The body keeps the score

American animator Robert Breer has been credited in introducing the first visual bomb to cinema in his loop film Image by Images I (1954), Two abstract animated films by Robert Breer are examined: 69 (1968 5 minutes) and Fuji (1974 10 minutes). Using Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological perspective, though these films are not representational or photographic in the traditional sense it is argued that they are still able to talk to us about real experiences because ‘the lived perspective, that which we actually perceive, is not a geometric or photographic one.’(Merleau-Ponty, 1964b: 14) 69 provides a metaphor for a system that collapses and Fuji as an articulation of that embodied seeing required for train travel. It is argued that Breer’s work in its explorations of style ahead of content is research into an act of viewing that offers a contemporary simulation of the impact of a traumatic experience on the body. Just as one cannot grab each object in the landscape at the speed of train travel nor can one grab or understand each frame that is presented to the retina of a Robert Breer film. What is required to attain “stillness” is a more dissociated way of looking that allows the images to wash over you. Such a “stillness” may be more about suppression than contemplation and could involve a process of metamorphosis.

Shattering the Shia: a Maliki political strategy in post-Saddam Iraq

This chapter argues that one key legacy of the US effort to bring democracy to Iraq has been that many elements within Iraq’s Shia Arab political elite have viewed democracy through the lens of a cynical majoritarianism and manipulated it to catapult themselves to power. This has had a further legacy, enabling the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to utilise his incumbency to maintain the veneer of democracy while becoming increasingly dictatorial and authoritarian. In doing so, Maliki’s government shares much in common with other ‘hybrid regimes’ in which governments hijack nominally democratic mechanisms such as elections, media freedoms, political opposition and civil society as part of their strategy to retain, rather than diffuse, power (Dodge 2012b, 2013). Although Maliki hasdeployed a host of different strategies along these lines – including blatant sectarianism, undermining key state institutions, the creation of a shadow state loyal to himself, and the concentration of military and political power in his own hands – this chapter focuses on Maliki’s less well-known efforts to shatter the unity of his Shia Arab political opponents. It focuses on his first two terms in power and examines the ways in which he has been able to systematically fracture the Shia political elite to such an extent that once tenuously united factions now stand bitterly divided. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the reasoning behind such an approach and the prospects of Iraq’s democracy moving beyond the blatant power grab of the incumbent Malikigovernment.