A semiotic view of Dewey's times and Habermas's lifeworlds

John Dewey (1859-1952) explained how life was ‘corporatised’ at the time of rampant, laissez faire capitalism in early 20th century America. This paper refers Dewey’s observations to Habermas’s notions of the colonisation of the lifeworld. The semiotic and pragmatist approaches of Charles Saunders Peirce are then enlisted to look further into these lifeworld changes. The
paper suggests modifications to Habermas’s schema to bring it more in line with Dewey’s empirical account. It puts together a theoretically and empirically informed picture of the contemporary disruption to ways of living and the accompanying social and political instability. The paper then goes on to suggest how that instability appears to have been quelled by communicative means. These stages of: (1) stability; (2) disruption/instability; and (3) the regaining of stability are compared to Habermas’s notions of: (1) an original lifeworld; (2) colonisation of that lifeworld by the consequences of purposive rational activity; then (3) communicative action which ‘rebuilds’— that is which replaces or modifies or reforms or repairs—the disrupted lifeworld in order to create a new lifeworld. ‘Colonisation’ could be said to have provoked social instability. Notions of building a new ‘lifeworld’—a new cultural and psychic reference—could be said to correspond with attempts to resume social and political stability. The implication is that whatever the degree of purposive rationalism there is always a need for a return to some level of shared values and
understandings which imply communicative rationality. This ‘return’ or ‘counter-colonisation’ can be thought of as operating via a ‘lifeworld negotiation’ which might best be understood with reference to a Peircean based pragmatism-semiotic theory of human subjectivity. This paper
has been criticised for discussing “arguments” which: “would justify those who accommodated themselves to Nazism.” What this paper in fact tries to do is to use the concepts of the above three philosophers to try to account for the ways people think. This paper is not about justifying what philosophies people should hold. It is presumed that most readers are sensible and ethical and can make their own minds up in that respect. Rather it attempts to draw from Dewey, Habermas and Peirce to offer a characterisation of what philosophies might be argued to be held and to offer an explanation about how these modes of thinking might be said to have come into existence.
This paper rejects the notion that ones ‘will’ and thus the way one is able to think, is totally free and beyond the formative influences of the social-cultural context—including the influences of public relations and other persuasive discourse industries.

Dewey's democracy as the kingdom of God on earth

John Dewey has been portrayed as a sort of villain in Rosenow's (1997) article which appeared in this journal, apparently because he was unfairly opposed to God and to religion, and also because he deliberately usurped religious language to ‘camouflage’ his secular ideas. By drawing mainly upon similar sources but with some important additions, I wish to challenge the four major concerns raised in Rosenow's article and in doing so aim to offer an alternative interpretation. It is understood here that Dewey's approach to religion was not so much religious as it was ‘spiritual’ and while developing and changing throughout his writings, his ideas on spirituality nevertheless were thoroughly entwined with his other views, especially those dealing with education, science and democracy.

The educative value of Dewey's religious attitude for spirituality

John Dewey's 'religious attitude' has great potential for the educative development of children's spirituality. This is because it enables their spiritual understandings to become more intelligently composed - not just in a cognitive or hyper-rational sense, but as a way of being. This paper provides an outline of Dewey's approach, which is described as being democratic, inquiry based, and 'scientific'. Such an approach therefore offers a contrast to other more epistemologically focused curricula which attempt to educate a person's spirituality. In order to make the case for the potential educative value of such an attitude, a brief review of Dewey's approach to education shall be offered, in which the notions of inquiry, democracy, and 'science' shall be highlighted to make the case that such attributes might be necessary for spiritual education if the United Nations Educational and Scientific Organization's goal of attaining world peace is to ever become possible.

Must Dewey and Kierkegaard’s inquiry for world peace be violent?

Amongst the many aims of education, surely the pursuit of global peace must be one of the most significant.The mandate of UNESCO is to pursue world peace through education by primarily promoting collaboration.The sort of collaboration that UNESCO endorses involves democratic dialogue,where various persons from differing backgrounds can come together,listen,negotiate and discuss possible ways in which peace might be pursued.While this sort of democratic dialogue with its associated free intellectual inquiry is more readily acceptable for issues dealing with problems in the realm of physical nature, it is not so easily tolerated in the realm of ethics and values. Indeed inquiry into the realm of ethics by Kierkegaard has been described by Levinas to be a form of violence. Similarly John Dewey’s work has been included in a list of the ten most harmful books by some conservatives in the United States because he promoted inquiry into morals and religion. Dewey argued against the assumption that there are two-realms—one physical and one moral.He and Kierkegaard both encouraged democratic inquiry into ethics,which is the sort of collaboration recognised by UNESCO as being necessary if we are to pursue world peace.Yet such investigations can be considered by some to be violent and harmful. It is argued here that pursuing inquiries into ethics and aims of education,while appearing to challenge the status quo, should not be construed as being violent but rather should be understood as democratic and educative.

John Martyn Harlow: 'obscure country physician?'

If John Martyn Harlow is known at all in the neurosciences, it is because he was the physician who attended Phineas Gage and followed up his case. Although Harlow's brief but insightful accounts of the changes in Gage's personality are fairly well recognized, and his skill in treating Gage often acknowledged, Harlow himself is, for the most part, the shadowy figure caught by the self-depreciatory characterization of the subtitle of this paper. Although his contribution to the neurosciences was singular, literally and figuratively, he deserves a place in the history of the subject. Harlow's training in antiphlogistic therapy can be seen in his treatment of Gage and in his evaluation of its results. As a medical student, he was also exposed to phrenological doctrine, the influence of which can also be seen in his  appreciation and explanation of some aspects of Gage's behaviour.  Manuscript materials, newspaper reports, and other little known material are used here to evaluate Harlow's contributions to medicine and to the medical, political, and civic life of Cavendish, Woburn, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Misunderstanding John Stuart Mill on science: Paul Feyerabend`s bad influence

Feyerabend, 1975; Feyerabend, 1981 and Feyerabend, 1987 takes J. S. Mill’s On Liberty to support the proliferation of theories in science and to emphasize the fallibility of scientific knowledge. On Liberty, according to Feyerabend, contradicts and overthrows Mill’s major study of science, A System of Logic. Staley (1999) reads the 2 works of Mill as giving complementary accounts of science. The present author rejects these interpretations of Mill, arguing that A System of Logic and On Liberty are mutually compatible since On Liberty concerns the nature of non-scientific knowledge and the methods that Mill believes are appropriate to expanding and assessing that knowledge.

Western maps/Yanyuwa meaning: an interview with John Bradley

In July 2003 an important one-volume text, Forget about Flinders: A Yanyuwa atlas of the south west gulf of Carpentaria produced in a limited edition of 14 copies, returned to Yanyuwa country and to the families who collaborated with John Bradley and artist Nona Cameron on the project. Subsequently, a second edition of 20 copies has been released, mainly to institutions. It is the most comprehensive attempt yet to restore Yanyuwa names to country and to produce a multilayered, dynamic, history-rich, and bilingual representation of how country is known in this community, and how the central song cycle texts intersect with Yanyuwa tradition. What follows is a condensed and edited interview with Frances Devlin-Glass, in which John Bradley discusses the motivations, the hybridised methodologies employed, the innovations of this new genre, and the pedagogical ends served by this latest iteration of Yanyuwa song cycles.

From crystals to pixels: new technology in the documentary work of John Hughes

Film technology, in the broadest sense, embraces a vast array of knowledge, skills, tools, and systems. These include the codes and conventions of screen representation at the centre of much screen scholarship. The electro-mechanical tools of filmmaking are less often the focus of academic study than these codes and conventions, but they are central to them and to the daily work of artists and educators in the field of screen production. This paper traces the scope and significance of technical change, for independent film making, over the past four decades. Melbourne documentary filmmaker John Hughes provides a varied and expansive oeuvre through which to arrange an historical equipment list.

Lifetime cost of stroke subtypes in Australia: findings from the North East Melbourne stroke incidence study (NEMESIS)

Background and Purpose-: Little is known about any variations in resource use and costs of care between stroke subtypes, especially nonhospital costs. The purpose of this study was to describe the patterns of resource use and to estimate the first-year and lifetime costs for stroke subtypes.

Methods-: A cost-of-illness model was used to estimate the total first-year costs and lifetime costs of stroke subtypes for all strokes (subarachnoid hemorrhages excluded) that occurred in Australia during 1997. For each subtype, average cost per case during the first year and the present value of average cost per case over a lifetime were calculated. Resource use data obtained in the North East Melbourne Stroke Incidence Study (NEMESIS) were used.

Results-: The present value of total lifetime costs for all strokes was Aus $1.3 billion (US $985 million). Total lifetime costs were greatest for ischemic stroke (72%; Aus $936.8 million; US $709.7 million), followed by intracerebral hemorrhage (26%; Aus $334.5 million; US $253.4 million) and unclassified stroke (2%; Aus $30 million; US $22.7 million). The average cost per case during the first year was greatest for total anterior circulation infarction (Aus $28 266). Over a lifetime, the present value of average costs was greatest for intracerebral hemorrhage (Aus $73 542), followed by total anterior circulation infarction (Aus $53 020), partial anterior circulation infarction (Aus $50 692), posterior circulation infarction (Aus $37 270), lacunar infarction (Aus $34 470), and unclassified stroke (Aus $12 031).

Conclusions-: First-year and lifetime costs vary considerably between stroke subtypes. Variation in average length of total hospital stay is the main explanation for differences in first-year costs.

Cost of stroke in Australia from a societal perspective: results from the north east Melbourne stroke incidence study (NEMESIS)

Background and Purpose—— Accurate information about resource use and costs of stroke is necessary for informed health service planning. The purpose of this study was to determine the patterns of resource use among stroke patients and to estimate the total costs (direct service use and indirect production losses) of stroke (excluding SAH) in Australia for 1997.

Methods—— An incidence-based cost-of-illness model was developed, incorporating data obtained from the North East Melbourne Stroke Incidence Study (NEMESIS). The costs of stroke during the first year after stroke and the present value of total lifetime costs of stroke were estimated.

Results—— The total first-year costs of all first-ever-in-a lifetime strokes (SAH excluded) that occurred in Australia during 1997 were estimated to be A$555 million (US$420 million), and the present value of lifetime costs was estimated to be A$1.3 billion (US$985 million). The average cost per case during the first 12 months and over a lifetime was A$18 956 (US$14 361) and A$44 428 (US$33 658), respectively. The most important categories of cost during the first year were acute hospitalization (A$154 million), inpatient rehabilitation (A$150 million), and nursing home care (A$63 million). The present value of lifetime indirect costs was estimated to be A$34 million.

Conclusions—— Similar to other studies, hospital and nursing home costs contributed most to the total cost of stroke (excluding SAH) in Australia. Inpatient rehabilitation accounts for {approx}27% of total first-year costs. Given the magnitude of these costs, investigation of the cost-effectiveness of rehabilitation services should become a priority in this community.

Experiential learning in practice as research: context, method, knowledge

Creative arts research is often motivated by emotional, personal and subjective concerns; it operates not only on the basis of explicit and exact knowledge, but also on that of tacit and experiential knowledge. Experience operates within in the domain of the aesthetic and knowledge produced through aesthetic experience is always contextual and situated. The continuity of artistic experience with normal processes of living is derived from an impulse to handle materials and to think and feel through their handling. The key term for understanding the relationship between experience, practice and knowledge is 'aesthetic experience', not as it is understood through traditional eighteenth century accounts, but as 'sense activity'.

In this article, I will draw on the work of John Dewey, Michael Polanyi and others to argue that creative arts practice as research is an intensification of everyday experiences from which new knowledge or knowing emerges. The ideas presented here will be illustrated with reference to case studies based on reflections, by the artists themselves, on successful research projects in dance, creative writing and visual art.

Out of pocket costs to stroke patients during the first year after stroke - results from the North East Melbourne stroke incidence study

Non-reimbursed ‘out of pocket’ costs to stroke patients have not been included in existing cost of illness studies. We aimed to determine the nature and magnitude of ‘out of pocket’ costs to stroke patients during the first year after stroke. ‘Out of pocket’ costs during the first year after stroke were documented for 165 persons registered in a community-based stroke incidence study during 1996/1997. Virtually all cases reported some ‘out of pocket’ costs. The average cost over 12 months was A$1110. The highest cost items were home modifications, aids and equipment. The most commonly incurred expense was for prescription medications. Total ‘out of pocket’ costs incurred by first-ever stroke patients in Australia in 1997 were estimated to be A$29 million or 5% of the total cost of stroke. The majority of ‘out of pocket’ costs relate to post-acute care aimed at minimising disability and handicap rather than to ‘acute’ healthcare.