The importance of audit committees in initial public offerings

This paper follows Balvers, McDonald and Miller (1988), and Beatty (1989), who find lower underpricing in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) when prestigious auditors are used to attest to the IPO's financial statements. Australian IPOs are not obliged to nominate audit firms in the prospectus, but often identify that they will have audit committees so as to assist in more appropriate corporate governance. This paper analyzes if IPOs identifying the existence of audit committees in the prospectus have a lower underpricing return. While our findings are consistent with previous studies concluding that both the size of the new issue and the use of an underwriter are important ingredients in the level of underpricing return, the inclusion of an audit committee in the prospectuses has actually increased underpricing returns. The capital market may view the audit committee identification with some skepticism.

Towards manadatory shareholder committees in Australian companies

A common objective in recent Australian and international corporate governance reform programs is the enhancement of shareholder participation. Active shareholder involvement brings account- ability to the board and management, and is appropriate considering that shareholders are the ultimate owners of the company. Curiously, however, while shareholder participation and representation has become a priority in the contemporary corporate governance arena, the bulk of recent governance reform initiatives operate on the assumption that there is a clear separation of the board and management from the general body of shareholders, and that this is necessary to achieve optimal performance. The requirement that directors be 'independent' of the company and its shareholders is a prime example. In this article, the authors propose the establishment of a mandatory shareholder committee in Australian companies as a way of enhancing shareholder participation and representation.]

The existence and nature of risk management committees in Australian companies

A risk management committee (RMC), as a newly evolving sub-committee of the board of directors, functions as a key governance support mechanism in the oversight an organisation’s risk management strategies, policies and processes. However, empirical evidence on the factors associated with the existence and the type of RMCs remains scant. Using an agency theory perspective, this study investigates the association between board factors such as proportion of non-executive directors, CEO duality, and board size; as well as, other firm-related factors (e.g. auditor type, industry, leverage, and complexity), and (1) the existence of a RMC, and (2) the type of RMC (namely, a separate RMC versus one that is combined with the audit committee). Data was collected from the annual reports of the top 300 ASX-listed companies. The results, based on logistic regression analyses, indicate that RMCs tend to exist in companies with an independent board chairman and larger boards. Further, the results also indicate that in comparison to companies with a combined RMC and audit committee, those with a separate RMC are more likely to have larger boards, higher financial reporting risk and lower organisational complexity. The findings of this study provide additional information on the use and design of RMCs in a voluntary setting.

Disquiet on the research front : surveying the battle ground between researchers and human research ethics committees

In this paper, I play with the metaphors of war and peace (with apologies to Leo Tolstoy) as a strategy for describing the relations between (some) social science researchers and human research ethics committees. Even a cursory survey of recent literature reveals a raft of grievances and grumblings amongst researchers about the operation and decisions of research ethics committees. This paper presents a partial survey from both sides of some of the claims that have triggered this unofficial declaration of war, and discusses the implications for ethical research. My central argument is that the truly ethical moment lies in mutual and constructive conversations and critique between ethics committees and researchers.

Committees with leaks

We analyze the quality (informativeness and efficiency) of advice obtained from a committee of careerist experts where voting is secret but voting profiles are ‘leaked’ with an exogenously given probability. We show that fully informative voting is achievable only when the common prior is not too informative, the committee uses the unanimity rule and faces random leakage. It is then shown that informativeness and efficiency are mutually exclusive properties of committees with careerist experts.

Do political connections affect the role of independent audit committees and CEO Duality? Some evidence from Malaysian audit pricing

This study examines whether political connection to firms affects the association between audit committee independence and demand for higher quality audits. In line with Carcello et al. (2002), our findings show that there is a positive association between audit committee independence and audit fees thus supporting the hypothesis that more independent audit committees demand higher audit quality. However, we find that this relationship is weaker for politically connected (PCON) firms suggesting that the independence of audit committees in Malaysian PCON firms may be compromised. Additionally, we provide evidence that PCON firms that have CEO duality are perceived by audit firms as being of higher risk than CEO duality firms without political connection.

Joint consultative committees

This handbook provides an up-to-date survey of the current research into employee voice, sets this research into context, and sets a marker for future research in the area.

Towards real shareholder participation in contemporary corporate governance

Enhanced shareholder participation in large public companies in Australia has not gone far enough.  Shareholders need to be given the opportunity to contribute to the forming of company decisions and strategies.  One proposal is to require that directors themselves be shareholders. A second proposal mandates shareholder committees in public companies.