Home truths about home detention

The Victorian Parliament has recently introduced a Bill which implements home detention as a sentencing option. Home detention is an intuitively appealing reform. The logic behind the proposal seems obvious. Prisons are expensive to run. There are too many offenders in prison. So let's take the cost out of prison by turning the homes of offenders into prisons: classic, user-pays, cost-shifting economics. The level of superficial appeal of the argument in favour of home detention is matched only by the depth of the fallacies underpinning some of the fundamental premises. The most basic of which is the assumption that offenders who are candidates for the new sanction should be in detention (of any kind) in the first place. Further, the narrow objective of reducing imprisonment is misguided. It should not be elevated to a cardinal sentencing objective?otherwise total success could be achieved by simply opening the prison gates. There are also other concerns about the appropriateness of home detention. The degree of pain it inflicts in many cases is questionable and it may also violate the principle that punishment should not be inflicted on the innocent. After examining the arguments for and against home detention, this article suggests the approach that should be adopted to achieve enlightened and meaningful sentencing reform.

Commonwealth legislative power and "non punitive" detention: a constitutional roadmap

In 2004 The High Court handed down a number of decisions concerning detention imposed for purposes allegedly unrelated to punishment. This paper outlines the way the Federal Constitution restricts (and also facilitates) the imposition of "non punitive detention" by our governments. Such laws (as passed by the Federal Legislature) are constitutionally valid provided they can be characterised as falling within a legislative head of power under  section 51 off he Constitution. The power to detain for non punitive purposes can be reposed by the Legislature in the either the Executive or Judicial arms of government. Detention by the Executive is non punitive (and therefore does not offend the separation of powers) even though it involves a deprivation of liberty, provided it is imposed for “legitimate non punitive purposes”.  Legitimacy is in turn determined by reference to the section 51 heads of power. Detention for non punitive purposes by the judicial arm of government is constitutionally valid provided that (i) a “judicial process ” is adopted and (ii) (arguably) there is some link (albeit tenuous) with a previous finding of criminal guilt. The continuing existence of the “constitutional immunity ”from being detained by other than judicial order identified by the High Court in its 1992 decision in Lim v Minister for Immigration is called into question.

Preventative detention and the right of personal liberty and security under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966

Preventive detention enables a person to be deprived of liberty, by executive determination, for the purposes of safeguarding national security or public order without that person being charged or brought to trial. This paper examines Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 to assess whether preventive detention is prohibited by the phrase 'arbitrary arrest and detention '. To analyse this Article, this paper uses a textual and structural analysis of the Article, as well as reference to the travaux preparatoires and case law of the Human Rights Committee. This paper argues that preventive detention is not explicitly prohibited by Article 9(1) ofthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. If preventive detention is 'arbitrary', within the wide interpretation of that term as argued in this paper, it will be a permissible deprivation of personal liberty under Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. Preventive detention will, however, always be considered 'arbitrary' if sajeguards for those arrested and detained are not complied with, in particular the right to judicial review of the lawfulness of detention.

Preventive detention and the right to personal liberty and security under Article 5 ECHR

'Preventive detention' refers to detention by executive order as a  precautionary measure based on predicted criminal conduct. Detention is without criminal charge or trial as detention is based on the prediction of a future offence. This paper examines Article 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ('ECHR'), in particular Article 5(1)(c) and Article 5(3). To explore this issue, this paper conducts a textual analysis of Article 5 and examines both the travaux preacuteparatoires of the ECHR, as well as jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. This article argues that preventive detention is specifically provided for under the second ground of detention in Article 5(1)(c). A person in preventive detention, however, must be brought promptly before judicial authority under Article 5(3).

Preventative detention in Australian law : issues of interpretation

This article examines the statutory interpretation of terms in Div 105 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) . This division is the regime for preventative detention orders (PDOs), an Executive order permitting a person to be taken into custody and deprived of his/her personal liberty for the purpose of either preventing an imminent terrorist act or preserving evidence of a past terrorist act. The organisation of this article corresponds with three key features of a PDO from this description: "detention"; "Executive"; and "preventative purpose". To consider the interpretation of Div 105 , this article relies on statutory principles of interpretation, and most notably, the recent authority of Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 81 ALJR 1414 [PDF] ; [2007] HCA 33.

The compliance of Australian preventative detention law with article 9(1) ICCPR

This thesis found that a provision of Australia's counter-terrorism policy, preventative detention, does not comply with a major international treaty, the ICCPR. This thesis provides an alternative model by which the Australian Government could achieve the legitimate purposes of preventative detention within the existing constraints of the Australian criminal law.

Immigration detention in Australia

This thesis explains why immigration detention persists as part of Australia's immigration policy. It argues that this form of incarceration has a long history in Australia, and that it fulfils specific social and political functions. The thesis also demonstrates that immigration detention is punitive and therefore breaches Australia's constitution.

Exporting detention : Australia-funded immigration detention in Indonesia

Since 2000, Australia has provided significant levels of funding and resources to encourage Indonesia to use immigration detention to deter asylum seekers from making the onward journey to Australia. In this way Australia has effectively extended its domestic policy of immigration detention beyond its own national borders. The provision of Australian funding for detention in Indonesia has resulted in an increased propensity of Indonesian officials to detain. This article examines the outcomes and implications of this transfer of immigration detention policy for asylum seekers and refugees in Indonesia. It draws on interviews conducted with individuals who have spent time in Indonesia’s immigration detention centres, and Indonesian immigration officials, to assess the conditions of the detention centres. The particular arrangement between Australia and Indonesia, however, fails adequately to protect the human rights of immigration detainees. Ultimately, the detention of asylum seekers in Indonesia serves as one more barrier to finding effective protection in the Asia-Pacific region.