Defendants' liability for pure mental harm to third parties in Australia : still a work in progress

In Australia, both common and statutory law allows compensation for negligently occasioned recognised psychiatric injury, but distinguishes between pure mental harm and consequential mental harm. This column briefly discusses the concept of pure "mental harm" and the major Australian cases relating to defendants' liability to third parties for causing them pure mental harm (Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549 [PDF]; Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 211 CLR 317 [PDF]; Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562 [PDF]; and Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269 [PDF]). The analysis focuses on judicial approaches to determining liability in these cases, especially causation. Lack of guiding principles and precise tests for attribution of liability are illustrated by Kemp v Lyell McEwin Health Service (2006) 96 SASR 192 [PDF]. This case is analysed first in the context of common law, and then in the light of the reform legislation contained in the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) and similar provisions in other jurisdictions.

An overview of liability and compensation for personal injury in China under the general principles of civil law

This article reviews the personal injury tort system in the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Chinese torts law has a number of unique features. To begin with, it is quite new — the legal framework of torts law was established only in 1986. The unique features of the Chinese torts law also stem from its long and difficult evolution over nearly 40 years. Equally important has been the remarkable blend of influences that have shaped its current law — a mixture of socialist objectives, capitalist pragmatism, and feudal doctrines combined with jurisprudential models taken from a range of western civil codes and, more recently, the common law.

Part one of the article briefly analyses the most important features of the existing Chinese legal system. Part two provides a background to the enactment of the General Principles of Civil Law (GPCL), which incorporates Chinese torts law. The review looks at the development and drafting of the GPCL legislation, and the influences that guided the formulation of legal principles. Part three of the article provides an overview of the torts law provisions in the GPCL. Part four examines the law of personal injury established by the GPCL. Part five uses some case studies to illustrate the principles highlighted in the previous two parts and part six contains a brief conclusion and some pointers to the directions that Chinese torts law may take in the future.

Excessive force used in making an arrest: does it make the arrest ipso facto unlawful?

The purpose of this article is to consider whether or not the use of excessive force in effecting an arrest makes the arrest ipso facto unlawful at common law. With a dearth of appellate court authority on point in either Australia or the United Kingdom, the question is presently open. It is my argument that as force is not a minimum condition of an arrest, its excessive use will not, therefore, make unlawful an otherwise lawful arrest. This conclusion is a matter of some import. It exposes an arrester to civil and possibly even criminal liability for assault but not to an action for false imprisonment. It may also have practical repercussions for the possible discretionary exclusion of evidence on public policy grounds. In theory, it should not matter whether excessive force made an arrest unlawful or not, for the public policy discretion permits a judge to exclude evidence illegally or improperly obtained. But common sense suggests that a judge may not be so likely to exclude evidence when the relevant conduct amounts only to police impropriety not illegality.

Introducing personal liability under the continuous disclosure regime : The essentials and non-essentials

Under the Federal Government's CLERP 9 legislation, expected at the time of writing to come into force in July 2004, personal liability will be introduced for the first time under the continuous disclosure regime. Individuals who are 'involved' in a failure to immediately disclose materially price sensitive information to the market will be subject to a civil penalty, in addition to the company being liable. According to the author, the introduction of personal liability per se is not contentious and indeed is a favourable change; what is questionable, however, is whether 'involvement' in a contravention is the appropriate test for imposing personal liability in relation to breaches of the continuous disclosure provisions. Based on the case law to date on the meaning of 'involved', there is particular uncertainty as to whether an individual would need to have actual knowledge that non-disclosed information is 'materially price sensitive' in order to satisfy the test of 'involved' in the context of continuous disclosure, or whether mere knowledge that the information has not been disclosed would be sufficient. This uncertainty arises due to the vague concept of 'essential matters' which the courts have developed as a test for what degree of knowledge a person needs to have in order to be 'involved'. The author argues that all the confusion as to what 'involved' means could be addressed by removing the word 'essential' from the dialogue, so that the test of 'involvement' would simply be based on whether the particular person had actual knowledge of each of the factual elements constituting the offence.