering gender and ethno-cultural relations. Amid unprecedented gendered Islamophobia and the clear imperative of supporting Muslim women to access the tools of feminist ijtihad, the paper provides important insight into the possibilities and problematics of these tools.

Advancing Australian 'shared security' : secular-religious peacebuilding networks

The role of religious leaders in promoting social cohesion and ‘shared security’ is increasingly being examined by scholars, as is the growing multifaith movement. The VIIIth World Assembly of Religions for Peace first proposed the notion of ‘shared security’ and the importance of religious leaders’ role in advancing such a concept in Kyoto 2006. A recent study, Managing the Impact of Global Crisis Events on Community Relations in Multicultural Australia (Bouma et al. 2007) has documented the impacts of international crisis events and discourses of exclusion on religiously diverse communities in Australia, in particular rising Islamophobia, migrantophobia and attacks on multiculturalism. Religious communities have been far from passive in their responses to the impact of these events initiating dialogue and educational activities to dispel negative stereotypes and attitudes. State actors, including police, have prioritized engagement with religious leaders resulting in a rise of state supported multifaith and secular-religious peacebuilding activities. This paper argues that, in response to global risks of terror and exclusion, secular-religious networks including religious leaders, state actors, educators and the media have the potential to advance ‘shared security’ in multifaith societies, by drawing on Australian experiences documented in the Global Crisis Events study.

With guarded optimism? Evidence from focus groups of ‘mainstream’ Australians’ perceptions of Muslims

Studies of Australian perceptions of Muslims and Islam tend to be based on research into media representations of these themes. Additionally, most research on attitudes pertaining to social cohesion and security in the post-9/11 environment concentrates on the opinions of minority groups on these matters. The following study is drawn from materials extracted from focus group discussions relating to Islam, multiculturalism and security that took place with 119 Australians from so-called ethnic and religious majority groups (European descended, and identifying with Judaeo-Christian traditions or having no religious affiliation) in selected metropolitan and rural/regional centres of the state of Victoria in 2007–2008. This article is guided by the following research questions: How can ‘mainstream’ Australian attitudes towards Muslims be categorized? What concerns ‘mainstream’ Australians most about Muslims? Can these attitudes be considered to be Islamophobic? If not, how else may we classify these attitudes? Although some participants voiced very strong, critical and at times unflattering and potentially antagonistic opinions of Muslims, most contributors were guardedly optimistic that current tensions with and controversies surrounding Australia’s Muslims would subside, and that Muslims would soon become well established within Australian society, as previous generations of migrants have since World War II.

"It's about freedom": contesting dominant representations of devout Muslim women in the space of the nation

Since September 11 there has been a rise of Islamophobia in Australian public discourse, matched by a growth of racialised attacks on visibly identifiable Muslims in public space. These cultural racisms have arisen in a context where Islamic religious signifiers and practices have come to be read as signs of fundamentalism, terrorism and threat to national political traditions and cultural values. In particular, the hijab has become a symbol of these tensions, with the veiled woman being read as the embodiment of a ‘repressive and fundamentalist religion’. However, as some Muslim and feminist scholars have proposed, these readings rob Muslim women of their ability to articulate the reasons why wear the veil or engage in gendered religious practices. This paper argues that this enacts a form of disembodiment, whereby Muslim womens’ ability to comfortably inhabit their bodies and assert themselves in the public sphere is limited. In particular the paper draws upon two case studies which express this disembodiment, whilst highlighting the counter-strategies that devout Muslim women are adopting to reinsert their bodies and narratives in the national frame. The first refers to the recent media backlash which followed a public lecture held at Melbourne University by Islamic organization Hikmah Way, where the audience was segregated along gender lines. The second draws upon interviews conducted with veiled Muslim women in Sydney, following the Cronulla riot. These interviews show how Muslim women are contesting dominant representations of the hijab in western popular discourse by recoding it as a signifier of religious and national identity, and as an expression of democratic freedom.

Thai cyber-actors : evidence of an Islamophobic effect

The long-standing Patani Muslim separatist resistance of Southern Thailand is not one that is well known, and its contemporaneous spill over onto the Internet even less so. The more radical Patani online propaganda is in fact symptomatic of the relocation of the struggle within the sphere of influence of global jihadism, distancing itself from the ethno-nationalism characteristic of a previous generation of fighters. New media propaganda, in particular Jihad 2.0, has opened a new sphere of influence to the Patani neojihadist movement, allowing the militants to expand their propaganda campaign to a wider audience, while reaching out to a younger Melayu public. While Jihad 2.0 has presented the resistance movement with new ways to diffuse its message, in a more innovative and appealing manner, it also has enabled it to engage with its audiences more interactively. Because the message is no longer linear, anyone can contribute to the dialectics of the struggle, which in fine results in the alteration and reshaping of its ideological discourse in unprecedented directions. Arguably the ‘glocalisation’ of Islamophobia within Thai culture has resulted in the alteration of the Thai cultural stereotype of the Muslim khaek ‘Other’, transforming the khaek into an evil violent Muslim, both in real and virtual worlds. This further leads to discriminatory attitudes and behaviours towards Muslims, which causes the hardening of the views of the online Patani community of support towards the Thais and possibly its radicalisation.

The janus face of new media propaganda: The case of Patani neojihadist YouTube warfare and its Islamophobic effect on cyber-actors

Surfing on the Internet 2.0 revolution, Patani 2.0 has allowed Patani neojihadist militants to access new competitive spaces and create their own imagined online community by penetrating new realms of the Internet. This article discusses the use of new media militant propaganda by Patani militants and how it is Janus faced. It further examines how the Patani 2.0 social interaction enabled by social media such as YouTube leads to group cohesion among certain actors and the formation of a collective identity that is clustered around the notions of Muslim victimization and defensive jihad; and how, at the same time, it reinforces antithetical identities and fosters group identity competition, where one religious group is often pitted against another. As a result, the Janus effect of Patani neojihadist YouTube online propaganda, while it primarily seeks to radicalize, also generates a reactionary, often virulent, anti-Muslim response from the movement's critics.

Peer research with young Muslims and the politics of knowledge production

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to draw on the authors’ experiences as a team made up of both “insiders” and “outsiders” in order to investigate how an insider-outsider peer research method facilitates productive forms of research into the lives of young Muslims, and to contribute to debates about ways of knowing youth. The authors aim to shift focus from a common claim that peer research methods simply improve research about youth to more deeply investigate how they enable, as well as limit, the production of particular kinds of knowledge, in this case, about Muslim youth in Australia. Design/methodology/approach – The research aimed to explore how “ordinary” young Australian Muslims engage in civic life. Yet the authors were faced with the challenge of accessing and recruiting “ordinary” youth in times of Islamophobia, wherein Muslim communities expressed serious concerns about their voices being misinterpreted, misused and misappropriated. Therefore, the authors sought to utilise an approach of outsider-designed and guided research that was then shaped and executed by insider peer researchers. It is this research design and its execution that the authors interrogate in this paper. Findings – As well as affording the authors access and the elicitation of rich, complex and high-quality data, the approach also fostered more complex stories about young Muslim identities and experiences, and enabled the authors to contest some common and homogenising representations. It also allowed opportunities for fundamental issues inherent in these kinds of qualitative research methods to be made explicit. These include the politics of performativity and issues of positionality in the peer research process. The authors suggest that the “insider” and “outsider” approach succeeded not so much because it got the authors closer to the “truth” about young Muslims’ civic lives, but because it revealed some of the mechanics of the ways stories are constructed and represented in youth research. Originality/value – The originality and value of this paper lie in its contribution to a debate about the politics of knowledge production about young people and Muslims in particular, and in its effort to move forward a discussion about how to be accountable in youth research to the various communities and to one another in insider-outsider research teams.