Application of white-beam X-ray microdiffraction for the study of mineralogical phase identification in ancient Egyptian pigments

High-brightness synchrotron X-rays together with precision achromatic focusing optics on beamline 7.3.3 at the Advanced Light Source have been applied for Laue microdiffraction analysis of mineralogical phases in Egyptian pigments. Although this task is usually performed using monochromatic X-ray diffraction, the Laue technique was both faster and more reliable for the present sample. In this approach, white-beam diffraction patterns are collected as the sample is raster scanned across the incident beam (0.8 µm × 0.8 µm). The complex Laue diffraction patterns arising from illumination of multiple grains are indexed using the white-beam crystallographic software package XMAS, enabling a mineralogical map as a function of sample position. This methodology has been applied to determine the mineralogy of colour pigments taken from the ancient Egyptian coffin of Tjeseb, a priestess of the Apis bull dating from the Third Intermediate to Late period, 25th Dynasty to early 26th Dynasty (747 to 600 BC). For all pigments, a ground layer of calcite and quartz was identified. For the blue pigment, cuprorivaite (CuCaSi4O10) was found to be the primary colouring agent with a grain size ranging from ∼10 to 50 µm. In the green and yellow samples, malachite [Cu2(OH)2CO3] and goethite [FeO(OH)] were identified, respectively. Grain sizes from these pigments were significantly smaller. It was possible to index some malachite grains up to ∼20 µm in size, while the majority of goethite grains displayed a nanocrystalline particle size. The inability to obtain a complete mineralogical map for goethite highlights the fact that the incident probe size is considerably larger than the grain size. This limit will continue to improve as the present trend is toward focusing optics approaching the diffraction limit (∼1000× smaller beam area).

On eschatology and the 'return to religion'

We begin with Tony Blair's July 2009 Australian visit. Mr Blair converted publicly to Catholicism in 2008. In Australia that year, he argued that the West was facing an internal crisis of confidence, as well as external threats. Blair warned in particular against what he called 'aggressive secularism' and the Western tendency to 'see people of religious faith as people to be pushed to one side'. The Australian's 'editor at large', Paul Kelly, responded enthusiastically. Blair's position represented 'the best argument against the rise of secular intolerance and its distorting of history in the education system by seeking to downgrade or eliminate religion in the West's story'. This stood in contrast to the Australian Labour Party's disastrous' distancing from the Christian tradition. Kelly styled Blair as opposing 'the fashionable Western idea that religion can be suppressed or confined to the private realm' as 'a delusion and dangerous'. The Australian's position is not surprising, given the news paper's long- standing, US-influenced neoconservative position.

2. Scanning and processing 3D objects for web display

We present a case study of scanning 3D objects for the purposes of education and public information. We begin by describing the original design of a 3D scanning system now in use in Cairo’s Egyptian Museum. The system captures both the geometry and surface color and detail of museum artifacts. We report on the experience using the system in the museum setting, and how practical problems with the system were addressed. We present samples of how the processed 3D data will be used on a web site designed to communicate Egyptian culture.We present a case study of scanning 3D objects for the purposes of education and public information. We begin by describing the original design of a 3D scanning system now in use in Cairo’s Egyptian Museum. The system captures both the geometry and surface color and detail of museum artifacts. We report on the experience using the system in the museum setting, and how practical problems with the system were addressed. We present samples of how the processed 3D data will be used on a web site designed to communicate Egyptian culture.

A just judgement? Considerations on Ronald Srigley’s Camus’ Critique of Modernity

This paper responds critically to Ronald Srigley’s groundbreaking 2011 study Albert Camus’ Critique of Modernity. Srigley’s book reasserts Camus’ credentials as a deeply serious thinker, whose literary and philosophical oeuvre was dedicated to rethinking modernity on the basis of critical reassessments of theWest’s entire premodern heritage. Yet we challenge whether Camus was ever, even in his final writings, so uncompromisingly anti-modern as Srigley contends. Srigley’s attempt to present Camus as committed to a return to the Greeks, on the basis of a total critique of modernity as deleteriously post-Christian, forces him to occlude important distinctions in Camus’ thought: those between unity and totality, rebellion and revolution. By contrast, we compare Camus’ defence of modern rebellion with Blumenberg’s argument in The Legitimacy of the Modern Age: finding justification for this rebellion in the deep problem faced by Christian theology of resolving the ‘problem of evil’. Finally, we suggest that Srigley overplays the extent of Camus’ ‘Hellenic’ critique of the Christian heritage (notably its ethical commitment to protecting the weak), in contrast to Christian theodicy and eschatology, which serve to rationalize avoidable suffering.

Refractive errors in students from Middle Eastern backgrounds living and undertaking schooling in Australia

Background:  Environmental factors associated with schooling systems in various countries have been implicated in the rising prevalence of myopia, making the comparison of prevalence of refractive errors in migrant populations of interest. This study aims to determine the prevalence of refractive errors in children of Middle Eastern descent, raised and living in urban Australia but actively maintaining strong ties to their ethnic culture, and to compare them with those in the Middle East where myopia prevalence is generally low.Methods:  A total of 354 out of a possible 384 late primary/early secondary schoolchildren attending a private school attracting children of Middle Eastern background in Melbourne were assessed for refractive error and visual acuity. A Shin Nippon open-field NVision-K5001 autorefractor was used to carry out non-cycloplegic autorefraction while viewing a distant target. For statistical analyses students were divided into three age groups: 10–11 years (n = 93); 12–13 years (n = 158); and 14–15 years (n = 102).Results:  All children were bilingual and classified as of Middle Eastern (96.3 per cent) or Egyptian (3.7 per cent) origin. Ages ranged from 10 to 15 years, with a mean of 13.17 ± 0.8 (SEM) years. Mean spherical equivalent refraction (SER) for the right eye was +0.09 ± 0.07 D (SEM) with a range from -7.77 D to +5.85 D. The prevalence of myopia, defined as a spherical equivalent refraction 0.50 D or more of myopia, was 14.7 per cent. The prevalence of hyperopia, defined as a spherical equivalent refraction of +0.75 D or greater, was 16.4 per cent, while hyperopia of +1.50 D or greater was 5.4 per cent. A significant difference in SER was seen as a function of age; however, no significant gender difference was seen.Conclusions:  This is the first study to report the prevalence of refractive errors for second-generation Australian schoolchildren coming from a predominantly Lebanese Middle Eastern Arabic background, who endeavour to maintain their ethnic ties. The relatively low prevalence of myopia is similar to that found for other metropolitan Australian school children but higher than that reported in the Middle East. These results suggest that lifestyle and educational practices may be a significant influence in the progression of myopic refractive errors.

On a neglected argument in French philosophy: Sceptical humanism in Montaigne, Voltaire and Camus

This paper wants to draw out a common argument in three great philosophers and littérateurs in modern French thought: Michel de Montaigne, Voltaire, and Albert Camus. The argument makes metaphysical and theological scepticism the first premise for a universalistic political ethics, as per Voltaire's: "it is clearer still that we ought to be tolerant of one another, because we are all weak, inconsistent, liable to fickleness and error." The argument, it seems to me, presents an interestingly overlooked, deeply important and powerful contribution to the philosophical discourse of modernity. On one hand, theological and post-structuralist critics of "humanism" usually take the latter to depend either on an essentialist philosophical anthropology, or a progressive philosophy of history. The former, it is argued, is philosophically contestable and ethically contentious (since however we define the human "essence," we are bound to exclude some "others"). The latter, for better or worse, is a continuation of theological eschatology by another name. So both, if not "modernity" per se, should somehow be rejected. But an ethical universalism - like that we find in Montaigne, Bayle, Voltaire, or Camus - which does not claim familiarity with metaphysical or eschatological truths, but humbly confesses our epistemic finitude, seeing in this the basis for ethical solidarity, eludes these charges. On the other hand, philosophical scepticism plays a large role in the post-structuralist criticisms of modern institutions and ideas in ways which have been widely taken to license forms of ethics which problematically identify responsibility, with taking a stand unjustifiable by recourse to universalizable reasons. But, in Montaigne, Voltaire and Camus, our ignorance concerning the highest or final truths does not close off, but rather opens up, a new descriptive sensitivity to the foibles and complexities of human experience: a sensitivity reflected amply, and often hilariously, in their literary productions. As such, a critical agnosticism concerning claims about things "in the heavens and beneath the earth" does not, for such a "sceptical humanism," necessitate decisionism or nihilism. Instead, it demands a redoubled ethical sensitivity to the complexities and plurality of political life which sees the dignity of "really-existing" others, whatever their metaphysical creeds, as an inalienable first datum of ethical conduct and reflection. After tracking these arguments in Montaigne, Voltaire, and Camus, the essay closes by reflecting on, and contesting, one more powerful theological argument against modern agnosticism's allegedly deleterious effects on ethical culture: that acknowledging ignorance concerning the highest things robs us of the basis for awe or wonder, the wellspring of human beings' highest ethical, aesthetic, and spiritual achievements.