What was the iconoclast controversy about?

Byzantine society of the eighth and ninth centuries experienced a vigorous and often violent dispute over the status of holy icons. 'Iconoclasts' were deeply suspicious of any pictorial representations of Christ, the Mother of God, and the saints, and they therefore unleashed a wave of persecution against the use of religious images, while 'iconophiles' fiercely defended the veneration of icons as an integral element of the life of the church. The extent and magnitude of this controversy indicates that it was more than a mere dispute over competing conceptions of religious art. A number of deeper issues and concerns were at play, and in this paper I seek to uncover some of these underlying concerns and hidden agendas. In particular, I argue that the opposing factions in the iconoclast crisis were, at bottom, concerned with issues relating to salvation, power, idolatry, tradition, and access to the divine.

Cultural destruction and identity politics : targeting the history of Iraq

Since its inception in 1921, a number of successive regimes have sought to politicize Iraq‟s cultural history in order to develop national identity and foster social cohesion across this rich and complex nation. Foremost among these were the Baath party, particularly under the rule of Saddam Hussein, who used much of the nation‟s Oil wealth to undergo an extensive nation-building campaign. However, identity in Iraq is far from monolithic and various factions have long resisted the state sanctioned version of “Iraqi” identity and asserted alternative histories and narratives to underpin their own identity politics. With the invasion of Iraq by Coalition forces in 2003, however, came an unprecedented era of cultural destruction. Following the devastation of the battle phase of the war, there were further attacks on Iraq‟s cultural heritage including everything from the carefully choreographed removal of the giant bronze statue of Saddam in Firdos square, through to military bases set up at sensitive archaeological sites such as the ancient city of Babylon. In addition, Iraqi civilians targeted the cultural history of their nation with wanton looting and arson, as well as systematic attacks on sites of archaeological or ethno-religious significance. More recently, the Shia and Kurdish dominated Iraqi Government have organised the “Committee for Removing Symbols of the Saddam Era” and drew up plans to purge the state of its Sunni dominated past.

This paper argues that the unprecedented scale and magnitude of the destruction of Iraq‟s cultural history has played a part in eroding the various intersecting and overlapping versions of identity politics in Iraq. In turn, this has provided fertile ground for terrorists and sectarians to plant the seeds of their own narrow and deadly ideologies. This has brought about the rise of ethno-religious based violence and seen a series of bloody and protracted conflicts emerge between previously peaceful and compatible factions. In this way, Iraq serves as a powerful case study in furthering academic discussion on the complex inter-relationships between cultural and historical destruction and identity politics, sectarianism, violence and democracy.

The post-Saddam Iraqi media : reporting the democratic developments of 2005

The toppling of Saddam in 2003 brought with it the re-emergence of the free press in Iraq. This has seen Iraq shift from only a handful of state media outlets that served as propaganda machines, to a vast array of Iraqi-owned newspapers, radio stations and television channels which are being fervently produced and avidly consumed across the nation. This paper therefore reviews the developments in Iraq’s post-Saddam media sector and finds that it has been central to the return of an Iraqi public sphere which has openly debated and discussed the issues surrounding the nation’s shift from despotism to democracy. This is perhaps best evidenced by the role that the Iraqi media played in hosting a rich tapestry of debate, discourse and deliberation from a panoply of political, religious and ethno-sectarian factions throughout the elections and the referendum held across the nation in 2005. Despite their respective biases and particular persuasions, the net effect of such a rich media sector has been an Iraqi populace who are both concerned and informed about the nuances of democratic governance.

Manipulating Islam and democracy in Iraq’s ‘Pluralised Authoritarianism’

With the realisation that the initial motives for the 2003 invasion of Iraq – Saddam’s alleged stockpile of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and his links to Al-Qaeda – were grievous intelligence errors the Bush administration, with varying degrees of success, were able to spin the war’s rasion d’etre and redefine the parameters of victory. A central tenet of this approach was to begin speaking about democracy as if it had always been one of the aims of the war itself. For the first few years, the effort to democratise Iraq appeared to gain some credible momentum: a complex array of political, religious and ethno-sectarian factions formed political parties and civil society movements; uncensored news was enthusiastically consumed across the nation; Iraqi citizens took to the streets to protest key government decisions; and millions of Iraqis voted in relatively free and fair national elections (Davis, 2004, 2007, Isakhan, 2008, 2011b). Central to each of these developments were various Iraqi religious establishments – but especially those of the Shia Arab population of Iraq – who saw no distinction between their Islamic faith and the notion of democracy. Not surprisingly, a body of literature has emerged which has been very optimistic about Iraq’s engagement with both ‘Islam’ and ‘democracy’ in the post-Baathist period, while acknowledging the challenges it faces in creating a stable, egalitarian and democratic society (Al-Musawi, 2006, Cole, 2006, Davis, 2005, Dawisha, 2009, Isakhan, 2011a, Stansfield, 2007).

However, there have been virtually no studies which have sought to question this optimism in the light of more recent events. Addressing this lacuna, this paper documents the last few years (2006- 2011) which have seen many elements within the Iraqi political elite – most notably the Maliki government and his State of Law Coalition (SLC) – demonstrate what has been referred to in literature on other Arab states alternatively as ‘liberalised autocracy’ (Brumberg, 2002), ‘semi-authoritarianism’ (Ottaway, 2003) or ‘pluralised authoritarianism’ (Posusney and Angrist, 2005). That is to say, that these states consolidate their incumbency while putting in place measures that can be considered more or less liberal. To do this, the regime actually utilises (and controls) nominally democratic mechanisms such as elections, media freedoms, political opposition and civil society as part of their strategy to retain power. Of particular interest here are the ways in which the Maliki government – and Shia Arab Iraqi political factions more broadly – have manipulated both ‘Islam’ and ‘democracy’ towards such ‘pluralised authoritarianism’.

The Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions : protests and public power in post-Saddam Iraq

Since the democratic elections held across Iraq in 2005 and 2010 much attention has understandably been paid to the new Iraqi government. Unfortunately, it has become increasingly clear that much of Iraq’s political elite are practising the type of governance referred to in the literature on other Arab states alternatively as ‘liberalised autocracy’ (Brumberg, 2002), ‘semi-authoritarianism’ (Ottaway, 2003) or ‘pluralised authoritarianism’ (Posusney & Angrist, 2005). That is to say, that the Iraqi government actually utilises (and controls) nominally democratic mechanisms such as elections, media freedoms, political opposition and civil society as part of their strategy to retain power. This is perhaps best demonstrated via the nine month political stalemate that followed the March 2010 elections and PM Maliki’s refusal to step down despite having narrowly lost the election. Not surprisingly, the Iraqi people have become increasingly disillusioned and critical of their political leaders – hence the mass protests that have swept across Iraq in the context of the popular Arab Revolutions of 2010-11.

However, these latest Iraqi protests are only the most recent and overt sign of the hidden geographies that are agitating towards democracy in this deeply troubled and increasingly authoritarian state. Since the invasion of 2003, a complex array of political, religious and ethno-sectarian factions have formed civil society movements; uncensored news has been consumed across the nation; ordinary citizens have taken to the streets to protest key government decisions; and various local councils have been formed, deliberating on key decisions facing their immediate communities (Davis, 2004, 2007). Given this context, this chapter focuses on the specific case of the Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions (IFOU), Iraq’s largest and most powerful independent workers union. The IFOU has repeatedly taken the Iraqi government to task over their poor pay and the dangerous nature of their work, as well as the government’s initial kowtowing to US plans to privatise the entire Iraqi oil sector. To do this, the IFOU have utilised a variety of very democratic mechanisms including peaceful strikes and protests, media campaigns and political lobbying. Such moves have met with mixed results in Baghdad – at times the central government has pandered to the requests of IFOU, but it has also gone as far as issuing arrest warrants for its senior members. The IFOU therefore serve as an interesting example of public power in Iraq and may well pose one of the greatest challenges to rising authoritarianism there.

Oil unions and democracy in post-Saddam Iraq

Since the invasion of 2003, a complex array of political, religious and ethno-sectarian factions have formed civil society movements; uncensored news has been consumed across the nation; ordinary citizens have taken to the streets to protest key government decisions; and various local councils have been formed, deliberating on key decisions facing their immediate communities. Given this context, this paper focuses on the specific case of the Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions (IFOU), Iraq’s largest and most powerful independent workers union. The IFOU has repeatedly taken the Iraqi government to task over their poor pay and the dangerous nature of their work, as well as the government’s initial kowtowing to US plans to privatise the entire Iraqi oil sector. To do this, the IFOU have utilised a variety of very democratic mechanisms including peaceful strikes and protests, media campaigns and political lobbying. Such moves have met with mixed results in Baghdad – at times the central government has pandered to the requests of IFOU, but it has also gone as far as issuing arrest warrants for its senior members. The IFOU therefore serve as an interesting example of public power in Iraq and may well pose one of the greatest challenges to rising authoritarianism there.

Civil society after Saddam: oil unions and democracy in Iraq

Following the intervention in Iraq by coalition forces one decade ago, the Bush Administration underwent an enormous and unprecedented project to bring the ‘Western’ liberal model of democracy to Iraq. For the first few years the project to bring democracy to Iraq had its share of successes as the Iraqi people proved themselves capable of understanding and utilizing democratic mechanisms and institutions. This culminated in a series of nation-wide elections from 2005 onwards that brought a democratically elected government to power (Isakhan, 2012). However, one of the unfortunate consequences of the war and the US effort to bring democracy to Iraq was that many key ethno-religious political factions viewed it as an opportunity to pedal their own relatively narrow and very divisive political rhetoric (Davis, 2007). This meant that the Iraqi government was constituted not so much by a body who wanted to draw Iraq together behind a common ideology and to work towards a collective and egalitarian future, as it was by representatives who would fight on behalf of their ethno-religious constituencies. Not surprisingly, a great deal of academic literature has emerged which has analysed and criticised the formal political parties and institutions of the post-Saddam era (Dawisha, 2009). Indeed, the bulk of contemporary scholarship on Iraqi politics focuses on issues such as: the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the Iraqi government; the obstinacy and ineptitude of many elements of Iraq’s political elite; the systemic corruption that is hollowing out the coffers of the state; the moribund bureaucracy that are struggling to deliver basic services and; of course, the deep-seated divisions within and between those that represent Iraq’s three main ethno-religious blocks: the Shia Arabs, the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds.

Wave of bombings across Iraq ahead of elections

The people of Iraq have also endured bombings but on a larger scale. There are media reports saying up to thirty-one people were killed in dozens of separate explosions across different Iraqi provinces including two blasts at a checkpoint at Baghdad international airport.

This comes just days before provincial elections across Iraq, the first ballot since the withdrawal of US troops at the end of 2011. Although it is unclear who carried out the attacks different factions are increasingly stoking the fire as they vie for political power in the upcoming elections. Tawar Razaghi spoke to Senior Research Fellow, Dr Benjamin Isakhan, at the Centre for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University.

Succeeding and seceding in Iraq: the case for a Shiite State

The US project to democratize Iraq has given way to a dramatic upsurge in ethno-religious factionalism in which a series of groups have sought to use ‘democracy’ to create or exacerbate division. Among these divisive political elements a relatively fringe idea held mostly by power-hungry elites has become a central driving force of much political debate within Iraq: separatism. Although there are many examples of political factions within Iraq which have called for territorial separatism since 2003 (such as some Kurdish, Sunni, Assyrian and Turcoman political parties), this chapter focuses on the less known case for a Shiite state. Specifically, it concentrates on the Shia Arab Islamist political party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which differs from other Shia political factions in their calls for a decentralized federal Iraq with an autonomous Shia Islamic state in the south.

Shattering the Shia: a Maliki political strategy in post-Saddam Iraq

This chapter argues that one key legacy of the US effort to bring democracy to Iraq has been that many elements within Iraq’s Shia Arab political elite have viewed democracy through the lens of a cynical majoritarianism and manipulated it to catapult themselves to power. This has had a further legacy, enabling the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to utilise his incumbency to maintain the veneer of democracy while becoming increasingly dictatorial and authoritarian. In doing so, Maliki’s government shares much in common with other ‘hybrid regimes’ in which governments hijack nominally democratic mechanisms such as elections, media freedoms, political opposition and civil society as part of their strategy to retain, rather than diffuse, power (Dodge 2012b, 2013). Although Maliki hasdeployed a host of different strategies along these lines – including blatant sectarianism, undermining key state institutions, the creation of a shadow state loyal to himself, and the concentration of military and political power in his own hands – this chapter focuses on Maliki’s less well-known efforts to shatter the unity of his Shia Arab political opponents. It focuses on his first two terms in power and examines the ways in which he has been able to systematically fracture the Shia political elite to such an extent that once tenuously united factions now stand bitterly divided. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the reasoning behind such an approach and the prospects of Iraq’s democracy moving beyond the blatant power grab of the incumbent Malikigovernment.