Removal of directors of public companies takes centre stage in Australia : an exploration of the corporate law and governance issues

Increasing attention is being given to the legal and governance issues relating to the removal of directors in Australian public companies. This has been due mainly to the difficulties experienced by the board of National Australia Bank in attempting to remove one of its fellow directors, and the subsequent development of public companies entering into so-called 'prenuptial agreements' with new directors, requiring that the director 'resign' if the board pass a vote of no-confidence in the director. In this article, the author revisits the area of director removal in Australian public companies for two reasons. The first reason, which covers the majority of the article, is to engage in a detailed analysis of whether the pre-nuptial agreements which some public companies have indicated that they support using to remove directors, are in fact enforceable under Australia's Corporations Act The second reason is to outline a law reform proposal to enable public companies to remove directors without requiring the vote of shareholders at a general meeting. The proposal involves providing Australia' corporate  regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) with the power to grant relief from the statutory removal provisions to public companies, but in a way which balances the competing objectives of commercial efficiency and shareholder participation and, very importantly, encourages good corporate governance practices by companies in relation to the performance assessment  of directors.

It is in the interests of both shareholders and directors to agree on a set of ground rules for the effective supervision of companies that reconciles the rights of the owners to overall control with the much tougher demands on modern directors

Some care, little responsibility? Promoting directors'and managers' legal accountability for Occupational Health and Safety in the workplace

Health and safety at work remains a serious and under-recognised problem in Australia. This paper argues for the importance of increasing the individual responsibility and accountability of senior managers and directors of corporations for the development and maintenance of occupational health and safety (OHS) standards in the workplace. In order to do so, the paper first sets out the range of statutory and general law duties and liabilities to which directors and senior managers are subject, considers to what extent these obligations have relevance in the OHS area and argues for the extension of these duties and liabilities in some circumstances. The paper then goes on to argue for a better legislative model for the legal responsibility of managers and officers, supported by the increased prosecution of individuals in appropriate circumstances, as well as acknowledging the benefits of a broader range of non-legal strategies to improve board level commitment to OHS that will influence corporate compliance overall.

Ethical structures and processes of corporations operating in Australia, Canada and Sweden : A longitudinal and cross-cultural study

Based on the ‘Partnership Model of Corporate Ethics’ (Wood, 2002), this study examines the ethical structures and processes that are put in place by organizations to enhance the ethical business behavior of staff. The study examines the use of these structures and processes amongst the top companies in the three countries of Australia, Canada, and Sweden over two time periods (2001–2002 and 2005–2006). Subsequently, a combined comparative and longitudinal approach is applied in the study, which we contend is a unique approach in the area of business ethics. The findings of the study indicate that corporations operating in Sweden have utilized ethical structures and processes differently than their Canadian and/or Australian counterparts, and that in each culture the way that companies fashion their approach to business ethics appears congruent with their national cultural values. There does, however, appear to be a convergence of views within the organizations of each culture, as the Swedish companies appear to have been more influenced in 2005–2006 by an Anglo-Saxon business paradigm than they have been in the past.

Contracting-agency analysis of the association between firm risk, investment opportunity set, corporate governance and firm performance

Tests the efficiency of corporate controls (board monitoring and incentive contracts) for growth or risk firms. By exploring the implications of controls and studying their interactive effects on firm performance, this study demonstrates how and why different firms use corporate governance controls to align managers' and shareholders' interests.

Survey of Directors of Australian university teaching and learning centres

The data provides a representative quantitative snapshot of the characteristics, capacities and constraints of Australian teaching and learning centres as seen through the eyes of their Directors. It provides evidence-based information for sector benchmarking and policy design, and identifies factors that contribute to the effective startegic leadership of Australian teaching and learning centres.

Human rights performance reporting : a study of corporations within Australian financial sector

This paper investigates the human rights performance reporting practices of the top 50 Australian financial service companies listed in the Australian Stock Exchange. All corporate reporting media, including annual reports, Social Responsibility Reports (CSR) and company websites, were reviewed to document their disclosure practices for the current period (2009/2010). In considering a number of international voluntary guidelines on human rights, a content analysis instrument containing 80 specific human rights themes, under 10 general categories, was developed to examine corporate reporting media. The results remain intensely unimpressive. The number of companies that disclosed human rights items is extremely low; the majority of the items were not disclosed by any of the companies under investigation. However, compared to CSR reports and company websites, annual reports were the preferable media used to disclose human rights issues. The result indicates how ineffective the voluntary global guidelines are in ensuring that Australian financial corporations report on their human rights performances.

Putting the spoils of litigation into the shareholders’ pockets: when can shareholders bring a personal action against the directors of their company?

company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other independent person with its rightsand liabilities appropriate to itself”.2 A consequence of this is the “proper plaintiff” principleestablished in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189: the proper plaintiff in an action inrespect of a wrong done to a corporation is the corporation itself.3 It is also a “hallowed rule” thatdirectors owe their duties to the company, not the shareholders,4 and so any loss accruing to thecompany as a result of the directors’ breach of their duties is recoverable only by the company.5An obvious problem with this state of affairs is that a company will be unlikely to initiateproceedings against its directors when the company is controlled by those directors.6 While there aregood economic reasons for this division of management and ownership,7 shareholders are left with acritical question: under what circumstances can they initiate proceedings to recover loss suffered as aresult of company directors’ breach of their duties? Although one writer has referred to the“expansive statutory and common law arsenals” available to aggrieved shareholders,8 it seems ratherthe case that there are few effective remedies. For shareholders have no contractual relationship withdirectors,9 and the personal rights conferred on shareholders by statute or general law are largelyprocedural10 and seem a rather ineffective basis for “scrutinising directorial performance”.

Connection between commonly used financial ratios and misrepresentation of financial statements of collapsed corporations

This paper unravels dynamic and intriguing shifts in the use of financial ratios in signaling corporate collapse. An empirical examination of the anecdotal evidences from notable recent corporate collapses coupled with the short-lived usefulness of financial ratios in various prediction models suggest that companies(1) that deliberately misrepresent their financial statements may have taken cues from the ratios that are commonly investigated. This proposition is supported by an extensive examination of over 50 studies conducted between 1968 and 2002. The erosion in the reliability of numbers in financial statements has led to significant distortions in the predictive power of financial ratios when used in signaling corporate collapse. Recent collapses such as Parmalat in Europe, Enron and WorldCom in the U.S. and HIH in Australia, present yet another reminder that financial statement items are being misrepresented. These are all large corporations with well-established household names, and are for sure closely monitored by financial communities around the globe. Nevertheless, a common thread seems to link the collapse of these companies: none of these collapses were foreseen by credit rating agencies or foretold by the widely accepted bankruptcy prediction models. Why? This paper attempts to use some anecdotal evidence in order to provide logical explanations to the existence of such a common thread. It argues that there appears to be anecdotal evidence to suggest that directors of publicly listed companies that have collapsed may have deliberately misrepresented financial statement items.

Connection between commonly used financial ratios and misrepresentation of financial statements of collapsed corporations

This paper unravels dynamic and intriguing shifts in the use of financial ratios in signaling corporate collapse. An empirical examination of the anecdotal evidences from notable recent corporate collapses coupled with the short-lived usefulness of financial ratios in various prediction models suggest that companies(1) that deliberately misrepresent their financial statements may have taken cues from the ratios that are commonly investigated. This proposition is supported by an extensive examination of over 50 studies conducted between 1968 and 2002. The erosion in the reliability of numbers in financial statements has led to significant distortions in the predictive power of financial ratios when used in signaling corporate collapse. Recent collapses such as Parmalat in Europe, Enron and WorldCom in the U.S. and HIH in Australia, present yet another reminder that financial statement items are being misrepresented. These are all large corporations with well-established household names, and are for sure closely monitored by financial communities around the globe. Nevertheless, a common thread seems to link the collapse of these companies: none of these collapses were foreseen by credit rating agencies or foretold by the widely accepted bankruptcy prediction models. Why? This paper attempts to use some anecdotal evidence in order to provide logical explanations to the existence of such a common thread. It argues that there appears to be anecdotal evidence to suggest that directors of publicly listed companies that have collapsed may have deliberately misrepresented financial statement items.

A comparative analysis of directors' duty of care, skill and diligence in South Africa and in Australia

The South African and Australian law regarding directors' duty of care, ski ll and diligence were influenced considerably by English precedent of the late 1800s and early 19005. Originally both jurisdictions adopted a conservative approach towards directors' duty of care, skill and diligence. This resulted in very low standards of care, skill and diligence expected of directors. In Australia, the standards of care and diligence expected of directors changed drastically with the case of Daniels v Anderson, where objective standards were used to determine a breach of directors' duty of care and diligence, and when objective standards of care and diligence were introduced in Australian corporations legislation. In this article it is submitted that if the opportunity arose for a South African court to consider whether a director is in breach of his or her common law duty of care, skill and diligence, the form of fault that will be required will be negligence as judged against the standards of a reasonable person. This means that in actual fact objective standards of care and diligence are expected of directors in South Africa. Although section 76(3) of the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 does not introduce purely objective standards of care, skill and diligence, the section is defended in this article. It is pointed out that encouraging emerging entrepreneurs to become directors of South African companies provides justification for keeping subjective elements as part of the test to determine whether a director was in breach of his or her statutory duty of care, skill and diligence.

Reverberations after the HIH and other recent Australian corporate collapses: the role of ASIC

This article focuses on some of the litigation and other developments following the recent spate of corporate collapses in Australia. It gives a basic background to abuses of the 1980s, followed by a short description of some of ASIC's statutory powers. The remaining parts of the article focus on the role ASIC played in instituting actions against the directors of some of the collapsed corporations and in particular what ASIC seeks to achieve with high profile litigation. The article concludes that there is no doubt that in the aftermath of these massive corporate collapses ASIC fulfilled its role as the primary Australian corporate regulator with assiduousness. However, it also draws attention to the fact that the challenges for ASIC now will be to play a far more active role in assuring that signs of corporate collapses are detected at the earliest possible juncture. This will probably mean that ASIC's focus will have to be more and more on monitoring companies, rather than on its role as regulator and enforcer in the strict sense of the word.

Directors' personal liability-is the proposed amendment to Section 197 acceptable when compared with Hanel v O'Neill?

On 2 June 2005, the Australian Government announced a proposal to amend s. 197 of the Corporations Act. This is to overturn the decision in Hanel v. O'Neill ("Hanel") where the South Australian Supreme Court has expanded the circumstances in which directors of trustee companies can be held personally liable for the debts under the current section 197(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The multiple interpretations presented in Hanel highlighted the uncertainty of s. 197 and this uncertainty is heightened in at least two subsequent cases. The article provides a detailed analysis of how the decision in Hanel is affecting the directors' freedom of management and suggests some precautionary measures that the directors could take as protection against creditor's actions under s. 197. The author welcomes the proposed amendment because the new section will create certainty for directors as to. the scope of their potential personal liability, but contends that the substance of the proposed s. 197 is not acceptable as there is potential for abuse by directors of certain trustee companies.

Board directors and conflict of interest : a study of a sport league

Conflict of interest is one aspect of governance that has the potential to damage both an organisation and those who govern that organisation. Board directors of sport organisations are faced with a number of influences particular to sport business, which can impact on the process of managing conflict of interest. This research identified processes and attributes that influence directors: selection processes, outside roles, experience, regulation, education, motivation and qualifications. Directors and CEOs drawn from a sample of five Australian Football League (AFL) clubs and members of the AFL commission were interviewed. Data analysis was undertaken using a constructivist grounded theory method, and key processes (selection processes and director education) and attributes (outside roles, experience, regulation, motivation and qualifications) of non-executive directors were identified. By better understanding the influences on board directors in sport organisations, and the impact of these on managing conflict of interest, the potential for damage to the directors and the organisation may be decreased.

The information content of directors' trades: empirical analysis of the Australian market

We examine the trading activities of directors in shares of their own companies on the Australian Stock Exchange during the July-December 2005 period. We find that directors of small companies in particular earn abnormal return after both their 'Purchase' and as well as their 'Sale' trade. Directors of these companies have an uncanny ability to time the market by trading when mispricing is greatest, and are able to predict the future performance of their firms in short run. For directors of medium and large companies, we find evidence that 'Sale' trades are the ones which work as loss avoiders. Outsiders recognise to some extent that directors' trades are informative, however they are slow to incorporate the new information into prices, refuting much of the market efficiency literature.

The tsunami of independent directors - how to handle the demand

Good governance is recognized as a fundamental indicator of the success of a company. For a small- midsized company, this is particularly so, as such companies must be able to competitively demonstrate their flexibility in the face of market forces. This flexibility is the primary advantage they hold over larger firms (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998).

Such companies, however, can find it difficult to attract good directors (Daum and Neff, 2003) and this makes developing improved strategies of governance a challenge. Taylor, Chait and Holland suggest top directors are not attracted to small/ medium companies because "the stakes remain low, the meetings process-driven, the outcomes ambiguous, and the deliberations insular" (Taylor, Chait and Holland, 2001). We suggest that the attraction of quality directors is a uniquely impacting situation for small and mid-size firms, as it is there where additional management resources should be needed most urgently.

Directors on the boards of small-medium sized businesses are often lagging behind directors of large companies in that they are less likely to be independent external directors and are less likely to represent a diversity of attributes (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998). Arthur Levitt, former United States Securities and Exchange Commission Chair, describes the culture of medium sized business directorships as a "kind of a fraternity of CEOs who serve on one another's boards" (Stainburn, 2005). In addition, evidence suggests directors of small- medium businesses are often insufficiently trained for the role. Uncertain directors may, for example, be unwilling to ask crucial questions of managers before making major decisions. "Board members sometimes are made to feel that asking a thorny question or advancing an alternative opinion is disloyal to the administration" (Taylor, Chait and Holland, 2001).

Small and medium businesses, however, are a growing contributor to the national economies of countries internationally. In New Zealand, small and medium-size firms recording large GDP values, ahead of many large businesses, which makes our investigation into good governance practices of SMEs relevant to suggest areas in which these firms can improve their governance policies and practices.

We have reviewed more than 2,000 directors, executives and investors in New Zealand, making this one of the largest non-government surveys in governance. Supported by 16 large corporate organizations, such as KPMG, Business New Zealand, Simpson Grierson, Brook Asset Management, Porter Novelli, Sheffield and 'Management' Magazine, this work suggests that the current processes through which directors are selected and trained to serve on Boards of small and medium businesses needs to be altered. We are also concerned over the lack of director education and the close involvement of the Chief Executives as members of the Boards. There is a general concern over the lack of director independence and whether directors are effective in their roles.

We are recommending an alternative process for SMEs to select directors, which will hopefully expand the available pool of directors in quantity and quality.