'Statesmanship of the highest order': Governor-General Ronald Munro-Ferguson and Australia's war of 1914-1918

A study of Governor-General Ronald Munro-Ferguson with particular attention to the views of modern historians. It describes his constitutional role and interventions in the Australian political process. It concludes that he was a conscientious King’s representative, with a deep interest in Australian political and social affairs and was accepted by members of both parties.

Australia and East Timor : elitism, pragmatism and the national interest

For over two decades the issue of East Timor's right to self-determination has been a ‘prickly’ issue in Australian foreign policy. The invasion by Indonesian forces in 1975 was expected, as Australian policy-makers had been well informed of the events leading up to the punitive action being taken. Indeed, prior discussions involving the future of the territory were held between the Australian Prime Minister and the Indonesian President in 1974. In response to the events unfolding in the territory the Australian Labor Government at the time was presented with two policy options for dealing with the issue. The Department of Defence recommended the recognition of an independent East Timor; whereas the Department of Foreign Affairs proposed that Australia disengage itself as far as possible from the issue. The decision had ramifications for future policy considerations especially with changes in government. With the Department of Foreign Affairs option being the prevailing policy what were the essential ingredients that give explanation for the government's choice? It is important to note the existence of the continuity and cyclical nature of attitudes by Labor governments toward Indonesia before and after the invasion. To do so requires an analysis of the influence ‘Doc’ Evatt had in shaping any possible Labor tradition in foreign policy articulation. The support given by Evatt for the decolonisation of the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia) gave rise to the development of a special relationship-so defined. Evidence of the effect Evatt had on future Labor governments may be found in the opinions of Gough Whitlam. In 1975 when he was Prime Minister, Whitlam felt the East Timor issue was merely the finalisation of Indonesia's decolonisation honouring Evatt's long held anti-colonialist tradition existing in the Australian Labor Party. The early predisposition toward Indonesia's cohesiveness surfaced again in the Hawke and Keating Labor governments of later years. It did not vary a great deal with changes in government The on-going commitment to preserving and strengthening the bilateral relationship meant Indonesia's territorial integrity became the focus of the Australian political elites’ regional foreign policy determinations. The actions taken by policy-makers served to promote the desire for a stable region ahead of independence claims of the East Timorese. From a realist perspective, the security dilemma for Australian policy-makers was how to best promote regional order and stability in the South East Asian region. The desire for regional cohesiveness and stability continues to drive Australian political elites to promote policies that gives a priority to the territorial integrity of regional states. Indonesia, in spite of its diversity, was only ever thought of as a cohesive unitary state and changes to its construct have rarely been countenanced. Australia's political elite justifications for this stance vacillate between strategic and economic considerations, ideological (anti-colonialism) to one of being a pragmatic response to international politics. The political elite argues the projection of power into the region is in Australia’s national interest. The policies from one government to the next necessarily see the national interest as being an apparent fixed feature of foreign policy. The persistent fear of invasion from the north traditionally motivated Australia's political elite to adopt a strategic realist policy that sought to ‘shore up’ the stability, strength and unity of Indonesia. The national interest was deemed to be at risk if support for East Timorese independence was given. The national interest though can involve more than just the security issue, and the political elite when dealing with East Timor assumed that they were acting in the common good. Questions that need to be addressed include determining what is the national interest in this context? What is the effect of a government invoking the national interest in debates over issues in foreign policy? And, who should participate in the debate? In an effort to answer these questions an analysis of how the ex-foreign affairs mandarin Richard Woolcott defines the national interest becomes crucial. Clearly, conflict in East Timor did have implications for the national interest. The invasion of East Timor by Indonesia had the potential to damage the relationship, but equally communist successes in 1975 in Indo-China raised Australia's regional security concerns. During the Cold War, the linking of communism to nationalism was driving the decision-making processes of the Australian policy-makers striving to come to grips with the strategic realities of a changing region. Because of this, did the constraints of world politics dominated by Cold War realities combined with domestic political disruption have anything to do with Australia's response? Certainly, Australia itself was experiencing a constitutional crisis in late 1975. The Senate had blocked supply and the Labor Government did not have the funds to govern. The Governor-General by dismissing the Labor Government finally resolved the impasse. What were the reactions of the two men charged with the responsibility of forming the caretaker government toward Indonesia's military action? And, could the crisis have prevented the Australian government from making a different response to the invasion? Importantly, and in terms of economic security, did the knowledge of oil and gas deposits thought to exist in the Timor Sea influence Australia's foreign policy? The search for oil and gas requires a stable political environment in which to operate. Therefore for exploration to continue in the Timor Sea Australia must have had a preferred political option and thoughts of with whom they preferred to negotiate. What was the extent of each government's cooperation and intervention in the oil and gas industry and could any involvement have influenced the Australian political elites’ attitude toward the prospect of an independent East Timor? Australia's subsequent de jure recognition that East Timor was part of Indonesia paved the way for the Timor Gap (Zone of Cooperation) Treaty signing in 1989. The signing underpinned Australia's acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. The outcome of the analysis of the issues that shaped Australia's foreign policy toward East Timor showed that the political elite became locked into an integration model, which was defended by successive governments. Moreover, they formed an almost reflexive defence of Indonesia both at the domestic and international level.

The high commissioners : Australia’s representatives in the United Kingdom, 1910-2010

Marks the centenary of the posting of the first Australian High Commissioner in London, so beginning what is today Australia's oldest diplomatic mission. In 1910, when Sir George Reid was appointed its first High Commissioner in London, Australia was a self-governing but not yet sovereign state and the Australian Governor-General remained the most important channel of communication between the Australian and United Kingdom governments until the late 1920s. The book traces the history of the office and in doing so illuminates the larger story of Australian-United Kingdom relations in the twentieth century, the evolution of Australia from British colony to sovereign state and the gradual transition of the United Kingdom from head of an empire to member of the European Union.

Factors associated with higher sitting time in general, chronic disease, and psychologically-distressed, adult populations: findings from the 45 & up study

This study examined factors associated with higher sitting time in general, chronic disease, and psychologically-distressed, adult populations (aged ≥45 years). A series of logistic regression models examined potential socio-demographic and health factors associated with higher sitting (≥6hrs/day) in adults from the 45 and Up Study (n = 227,187), including four separate subsamples for analysis comprising those who had ever had heart disease (n = 26,599), cancer (n = 36,381), diabetes (n = 19,550) or psychological distress (n = 48,334). Odds of higher sitting were significantly (p<.01) associated with a number of factors across these groups, with an effect size of ORs≥1.5 observed for the high-income ≥$70,000AUD, employed full-time and severe physical limitations demographics. Identification of key factors associated with higher sitting time in this population-based sample will assist development of broad-based, public health and targeted strategies to reduce sitting-time. In particular, those categorized as being high-income earners, full-time workers, as well as those with severe physical limitations need to be of priority, as higher sitting appears to be substantial across these groups.