Who is responsible for the protection of children? Implicit and explicit interpretations of marketing messages

In this paper, we examine ethical issues related to advertising to children in light of evidence that people can hold ‘implicit’ as well as ‘explicit’ consumer attitudes. From a review of the important features of implicit versus explicit attitudes, we hypothesise three important features of implicit consumer attitudes in children. First, we suggest they are likely to be acquired automatically from, in part, exposure to marketing messages. Second, we predict that these attitudes will be resistant to change through reflection or reason by the child or other person. Third, we hypothesise that children’s implicit consumer attitudes will be powerful predictors of their consumer choices in many situations. We discuss the implications for the ethics of marketing to children, and propose a research framework to begin investigating this important issue.

Weighty matters and dense arguments: CSF versus real experience

This paper argues that the Victorian Curriculum Standards Framework (CSF II) sequencing is unhelpful for teachers of primary mathematics. 'Density' and 'speed', for example, become sensible concepts for young minds years before the CSF gives them any learning outcome status. While the CSF and its levels of outcomes should not be ignored, they need to be strengthened by teachers who should be guided by the everyday experience of students; teachers should aim to build on students' first hand experiences in real situations. The paper discusses the CSF benchmarks from year 1 to year 6, and provides a number of supermarket investigation learning activities.

Dissociations between implicit and explicit memory in children : the role of strategic processing and the knowledge base

A review of the literature shows that explicit memory develops substantially from three years of age to adulthood, while implicit memory remains stable across this age range. Previously, this developmental dissociation has been attributed to different memory systems, or to confounds with perceptual vs. conceptual processing. Prompted by an alternative developmental framework, the experiments reported here provide evidence against both interpretations. Instead, it will be argued that (a) the implicit - explicit developmental dissociation reflects differences in strategic processing (strategy use and metamemory) across childhood and (b) that implicit memory can show development if a child's knowledge base in the tested domain is developing with age.

Second person : a point of view? The function of the second person pronoun in narrative prose fiction

This thesis looks at the functions and effects of the ‘second-person’ pronoun in narrative prose fiction, with particular focus on the fluidity and ambiguity of the mode that I will call Protean-'you.' It is a mode in which it is unclear whether the ‘you’ is a character, the narrator, a reader/narratee, or no-one in particular—or a combination of these—so that readers find ‘second-person’ utterances at once familiar and deeply strange. I regard the ‘second person’ as a special case of narrative ‘person’ that, at its most fluid, can produce an experience of reading quite unlike that of reading traditional ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ narrative. Essentially, this unique experience comes about because Protean-‘you’ neglects to constitute the stable modes of subjectivity that readers expect to find within narrative textuality. These stable modes of subjectivity, modelled on what I will refer to as Cartesianism’s hegemonic notion of the self, have been thoroughly formalised and naturalised within the practices of ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ narrative. The Protean-‘you’ form of ‘second-person’ narrative, conversely, is a mode of narrative discourse that puts readers in a place of doubt and uncertainty, its unsettling equivocations forcefully disrupting accustomed, mimetic explanations of narrative and denying us access to the foundational, authorising subject of classical Cartesian thought. Rather than founding a notion of ‘second-person’ narrative and narrative ‘person’ generally on Cartesianism's ‘self-ish’ logic of unified, privatised identity, I turn to C.S, Peirce's notion of the semiotic self and to developments in post-structuralist thought. Essentially, the conception of subjectivity underpinning my arguments is Peirce's proposition that the self is to be conceived of not as a cogito, but as a sign by which the conscious entity knows itself. It is a sign, moreover, that is constantly being re-read, reinterpreted, so that identity is never self-complete. This reconception of subjectivity is necessary because 1 will argue that the effects of Protean-‘you’ arise in some part from a tension between Cartesianism's hegemony and what philosophical pragmatism and post-structuralism glimpse as the actual condition of the human subject—the subject as dispersed and contingent rather than unified and authoritative. Most discussions of ‘second-person’ narrative conceive of the mode in terms of implicit communicative relations, in some measure instituting Cartesianism's notion of the intentionalist self at the centre of literary meaning. I contrast the paradigmatic address model that arises from this conception against a model that approaches the analysis of ‘second-person’ narrative modality in terms of a referential function, that is, in terms of the object or objects referred to deictically by the ‘second-person’ pronoun. Two principal functions of ‘second-person’ textuality are identified and discussed at length. The first is generalisation, which is rarely dissipated altogether, a situation that contributes to the ambiguities of the pronoun's reference in much ‘second-person’ fiction. The second principal function is that of address, that is, the allocutionary function. Clearly, although stories that continually refer to a ‘you’ can seem quite baffling and unnatural, not all ‘second-person’ narratives unsettle the reader. In order to make the ‘second person's’ outlandish narratives knowable and stable, we bring to bear on them in our habits of reading whatever hermeneutic frames, whatever interpretive keys, come to hand, including a large number of unexceptional forms of literary and ‘natural’ discourse that employ the ‘second-person’ pronoun. These forms include letter writing and internal dialogue (i.e., talking to one's self), the language of the courtroom, the travelogue, the maxim, and so on. In looking at the ways in which the radicalising potentials of ‘second-person’ discourse are contained or recuperated, I focus on issues of vraisemblance and mimesis. Vraisemblance can be described as the ‘system of conventions and expectations which rests on/reinforces that more general system of ‘mutual knowledge’ produced within a community for the realisation and maintenance of a whole social world’. All of the forms of the vraisemblable are already instituted within social, cultural relations, so that what vraisemblance describes is the way we fit the inscriptions we read-that is, the way in which we naturalise what we read-into those given cultural and social forms. I also look at the conventionalising and naturalising work done by notions of mimesis in explaining relations between the world, our being in it, and texts, proposing that mimesis provides a principle buttress by which the good standing of the metaphor of ‘person’ is preserved in traditional and pre-critical modes of analysis. Indeed, the critic’s recourse to ‘person’ is in some measure always an engagement with mimesis. Any discussion that maintains that mimesis is in some way productive of meaning-which this thesis in fact does-must identify mimesis as a merely conventional category within practices of reading and semiosis more generally, and at the very least remove that term from its traditional position of transparent primacy and authority. Some of the most interesting and insightful arguments about ‘second-person’ narrative propose that the ‘second person’s’ most striking effects derive from the constitution of an ‘intersubjective’ experience of reading in which the subject positions of the ‘you’-protagonist, reader-narratee and narrator are combined into a fluid and indeterminate multiple subjectivity. Notions of intersubjectivity frequently position themselves as liberating the reader from Cartesianism's fixed, authoritative modes of subjectivity, Frequently, however, they tend implicitly to reinstate Cartesianism's notion of the self at the centre of textual practice and subjectivity. I look at Daniel Gunn's novel ‘Almost You’, at length in this context, illustrating the constant overdetermination of the ‘you’ and the novel's narrating voice, and demonstrating that this overdetermination leaves the origin of the narrative discourse, the identity of the narrator, and the ontological nature of both principal protagonists utterly ambiguous. The fluidity and ambiguity of Protean-‘you’ in ‘Almost You’ is discussed in terms of ‘second-person’ intersubjectivity, but with a view to demonstrating the indebtedness by the notion of intersubjectivity to Cartesianism's hegemony of ‘person’. I then turn to a discussion of what might be a more ‘old fashioned’ if perhaps ultimately more far-reaching approach to the ‘second person’s’ often startling ambiguities. This is Keats's notion of negative capability, a capacity or quality in which a person ‘is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.’ I suggest that Protean-‘you’ texts will license all of the readings of ambiguity and fluidity proposed in my discussion of ‘Almost You’, but conclude that the instances of indeterminacy illustrate no more than that: the fluidity and deep ambiguity, and thus, finally, the lack of coherence, of Protean-‘you’ discourse. This has particular implications for how we are to consider readers’ experiences of narrative texts. More fundamentally, it has implications for how we are to consider readers as subjects. I suggest that unstable, ambiguous instances of ‘second-person’ narrative can tear the complex and systematic embroidery of ideological suture that unifies Cretinism’s experience or sense of subjectivity, leaving the reader in a condition of epistemological and ontological havoc. I go on to argue that much of the deeply unsettling effect of Protean-‘you’ discourse anises because its utterances explicitly gesture towards Cretinism’s notion of self. Protean-‘you’ involves a sense of address that is much more pronounced than we are accustomed to facing when reading literary narrative, alerting us to the presence of inscribed anthropomorphic subjects. At the very same time, protean-‘you’ leaves its inscribed subjects indeterminate, ambiguous. This conflict generates a tension between the anticipation of the emergence of speaking and listening selves and our inability to find them. I go on to propose that Protean-‘you’ narrative's lack of coherence is also to be understood as the condition of narrative actuality generally, but a condition that is vigorously mediated against by dominant practices of reading and writing, hocusing my discussion in this respect on the issue of narrative ‘person,’ I argue that narrative ‘person’ is constituted within texts as an apparent unity, but that it is in fact, produced as unitary solely within the practice of making sense, that is, Within our habits of reading, and so is never finally unified. I propose that this is the case for ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ modes no less than for the ‘second.’ Where ‘second-person’ narrative at its most radical and Protean differs from conventional ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ narratives is the degree to which each has been circumscribed by practices of tantalization, containment and limit, and, in particular, Cretinism’s hegemony of ‘person.’ It may be that the most significant insights ‘second-person’ narrative has to offer are to be found within its capacity to reveal to the engaged reader the underlying condition of narrative discourse, and more generally, its capacity to reveal the actual condition of the human subject-a condition in which, exactly like its textual corollary of narrative ‘person,’ the self is glimpsed as thoroughly dispersed and contingent.

Recognition and respect : globalization culture and Malaysian education

Globalization and language reform is often presented as a set of practices and relationships to which educators must adapt in order to 'compete‘ or maintain 'relevance‘ in contemporary society. Presented in such a way neo-liberal versions of globalization and educational reform situate localized culture often as a kind of impediment, something we must overcome or ameliorate in order for progress to be sustained and maintained. In Malaysia, these kinds of discourses inform public policy debates. From debates over university competitiveness through to arguments over language and literacy in a global world, the pressures on Malaysian educators to change their practices and reform are often presented with an implicit assumption that local culture is somehow in deficit.

The argument of this paper challenges this framing and representation of globalization. I present an alternative theoretical framework through which educators can judge their practices within the discourse of globalization. I will demonstrate how respecting difference and culture is framing globalization as mutual respect and recognition rather than imposed change is critical to addressing the language and culture of globalization and education. In this sense, debates about language (understood here in the broadest sense as how we communicate and in what power discourse we communicate within) and culture are ultimately arguments about recognition and respect. Neo liberal politics as an expression of an increasingly authoritarian discourse of globalization needs to be challenged by a politics and practice of cultural recognition and respect.

Do young children get the message? The effects of repeated video viewing on explicit and implicit information

The aim of this study was to explore the effects of repeat viewing on comprehension of explicitly and implicitly presented information in an animated movie. Seventy-three pre-school children watched an animated film and were tested for comprehension after either their single or fifth viewing. Only children’s comprehension of explicitly presented information was facilitated by repeat viewing. However, post hoc analyses revealed that children’s explicit and implicit comprehension of a central character Thunderbolt significantly increased across viewing conditions, whereas, repeat viewing only facilitated children’s explicit comprehension of the central character Patch. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

Familiarity-based word-frequency effects in recognition memory and implicit priming

Provides evidence that familiarity as well as recollection contributes to the recognition advantage for low-frequency words. The importance for explanations of the low-frequency word advantage to account for the influence of both explicit and implicit memory processes is discussed with emphasis given to developing the dual-process model.

Identification of implicit technical relationships in overlapping networks

Overlapping network techniques to expand the single sequential finish-to-start relationship between preceding and succeeding activities in scheduling construction projects have been developed for decades. The hidden logic relationships between activities and two virtual activities, Start and Finish, however limit the applications of these techniques in practice as they may lead to incorrect time parameters of some activities. In this research, a novel approach has been developed to identify those concealed relationships in a structured procedure by a two-dimensional nested diagram. An empirical study was carried out to demonstrate the network modification approach.

Trade-offs and implicit preferences in human mate selection

Two novel to domain research methods - choice modelling and the implicit Association Test (IAT) - were applied to measure trade-offs and implicit preferences in human mate preferences. Collectively, findings from four experiments supported the explanatory superiority of Sexual Strategies Theory as a model of between sex and within sex variability in mate preferences.

Implicit theories and personality patterns in child-victim sex offenders

Research has suggested that child sex offenders hold thematically distinct cognitive distortions, which Ward and Keenan (1999) call Implicit Theories. The aim of this preliminary study was to investigate the relationship between offenders’ Implicit Theories and their personality related cognitions. The variables were measured using the Implicit Theory Questionnaire and Millon’s (1990) MCMI-III personality scales. Subjects were 28 male sex offenders against children serving a custodial sentence in New Zealand, who elected to participate in a treatment program. A majority of participants had personality scale scores that reached the clinical threshold. Results found that dependant, depressive and schizoidal personality patterns significantly correlated with Implicit Theories. Clinical and theoretical implications are discussed.

Sexual murderers' implicit theories

Interviews with 28 sexual murderers were subjected to grounded theory analysis. Five implicit theories (ITs) were identified: dangerous world, male sex drive is uncontrollable, entitlement, women as sexual objects, and women as unknowable. These ITs were found to be identical to those identified in the literature as being present in rapists. The presence of dangerous world and male sex drive is uncontrollable were present, or absent, such that three groups could be identified: (a) dangerous world plus male sex drive is uncontrollable; (b) dangerous world, in the absence of male sex drive is uncontrollable; (c) male sex drive is uncontrollable in the absence of dangerous world. These three groups were found to differ in motivation: (a) were motivated by urges to rape and murder; (b) were motivated by grievance, resentment and/or anger toward women; (c) were motivated to sexually offend but were prepared to kill to avoid detection, or secure compliance.

Identification of five fundamental implicit theories underlying cognitive distortions in child abusers : a preliminary study

Qualitative analysis of interviews with 22 child abusers found strong evidence for Ward and Keenan's (1999) proposal that there are five implicit theories in child abusers that account for the majority of their cognitive distortions/thinking errors. These implicit theories are: Child as a sexual being where children are perceived as being able to and wanting to engage in sexual activity with adults and also are not be harmed by such sexual contact; Nature of harm where the offender perceives that sexual activity does not cause harm (and may in fact be beneficial) to the child; Entitlement where the child abuser perceives that he is superior and more important than others: and hence is able to have sex with whoever, and whenever, he wants; Dangerous world where the offender perceives that that others are abusive and rejecting and he must fight to regain control; and Uncontrollable where the offender perceives the world as uncontrollable and hence he believes that circumstances are outside of his control. There was no evidence for any other type of implicit theory. Results of the study also indicated that there was a significant difference in terms of the endorsement of the Dangerous world implicit theory between participants reporting a history of child sexual abuse and those who did not. Offenders against male victims were significantly more likely to endorse the Child as a sexual being and Dangerous world implicit theories compared to men who had offended against female children.