Does Australia's treatment of non-citizens accord with its international human rights obligations? with specific reference to the treatment of on-shore refugees

The son of immigrants, I was motivated to write a paper addressing the issues of alienation and discrimination which confronts non-citizens upon arriving in Australia. Apart from descendants of Australia's indigenous population, the common bond shared by all citizens and permanent residents of Australia is that they are either themselves immigrants or are descended from immigrants. In this paper I will look at whether Australia's law and practice meets its international human rights treaty and convention obligations vis-a-vis non-citizens. To investigate this issue I trace the history of immigration to Australia and look at the political policies which influenced the treatment of non-citizens from 1788 to present times. In 1958 when my parents stepped upon Australian soil as displaced persons, Australia was a very different place from Australia in the 1990s. At that time Australia was still firmly under the influence of the 'White Australia Policy' which openly encouraged discrimination against non-anglo saxons. Since those times Australia has advanced to become one of the most culturally diverse nations in the world where multiculturalism is encouraged and a non-discriminatory immigration program is supported by both Australia's major political parties. However, notwithstanding the great social advances made in Australia in recent decades the traditional legal sources of law, namely, judicial pronouncements, statutes and the Commonwealth Constitution have not kept pace and it is my submission that Australia's body of law inadequately protects the rights of non-citizens when compared to Australia's international human rights convention and treaty obligations. This paper will consider these major sources of law and will investigate how they have been used in the context of the protection of the rights of non-citizens. It will be asserted that the weaknesses exposed in the Australian legal system can be improved by the adoption of a Bill of Rights1 which encompasses Australia's international human rights treaty and convention obligations. It is envisaged that a Bill of Rights would provide a framework applicable at the State, Territory and Federal levels within which issues pertaining to non-citizens could be resolved. The direction of this thesis owes much to the writings, advice and supervision of Dr. Imtiaz Omar who was always available to discuss the progress of this work. Dr. Omar is a passionate advocate of human rights and has been a tremendous inspiration to me throughout my writing. I owe a debt of thanks to the partners of Coulter Burke who with good nature ignored the sprawl of books and papers on the boardroom table, often for days at a time, thus enabling me to return to my writing from time to time as my inspirational juices ebbed and waned. Thanks also go to my typists Julie Pante, Vesna Dudas and Irene Padula who worked after hours and on weekends always without complaint, on the various versions of this thesis. My final acknowledgement goes to my wife Paula who during the years that I was working on this thesis encouraged me during my darker moments and listened to all my frustrations yet never doubted that I would one day complete the task successfully. I wish to thank her wholeheartedly for her motivation and belief in my abilities. The law relied upon in the thesis is as at the 30th June, 1998. Bill or Charter of Rights 'are taken to be enactments which systematically declare certain fundamental rights and freedoms and require that they be respected'. See Evans, G. 'Prospect and Problems for an Australian Bill of Rights' (1970) 3 Australian Year Book of International Law 1 at 16. Some such notable exception is the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, contained in an ordinary statute.

Addressing the curious black spot that is the separation between the principle of legality and sentencing

The principle of legality has evolved into a clear and entrenchedjurisprudential mechanism for protecting common law rights and freedoms. It operates as a shield to preserve the scope of application of fundamental rights and fre edoms. In recent years it has been increasingly applied by the courts to limit the scope of legislative provisions which potentially impinge on human rights and fundamental freedoms. Yet there is one domain where the principle of legality is conspicuously absent: sentencing. Ostensibly, this is paradoxical. Sentencing is the realm where the legalsystem operates in its most coercive manner against individuals. In thisarticle, we argue that logically the principle of legality has an importantrole in the sentencing system given the incursions by criminal sanctionsinto a number of basic rights, including the right to liberty, the freedom ofassociation and the deprivation of property. By way of illustration, we setout how the principle of legality should apply to the interpretation of keystatutory provisions. To this end, we argue that the objectives of generaldeterrence and specifi c deterrence should have less impact in sentencing. It is also suggested that judges should be more reluctant to send offenders with dependants to terms of imprisonment. Injecting the principle of legality into sentencing law and practice would result in the reduction in severity of a large number of sanctions, thereby reducing the frequency and extent to which the fundamental rights of offenders are violated. The methodology set out in this article can be applied to alter the operation of a number of legislative sentencing objectives and rules.

The principle of legality and contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissima in lege

If the principle of legality operates to obscure from Parliament the common law (rights) backdrop against which it legislates, the clarity or rights-sensitivity of that legislation cannot be improved. This undercuts, rather than promotes, the democratic and rule of law values that underpin the modern conception of the principle and its contemporary normative justification. So the courts must strive to give Parliament the clearest possible picture as to the content of the fundamental common law rights it seeks to protect and, depending on the right, freedom, or principle in legislative play, the strength with which the principle will be applied in order to do so. Parliament (and parliamentary counsel) can only ‘squarely confront’ those fundamental rights the existence and content of which was known at the time of legislating. The proposition which, necessarily, follows is that the rule of contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege must be revived when judges apply the principle of legality to the construction of statutes. If the courts are to maintain and take seriously the normative justification for the principle then its application to the construction of statutes can only operate to protect from legislative encroachment those fundamental rights existing at the time the statute was enacted.

Advance directives and the persistent vegetative state in Victoria: a human rights perspective

With advances in medical technology, it is now possible to sustain the life of a person in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) until a decision is made to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment. Who makes that decision? Under the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) there is no legally enforceable right for a person to choose, in advance, what intervention that person will and will not accept if he or she ends up in a PVS. The best that can be achieved is that a person can appoint an agent who is empowered to refuse medical treatment on the person's behalf in the event of incompetence. It is suggested that this mechanism ignores two fundamental human rights: self-determination and the inherent right to dignity. This article proposes the development of an advance directive mechanism that provides for a person to refuse, in advance, specified intervention, thereby respecting fundamental human rights and alleviating the existing need for an agent to second-guess a person's desires and best interests.

Fundamental elements in examining a child’s right to education : a study of home education research and regulation in Australia

Home education provides valuable educational and developmental opportunities for children. An examination of Australia’s research indicates many best educational practices, including more informed mediation, contextualised learning, and opportunities to exercise autonomy. Key features include learning embedded in communities and program modification in response to students’ needs. Current state and territory legal requirements are examined within the context of this research and Australia’s obligations to international human rights treaties. All jurisdictions accept home education as one way to meet compulsory education requirements. The extent to which respective laws then reflect understanding of home education research and practice varies. Most jurisdictions allow for a variety of educational approaches. Some oversight regulation could however be modified to reflect a better understanding of home education. Consultation with home educators and reference to research would assist the development of more uniform legislation and policy across Australia, and enable better regulatory practice.