Historical evolution and modern implications of concepts of consent to, and refusal of, medical treatment in the law of trespass

Many mischiefs arise on the change of a maxim and rule of the Common Law, which those who altered it could not see when they made the change.

Consent as a Common Law Defence to Non-Sexual Assaults: The Effect of Neal v The Queen

The following discussion is an exposition of the recognised exceptions to the general rule that the law will not sanction the giving of a lawful consent to the application or threat of actual or grievous bodily harm. The discussion will also focus on a series of decisions in the UK and Australia, particularly Neal v The Queen, that have altered the law's approach to these exceptions and, more importantly, now permit a personto give an informed consent to the risk of contracting HIV or any other sexually transmitted diseases, provided there was no intention on the part of the accused to actually infect the other person. The underlying rationale for sanctioning an informed consent to such a risk is that consenting adults should be accorded the utmost autonomy in conductingtheir private affairs, and particularly so in the context of the choices they make regarding their private sexual activities. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the notion of allowing one to lawfully consent to such a risk, it raises an important question as to the current status of the general rule that one cannot generally give an informed consent to the applicationor threat of actual or grievous bodily harm. More succinctly stated, if the law is prepared to allow an informed consent to the risk of contracting a potentially fatal disease, then what remains of what had previously been a well-settled rule that, save for a few well-recognised exceptions, persons were generally prohibited from consenting to the application or threat of actual or grievous bodily harm?

Principles of business law

Contents: 1. Development and overview of the Australian legal system -- 2. An introduction to the law of contract -- 3. Intention -- 4. Consideration -- 5. Capacity -- 6. Genuine consent -- 7. The contents of the contract -- 8. Termination -- 9. Remedies -- 10. The tort of negligence and liability for pure economic loss -- 11. Agency -- 12. Partnerships -- 13. An overview of business organisations -- 14. The day-to-day existence of business corporations -- 15. Trusts.

Ignorance of the law as a defence to rape : the destruction of a maxim

In DPP v Morgan, the House of Lords correctly concluded that an accused who entertained a genuine belief that a woman was consenting to carnal knowledge of her person could not be convicted of the common law crime of rape as such a belief and the requisite mens rea to convict were mutually exclusive of one another. Though England and Wales have resiled from this position by virtue of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1 (b), which allows for conviction upon proof that the accused did not reasonably believe that the complainant was consenting, the Morgan principle has retained its vitality at common law as well as under the various statutory crimes of rape that exist throughout Australia, most notably the provisions of s. 38 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). Despite a long line of Victorian Court of Appeal decisions which have reaffirmed the Morgan principle, the court has construed s. 37AA(b)(ii) of the Act as leaving open the possibility of an acquittal despite the fact that the accused acted with an awareness that one or more factors that are statutorily deemed as negating consent under s. 36(a)-(g) of the Act were operating at the time of his or her sexual penetration; specifically, the court held that the foregoing factors do not necessarily preclude a jury from finding that the accused acted in the genuine belief that the complainant was consenting. This article endeavours to explain how the accused could be aware of such circumstances at the time of penetration, yet still entertain such a belief. The article ultimately concludes that such an anomaly can only be explained through a combination of the poor drafting of s. 37AA(b)(ii) and the court's apparent refusal to follow the longstanding precept that ignorance of the law is never a defence to a crime, ostensibly prompted by its adherence to the cardinal precept that legislation is not to be construed as superfluous.

The chaotic state of the law of rape in Victoria: a mandate for reform

This article is intended as a final commentary and sequel to two earlier articles in this journal that have examined the arcane and circular wording of s. 37AA of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) and its patent incompatibility with ss 36 and 38 of that Act that define the elements of rape. In particular, this article will revisit many of the essential points raised in the first two articles in order to afford readers with an appropriate backdrop against which the Victorian Court of Appeal’s decision in GC v The Queen will be examined. The article concludes with a strenuous recommendation that s. 37AA be repealed or substantially amended in order to comport with ss 36 and 38 as well as the Court of Appeal’s decision in NT v The Queen that significantly reshaped the Morgan principle.