The novel as social satire: 60 years later, the wind done gone and the limitations of fair use

The absence of the doctrine of fair use from Australian copyright law has been a bone of contention in Australia after the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA). As the Australian government reformed the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) in the aftermath of the FTA it eschewed the option of adopting fair use. Instead, Australia chose to incorporate a version of fair use into its existing fair dealing framework. Accordingly, the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) inserted ss 41A and 103AA into the Copyright Act. These provisions provide that a fair dealing with a copyright protected work does not constitute an infringement if it is done for the purposes of parody or satire. These provisions codify part of the ratio of the United States Supreme Court in the seminal case of Campbell v Acuff Rose Music. However, the parameters of these new provisions are unexplored and the sparse nature of fair dealing jurisprudence means that the true meaning of the provisions is unclear. Moreover, two cases from the United States, SunTrust Bank v Houghton Mifflin and Salinger v Colting, underline just how important it is to have legal rules that protect literary ‘re-writes’. Both cases involved authors using an original novel to ‘write back’ to the original author and the broader culture. ‘Writing back’ or the ‘re-write’ has a firm basis in literature. It adds something invaluable to our culture. The key question is whether our legal landscape can allow it to flourish. This paper examines the interaction between fair use and literary re-writes.

Zeroes of Riemann's zeta function on the critical line with 40000 decimal digits accuracy

The project aims at computing Riemann's zeroes with high accuracy through an analysis of large determinants using Matyasievich's Artless method. Location of Riemann's zeroes is the famous 8th Hilbert problem, and one of Clay's Institute millennium problems.

Creating an Innovation Exception? Copyright Law as the Infrastructure for Innovation

Innovation is clearly essential for economic growth, cultural development and personal autonomy. Yet the relationship between innovation and copyright law in Australia is uncertain and perhaps overly restrictive. After the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement Australia now has a copyright regime that can broadly be
described as a lock up and lock out scheme. Whilst the Australian Government has paid lip service to innovation the Australian Copyright Act, which provides the essential legal infrastructure for innovation, now privileges the rights of owners over the interests of the public. In particular, the Copyright Act neglects to create a specific exception for technology innovation. If there is to be some coherence in Australia
thinking with regards to innovation and copyright policy it is crucial that such an exception be created. Arguably, it is possible that such an exception can withstand the scrutiny of the three step test. At present the only ‘exception’ that can be said to exist is in the form of the limits of the authorisation liability provisions or the ISP safe harbour scheme. Australian copyright law needs something more substantial than that
and needs for there to be a clear hierarchy between the exceptions and the liability provisions.

Creative choices : changes to Australian copyright law and the future of the public domain

Changes to Australian copyright law introduced under the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement will diminish the public domain, criminalise common copyright infringing practices and locally introduce significant portions of the controversial 1998 American Digital Millennium Copyright Act. This paper examines these imminent changes to Australian copyright law, with specific attention to the potential effects of the extended duration of copyright protection and the introduction of technological anti-circumvention measures. It argues that public domain-enhancing activities are crucial for sustaining cultural creativity and technological innovation, and discusses the potential role of the Creative Commons movement in establishing economically viable and legal alternatives to the current model of trade-oriented copyright reform.

Moral rights: a brief excursion into Canadian history

In 1931, Canada was the first of the copyright countries to adopt a moral rights provision, closely modeled on Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, into its legislation. But this was not the first step that Canada had taken towards the legislative protection of moral rights. Not only had certain provisions protective of the non-economic interests of authors been included in the federal Criminal Code and in the legislation of Quebec prior to 1920, but during the 1920s a sustained effort had been made to give these interests more explicit and systematic protection under the Copyright Act. The present article focuses on a series of bills put to the Canadian Parliament from 1924 onwards. Not only would they have provided increased protection for the non-economic interests of authors but they would have given a legislative definition to the term "moral right". These bills, framed in the absence of any influence from Article 6bis, provide a glimpse of what "moral rights" might have been. They support the view that Canada was moving towards the express legislative protection of these rights significantly earlier that is commonly thought.

Australia's first moral rights decision : a critical approach to Meskenas v ACP Publishing

Judgment in Australia's first moral rights case concerned issues of attribution and false attribution of authorship - reasoning in judgment is open to question - ways in which moral rights provisions in the Copyright Act may have been misunderstood - importance of distinguishing between UK right against false attribution and its Australian counterpart.

Moral rights, heritage and Australian contemporary architecture : thoughts & designs of Peter Muller

Peter Muller is one of the most unique Australian architects of the 20th century possessing a passion for organic architecture realised in several significant Australian and Indonesian design exemplars. His inquiry in the organic style of architecture stylistically mirrors that of Frank Lloyd Wright whom wrote to Muller expressing his pleasure in his successful pursuit of this style in Australia.3 This paper considers the position of moral rights under the Australian Copyright Act 19684 having regard to the Australian exemplars of Muller. It considers recent Australian debates about moral rights and projects that implicate several architectural and landscape architecture projects, the interpretations the legal fraternity are taking in approaching this topic, and positions the ideas, values, and attitudes of Muller in this context. Muller’s personal opinion is expressed providing an insight into the thoughts of one senior contemporary Australia architect as to 'their' architecture and ‘heritage’.

Authorship and fixation in copyright law : a comparative comment

[The present comment considers an issue that has received little discussion in the common law world: namely whether fixation and authorship are parts of the same creative act in relation to literary, dramatic and musical works. The importance of the question is that, if authorship does not entail fixation, it should logically be possible for a person independent of the author to reduce the work to material form for copyright purposes. This would significantly expand the range of works protected by copyright and would extend protection to those works which have never been fixed by their authors. The focus of the comment is Australian law, but its discussion is comparative, with particular attention given to UK law.]

Critique and comment: Authorship and fixation in copyright law: A comparative comment

The present comment considers an issue that has received little discussion in the common law world: namely whether fixation and authorship are parts of the same creative act in relation to literary, dramatic and musical works. The importance of the question is that, if authorship does not entail fixation, it should logically be possible for a person independent of the author to reduce the work to material form for copyright purposes. This would significantly expand the range of works protected by copyright and would extend protection to those works which have never been fixed by their authors. The focus of the comment is Australian law, but its discussion is comparative, with particular attention given to UK law.