Impact of board size and board diversity on firm value: Australian evidence

The aim of this paper is to provide a preliminary analysis of the relationship between firm market value and the size and gender diversity of a board of directors for a sample of publicly listed Australian firms. Our results show that smaller boards appear to be more effective in representing the shareholders as smaller boards are associated with higher firm value. As board size increases firm value declines, however at a decreasing rate suggesting that the relationship between board size and firm value is not strictly linear. Our findings further indicate that gender diversity promotes shareholders' value as the presence of women directors is associated with higher firm value.

Does the type of derivative instrument used by companies impact firm value?

We explore the relationship between the type of derivative instrument used and firm value, in a sample of Australian firms. Specifically, we examine the impact of the corporate use of swaps, futures, forwards and options, and the extent of such usage, on firm value. Our findings suggest that a 'discount' is most severely imposed on users of swaps.

Managerial ownership, capital structure and firm value: Evidence from China’s civilian-run firms

This paper examines the influence of managerial ownership on firm performance through capital-structure choices, using a sample of China’s civilian-run firms listed on the Chinese stock market between 2002 and 2007. The empirical results demonstrate a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. Managerial ownership drives the capital structure into a nonlinear shape, but in an opposite direction to the effect of managerial ownership on firm value. The results of simultaneous regressions suggest that managerial ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm value. Our findings imply that the “interest convergence” and “entrenchment” effects of managers’ behaviour in terms of managerial ownership can also explain the agency-relevant situation of China’s civilian-run firms.

Managerial ownership, capital structure and firm value

This paper extends prior research to examine the managerial ownership influences on firm performance through the choices of capital structures by using a new sample of S& P 500 firm in 2005. The empirical results of OLS regressions replicate the nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. However, we found that the turning points had moved up in our sample compared with previous papers, which implies that the managerial control for pursuing self-interst, and the alignment of interests between managers and other shareholders can only be achieved now by management holding more ownership in a firm than that found in previous studies. Managerial ownership also drives the capital structure as a nonlinear shape, but with a direction opposite to the shape of firm value. the results of simultaneous regressions suggest that managerial ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm value. Capital structure is endogenously determined by bith firm value and managerial ownership; while managerial ownership is not endogenously determined by the other two variables.

Managerial entrenchment and firm value: a dynamic perspective

We examine the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm value using a dynamic model with firm fixed effects. To estimate the model, we employ the long-difference technique, which is shown by our simulation to deliver the least biased estimates. Based on a large sample of U.S. companies, we document a significantly negative and causal effect of managerial entrenchment on firm value after taking into account omitted variables, reverse causality, and highly persistent endogenous variables. Additional analysis suggests that the causality running from managerial entrenchment to firm value is more pronounced than that for reverse causality.

Stock market liquidity and firm value : an empirical examination of the Australian market

We document a positive relation between stock liquidity and firm value. We examine the mechanism through which stock market liquidity enhances firm value by dividing firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, into three components, namely, operating income to price, leverage, and operating income to assets. Using the switch to broker anonymity as an exogenous shock to market liquidity, we show that the increase in liquidity around the shock leads to an increase in firm value. Our results suggest that higher firm value for more liquid stocks seems to stem from enhanced stock prices rather than from better operating performance.

The effect of financial constraints, investment policy, product market competition and corporate governance on the value of cash holdings

This study empirically investigates the value shareholders place on excess cash holdings and how shareholders’ valuation of cash holdings is associated with financial constraints, firm growth, cash-flow uncertainty and product market competition for Australian firms from 1990 to 2007. Our results indicate that the marginal value of cash holdings to shareholders declines with larger cash holdings and higher leverage. However, firms that are more financially constrained, that have higher growth rates and that face greater uncertainty exhibit a higher marginal value of cash holdings. These findings are consistent with the explanation that excess cash holdings are not necessarily detrimental to firm value. Firms with costly external financing and that also save more cash for current operating and future investing needs find that the market values these cash hoarding policies favourably. Finally, there is limited evidence of an association between various corporate governance measures and the value of cash holdings for a shorter sample period.

Board composition, board activity and ownership concentration, the impact on firm performance

This paper provides a parallel investigation on the impact of board composition, board activity and ownership concentration on the performance of listed Chinese firms. We find that independent directors enhance firm performance effectively than other board factors. The frequency of shareholder meetings, rather than board meetings, is positively associated with firm value. Tradable share ownership concentration has a positive and linear relationship with firm value, while state and total share ownership concentration represent U(V) shapes. Importantly, companies with the highest levels of both total share and tradable share ownership concentration have a greater firm values than companies with the highest levels of only a single concentration.

On the determinants of derivative usage by Australian companies

This paper provides an examination of the determinants of derivative use by Australian corporations. We analysed the characteristics of a sample of 469 firm/year observations drawn from the largest Australian publicly listed companies in 1999 and 2000 to address two issues: the decision to use financial derivatives and the extent to which they are used. Logit analysis suggests that a firm's leverage (distress proxy), size (financial distress and setup costs) and liquidity (financial constraints proxy) are important factors associated with the decision to use derivatives. These findings support the financial distress hypothesis while the evidence on the underinvestment hypothesis is mixed. Additionally, setup costs appear to be important, as larger firms are more likely to use derivatives. Tobit results, on the other hand, show that once the decision to use derivatives has been made, a firm uses more derivatives as its leverage increases and as it pays out more dividends (hedging substitute proxy). The overall results indicate that Australian companies use derivatives with a view to enhancing the firms' value rather than to maximizing managerial wealth. In particular, corporations' derivative policies are mostly concerned with reducing the expected cost of financial distress and managing cash flows. Our inability to identify managerial influences behind the derivative decision suggests a competitive Australian managerial labor market.

The impact of ownership structure on corporate debt policy : two stage least square simultaneous model approach for post crisis period : evidence from Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange

Ownership concentration as a governance mechanism has received considerable attention among academician, practitioners as well as policy makers because large-block shareholders are increasingly active in their demands that corporations adopt effective governance mechanisms to control managerial decisions, which include corporate debt policy. Earlier study on the agency model of the firm widely recognizes that the managerial ownership and external debt play an important role in mitigating agency conflicts and enhancing firm value. They also found that increase in the external monitors, for example the institutional investors, can actually play a useful role in limiting agency problems in the firm. This paper, using 100 Composite Index companies from Brusa Malaysia between 1998 to 2002 explores the impact of institutional holdings on managerial ownership and debt policy in an integrated framework by using a simultaneous equations estimation procedure (2SLS). The findings show that there is a significant impact of institutional ownership which serves effective control mechanism on managerial ownership and corporate debt policy as hypothesized. Findings of such evidence suggest that institutional holding thus have played an important role in managers' strategic management decision and reduce agency conflict. In addition, corporate debt policy too is governed by managerial ownership and exhibited a negative relation.

Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China

This study examines the effect of family control on the cash holding policy in China. We find that family firms with excess control rights tend to have high cash holdings that are tunneled rather than being invested or paid to shareholders. We further show that the incentive for controlling families to hold cash and for tunneling is exacerbated by the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders, i.e., it is weakened after the Chinese Non-tradable share (NTS) reform and strengthened by the presence of multiple large shareholders who probably play no monitoring role in Chinese family firms. Furthermore, family firms’ incentive to hold cash for tunneling is influenced by the unique characteristics of Chinese firms in the following ways: the incentive is stronger when the family founder has one child and face family succession problem, and when the founder has political connections and directly involves in firm’s management; while it is weakened by family founder’s social interpersonal trust with other entrepreneurs through their membership of Chambers of Commerce. Overall, we argue that family firms in China tend to hold high levels of cash for tunneling, which harms firm value, while the severe controlling-minority shareholder agency conflicts and unique Chinese family characteristics only make this situation worse.

Controlling shareholder, expropriations and firm’s leverage decision: Evidence from Chinese Non-tradable share reform

This paper examines the effect of excess control rights on the leverage decisions made by Chinese non-SOEs before and after the Non-tradable share reform (NTS reform). We find that firms with excess control rights have more excess leverage and their controlling shareholders use the resources for tunneling rather than investing in positive NPV projects. We also find that excess leverage in firms with excess control rights decreases and the market reaction to announcements of related party transactions are more positive after NTS reform. This confirms that tunneling by the controlling shareholders actually reduced. We argue that in emerging markets where legal protection for creditors and shareholders is weak, controlling shareholders borrow excess debt to tunnel through inter-corporate loans and related party transactions. Furthermore the privatization of these economies can reduce the controlling shareholders' tunneling activities and associated excess leverage which destroys firm value.