Commonwealth legislative power and "non punitive" detention: a constitutional roadmap

In 2004 The High Court handed down a number of decisions concerning detention imposed for purposes allegedly unrelated to punishment. This paper outlines the way the Federal Constitution restricts (and also facilitates) the imposition of "non punitive detention" by our governments. Such laws (as passed by the Federal Legislature) are constitutionally valid provided they can be characterised as falling within a legislative head of power under  section 51 off he Constitution. The power to detain for non punitive purposes can be reposed by the Legislature in the either the Executive or Judicial arms of government. Detention by the Executive is non punitive (and therefore does not offend the separation of powers) even though it involves a deprivation of liberty, provided it is imposed for “legitimate non punitive purposes”.  Legitimacy is in turn determined by reference to the section 51 heads of power. Detention for non punitive purposes by the judicial arm of government is constitutionally valid provided that (i) a “judicial process ” is adopted and (ii) (arguably) there is some link (albeit tenuous) with a previous finding of criminal guilt. The continuing existence of the “constitutional immunity ”from being detained by other than judicial order identified by the High Court in its 1992 decision in Lim v Minister for Immigration is called into question.

Opting out of shareholder governance rights: a new perspective on contractual freedom in Australian corporate law

One of the classic debates in corporate law relates to whether the rules of corporate law are ar should be 'mandatory', in that companies must comply, or 'enabling' - meaning a set of default rules which companies have the choice of adopting or 'opting out' of through alternative contractual arrangements. The so-called 'mandatory/enabling' debate has been especially prominent in the United States fro numerous reasons, yet has also received some attention in Australia. That said, the extent to which companies can 'opt out' of corporate law has rarely been considered as a practical issue in Australia - particularly whether Australian companies can 'opt out' of provisions under the Corporations Act ("the Act"). However, just recently, two high-profile events in Australia have made 'opting out' of corporate law a relevant issue, especially the question of whether companies are free to 'opt out' of provisions of the Corporations Act  which provide express governance rights to shareholders. These events were Boral's constitutional amendment in 2003 to restrict the ability of shreholders to propose amendments to the company's constitution, and the contemplation and introduction of so-called 'pre-nuptial' agreements- designed to by-pass the right of shreholders to vote on removing directors in public companies. In the light of these two recent events, in this article the authors revisit the mandatory/enabling debate. However, rather than going over old ground as to whether a mandatory or enabling approach to corporate regulation is desirable, the authors approach the issue from a fresh perspective: that Australian Securitiesand Investments Commission's ("ASIC") existing relief powers under the Act should be extended to provide a means for companies to opt out of provisions containing shareholder governance rights.

Devaluation of a constitutional guarantee : the history of section 51(xxiiiA) of the Commonwealth Constitution

This article describes constitutional and socio-historical background to the referendum that led to the inserrion of s 51(xxiijA) into the Commonwealth Constitution. It traces judicial interpretations of the clause 'but not so as to authorise any fonn of civil conscription' through the major cases, including British Medical Association v Commonwealth, General Practitioners Society v Commonwealth, and Alexandra Private Geriatric Hospital Pty Ud v Commonwealth. The issue of the powers of the Commonwealth to regulate private medical practice without infringing the constitutional guarantee against civil conscription is analysed in the context of the development of National Health Care Schemes for financing medical benefits (Health Insurance Commission v Peverill). Constitutional aspects of the 1995 legislation enabling the introduction into Australia of purchaser-provider agreements ('managed care ') are also examined. Finally, the article questions the constitutionality of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission s powers to regulate the essential elements of the patient-doctor relationship.

The legal recognition of same-sex unions in Australia : a constitutional analysis

The Marriage Equality Amendment Bill 2010 (Cth) currently before federal Parliament amends the present legislative definition of marriage to include same-sex unions. This article provides a constitutional analysis of the scope of the marriage power, s 51(xxi) of the Australian Constitution , through examination of the Bill and other existing and proposed legislation. It argues that if the High Court considered "marriage" to be a constitutionalised legal term of art, it could accommodate post-federation development at common law and in statute to the institution of marriage. It also argues that the presumption in favour of constitutionality ought to be at its strongest with federal legislation determining complex and intractable moral issues. The article explores the constitutional vulnerability of current same-sex union legislation and possible future legislation providing for recognition of the functional equivalent of "marriage". In addition, the article considers the constitutional foundation of a national framework to provide official legal recognition of same-sex relationships.