Historical evolution and modern implications of concepts of consent to, and refusal of, medical treatment in the law of trespass

Many mischiefs arise on the change of a maxim and rule of the Common Law, which those who altered it could not see when they made the change.

Ambiguities and inconsistencies in relation to the obligations of proxies under corporations law: a model for reform

This article reconsiders the important question which came to light as a result of the controversial 2002 Coles Myer annual general meeting: do directors that are appointed as proxy have an obligation to vote as directed (and indeed should they)? A recent decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court, which was subsequently approved on appeal, stands for the proposition that proxy holders are agents of the shareholders that appointed them. However, currently the Corporations Act only requires a Chairman appointed as proxy to vote as directed — not an ordinary director. This article briefly explains the present state of the law in Australia on this issue, and then explores some interesting recent judicial remarks which may suggest that ordinary directors appointed as proxy must vote as directed in order to satisfy their director’s duties (both common law and statutory) to the company. We finally outline a proposed statutory reform initiative which seeks to remove the present uncertainty in the law by introducing a blanket requirement that all proxy holders must vote as directed.

The status of using drug detection dogs under Australian law

In recent years it has become increasingly common for drug detection dogs to be active in and around public transport, busy nightclub precincts, music festivals and dance parties. However, the legal status of police using drug detection dogs is anything but clear in many parts of Australia. The aim of this article is to outline the nature and scope of the powers available to police at common law and under statute that allow their use.

An overview of liability and compensation for personal injury in China under the general principles of civil law

This article reviews the personal injury tort system in the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Chinese torts law has a number of unique features. To begin with, it is quite new — the legal framework of torts law was established only in 1986. The unique features of the Chinese torts law also stem from its long and difficult evolution over nearly 40 years. Equally important has been the remarkable blend of influences that have shaped its current law — a mixture of socialist objectives, capitalist pragmatism, and feudal doctrines combined with jurisprudential models taken from a range of western civil codes and, more recently, the common law.

Part one of the article briefly analyses the most important features of the existing Chinese legal system. Part two provides a background to the enactment of the General Principles of Civil Law (GPCL), which incorporates Chinese torts law. The review looks at the development and drafting of the GPCL legislation, and the influences that guided the formulation of legal principles. Part three of the article provides an overview of the torts law provisions in the GPCL. Part four examines the law of personal injury established by the GPCL. Part five uses some case studies to illustrate the principles highlighted in the previous two parts and part six contains a brief conclusion and some pointers to the directions that Chinese torts law may take in the future.

Remedies for unfair dismissal under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 - a fair go all round?

Background to unfair termination laws - remedies at common law - remedies for unfair termination under Federal Awards - overview of remedies under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 - compensation - reinstatement.

Introducing personal liability under the continuous disclosure regime : The essentials and non-essentials

Under the Federal Government's CLERP 9 legislation, expected at the time of writing to come into force in July 2004, personal liability will be introduced for the first time under the continuous disclosure regime. Individuals who are 'involved' in a failure to immediately disclose materially price sensitive information to the market will be subject to a civil penalty, in addition to the company being liable. According to the author, the introduction of personal liability per se is not contentious and indeed is a favourable change; what is questionable, however, is whether 'involvement' in a contravention is the appropriate test for imposing personal liability in relation to breaches of the continuous disclosure provisions. Based on the case law to date on the meaning of 'involved', there is particular uncertainty as to whether an individual would need to have actual knowledge that non-disclosed information is 'materially price sensitive' in order to satisfy the test of 'involved' in the context of continuous disclosure, or whether mere knowledge that the information has not been disclosed would be sufficient. This uncertainty arises due to the vague concept of 'essential matters' which the courts have developed as a test for what degree of knowledge a person needs to have in order to be 'involved'. The author argues that all the confusion as to what 'involved' means could be addressed by removing the word 'essential' from the dialogue, so that the test of 'involvement' would simply be based on whether the particular person had actual knowledge of each of the factual elements constituting the offence.

The protection of political communication under the Australian constitution

Compatibility of a law with implied freedom of political communication - application of test of constitutionality outlined in Lange case - argues that two-tier approach be abandoned - if a law regulates the content of a political communication, not its mode, more rigorous judicial scrutiny will follow - should be a single test for constitutionality where application is through the proportionality framework and informed by the rationale of the implied freedom - application to Australian racial vilification laws.

Preventative detention and the right of personal liberty and security under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966

Preventive detention enables a person to be deprived of liberty, by executive determination, for the purposes of safeguarding national security or public order without that person being charged or brought to trial. This paper examines Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 to assess whether preventive detention is prohibited by the phrase 'arbitrary arrest and detention '. To analyse this Article, this paper uses a textual and structural analysis of the Article, as well as reference to the travaux preparatoires and case law of the Human Rights Committee. This paper argues that preventive detention is not explicitly prohibited by Article 9(1) ofthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. If preventive detention is 'arbitrary', within the wide interpretation of that term as argued in this paper, it will be a permissible deprivation of personal liberty under Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. Preventive detention will, however, always be considered 'arbitrary' if sajeguards for those arrested and detained are not complied with, in particular the right to judicial review of the lawfulness of detention.

Carrier's liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules

Provides a critical analysis of the carrier's liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules. Focusing on Australian and English jurisprudence, the work also demonstrates that, quite contrary to prevailing opinions, the Hamburg Rules do not materially change (still less increase) the carrier's existing liability.

Ignorance of the law as a defence to rape : the destruction of a maxim

In DPP v Morgan, the House of Lords correctly concluded that an accused who entertained a genuine belief that a woman was consenting to carnal knowledge of her person could not be convicted of the common law crime of rape as such a belief and the requisite mens rea to convict were mutually exclusive of one another. Though England and Wales have resiled from this position by virtue of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1 (b), which allows for conviction upon proof that the accused did not reasonably believe that the complainant was consenting, the Morgan principle has retained its vitality at common law as well as under the various statutory crimes of rape that exist throughout Australia, most notably the provisions of s. 38 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). Despite a long line of Victorian Court of Appeal decisions which have reaffirmed the Morgan principle, the court has construed s. 37AA(b)(ii) of the Act as leaving open the possibility of an acquittal despite the fact that the accused acted with an awareness that one or more factors that are statutorily deemed as negating consent under s. 36(a)-(g) of the Act were operating at the time of his or her sexual penetration; specifically, the court held that the foregoing factors do not necessarily preclude a jury from finding that the accused acted in the genuine belief that the complainant was consenting. This article endeavours to explain how the accused could be aware of such circumstances at the time of penetration, yet still entertain such a belief. The article ultimately concludes that such an anomaly can only be explained through a combination of the poor drafting of s. 37AA(b)(ii) and the court's apparent refusal to follow the longstanding precept that ignorance of the law is never a defence to a crime, ostensibly prompted by its adherence to the cardinal precept that legislation is not to be construed as superfluous.