Limited Liability Act of 1855

Examines the Limited Liability Act 1855 and highlights its significance in the formation of the modern company's legal framework. Looks at the background to the Act, which was repealed after a few months and incorporated in the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 in an amended form. Considers the Act's legacy in extending the general principle of limited liability for corporate debts to shareholders of registered companies, including its implications in allowing a greater diversification of shareholders.

Defendants' liability for pure mental harm to third parties in Australia : still a work in progress

In Australia, both common and statutory law allows compensation for negligently occasioned recognised psychiatric injury, but distinguishes between pure mental harm and consequential mental harm. This column briefly discusses the concept of pure "mental harm" and the major Australian cases relating to defendants' liability to third parties for causing them pure mental harm (Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549 [PDF]; Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 211 CLR 317 [PDF]; Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562 [PDF]; and Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269 [PDF]). The analysis focuses on judicial approaches to determining liability in these cases, especially causation. Lack of guiding principles and precise tests for attribution of liability are illustrated by Kemp v Lyell McEwin Health Service (2006) 96 SASR 192 [PDF]. This case is analysed first in the context of common law, and then in the light of the reform legislation contained in the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) and similar provisions in other jurisdictions.

Discussing sex at work can be a costly business: Translating the science, language and law behind M v A & U (2007) QADT 8...

On 16 March 2007, in the matter of M v A & U [2007] QADT 8, the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal of Queensland found that a complaint of discrimination in the supply of goods and services had been made out by the complainant on two grounds: her female sex and lawful sexual activity. The decision would have been quite unremarkable except that ‘M’, as the complainant was known for the purposes of the hearing, is a woman of difference, one who had unusually arrived at her legal female state by completing the sex reassignment process now more commonly described as ‘sex affirmation’.

This article seeks to elaborate on the language and law of transsexualism used by the Tribunal. Its aim is to enhance practitioners’ understanding of the legal and social issues peculiar to those who affirm a sex opposite that first assigned to them so that those practitioners may better interpret the law to their clients. As the instant decision shows, the failure by an employer to take reasonable steps to avoid infringing the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), either on its own part or by the actions of its employees, can prove a costly business indeed.

The author offers a brief synopsis of the current medical viewpoint regarding transsexualism and reviews recent Australian legal developments in the jurisprudence. She reminds practitioners that the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) has since been further strengthened by the inclusion of ‘gender identity’ as a protected attribute, and concludes by proposing the existence of a heightened duty on the part of practitioners to ensure business clients are aware of the full extent of their legal obligations to not discriminate against employees or clients.

Ignorance of the law as a defence to rape : the destruction of a maxim

In DPP v Morgan, the House of Lords correctly concluded that an accused who entertained a genuine belief that a woman was consenting to carnal knowledge of her person could not be convicted of the common law crime of rape as such a belief and the requisite mens rea to convict were mutually exclusive of one another. Though England and Wales have resiled from this position by virtue of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1 (b), which allows for conviction upon proof that the accused did not reasonably believe that the complainant was consenting, the Morgan principle has retained its vitality at common law as well as under the various statutory crimes of rape that exist throughout Australia, most notably the provisions of s. 38 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). Despite a long line of Victorian Court of Appeal decisions which have reaffirmed the Morgan principle, the court has construed s. 37AA(b)(ii) of the Act as leaving open the possibility of an acquittal despite the fact that the accused acted with an awareness that one or more factors that are statutorily deemed as negating consent under s. 36(a)-(g) of the Act were operating at the time of his or her sexual penetration; specifically, the court held that the foregoing factors do not necessarily preclude a jury from finding that the accused acted in the genuine belief that the complainant was consenting. This article endeavours to explain how the accused could be aware of such circumstances at the time of penetration, yet still entertain such a belief. The article ultimately concludes that such an anomaly can only be explained through a combination of the poor drafting of s. 37AA(b)(ii) and the court's apparent refusal to follow the longstanding precept that ignorance of the law is never a defence to a crime, ostensibly prompted by its adherence to the cardinal precept that legislation is not to be construed as superfluous.

Players, clubs, events and the Trade Practices Act : a primer for sporting clubs

The Trade Practices Act (TPA) has had an enormous impact on how corporations in Australia may conduct their business. In relation to sporting clubs, it limits the freedom of clubs to deal with players, each other and the public. While previously many clubs may have escaped the ambit of the TPA because they were not “corporations”, state equivalent Fair Trading legislation and the introduction of the national competition policy in 1995 have effectively expanded the scope of consumer and competition regulation to include individuals and associations. Consequently, an understanding of the nature and scope of trade practices regulation is now important for any sporting organisation—regardless of size or structure. This paper identifies the legislative provisions most likely to impact upon sporting clubs and examines some possible circumstances in which clubs might find themselves exposed to liability.

An overview of liability and compensation for personal injury in China under the general principles of civil law

This article reviews the personal injury tort system in the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Chinese torts law has a number of unique features. To begin with, it is quite new — the legal framework of torts law was established only in 1986. The unique features of the Chinese torts law also stem from its long and difficult evolution over nearly 40 years. Equally important has been the remarkable blend of influences that have shaped its current law — a mixture of socialist objectives, capitalist pragmatism, and feudal doctrines combined with jurisprudential models taken from a range of western civil codes and, more recently, the common law.

Part one of the article briefly analyses the most important features of the existing Chinese legal system. Part two provides a background to the enactment of the General Principles of Civil Law (GPCL), which incorporates Chinese torts law. The review looks at the development and drafting of the GPCL legislation, and the influences that guided the formulation of legal principles. Part three of the article provides an overview of the torts law provisions in the GPCL. Part four examines the law of personal injury established by the GPCL. Part five uses some case studies to illustrate the principles highlighted in the previous two parts and part six contains a brief conclusion and some pointers to the directions that Chinese torts law may take in the future.

An introduction to CLERP 9

An Introduction to CLERP 9, as its title suggests, is aimed at providing legal practitioners and students with an overview of Australia’s corporate governance reforms, but more than that, it also analyses the events that led to the reforms and provides practical examples of how the amendments will change corporate practices.

The book begins by defining what is generally meant by good corporate governance. It then outlines the relevant recent events that led to introduction and commencement of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (CLERP 9) on 1 July this year. The corporate failures of Enron and HIH – and subsequent Royal Commission – in 2001, and the failure of private auditing firms to warn of their client’s problems are well summarised.

As well as the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, the US equivalent to CLERP 9, the establishment of the ASX Corporate Governance Council and the release of its Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations are examined in detail.

The book covers all the chief changes, including the new rules for audit independence, financial disclosure, whistleblowing, remuneration for directors and executives and continuous disclosure.

Throughout, the book provides a comprehensive and easy to understand commentary on how the CLERP 9 Act alters the Corporations Act 2001 and the ASIC Act 2001, as well as highlighting important changes that affect present practice. For example, the author notes that under the auditor independence rules, when an audit firm contravenes an independence requirement, liability is placed on all members and directors of the audit firm, not just the lead auditor responsible for a particular audit. This, he says, is aimed at introducing a “culture of compliance”.

As well as providing a quick reference guide to how the CLERP 9 Act amends the Corporations and ASIC Acts at the beginning of the book, the table at the end of the book comparing the corporate governance reforms in the US, UK and Australia will be very useful for practitioners trying to make sense of how multinational clients might be liable across different jurisdictions.

"Sexually transmitted debts":the scope of defences to directors' liability for insolvent trading

The recent demise of prominent Australian corporations, such as GIO Australia Holdings Ltd, One.Tel Ltd, HIH Insurance Ltd and Ansett Australia Ltd, have highlighted the relevance of, inter alia, the Australian insolvent trading provisions embodied in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (formerly Corporations Law). What may not be appreciated, however, is that insolvent trading is not only concerned with large public companies. Many of the insolvent trading cases that come before the courts involve small proprietary companies. Moreover, in many cases these are small “family” companies where there may only be one active director. This gives rise to a difficult issue as to the appropriateness of imposing liability for insolvent trading on a spouse who is, factually, merely a dormant director. This article explores the issue of spousal liability for insolvent trading, particularly focusing on the scope of the current defences to insolvent
trading under s 588H.

The desirability of criminal penalties for breaches of part IV of the trade practices act

Following the introduction of criminal sanction, including jail terms, for hard core cartelisation in the United Kingdom, the Dawson Review has recently recommended that criminal penalties be introduced in Australia for individuals and corporations found to have engaged in hard core cartels. A number of reasons have been advanced to justify the introduction of criminal sanctions for this type of conduct, the most common of which are that it would bring Australia in line with other competition regimes and that criminal sanctions are more likely to provide an effective deterrent. This article evaluates those reasons, and others, to determine whether there is any adequate justification for the proposed criminal regime.

The high court on vicarious liability

Vicarious liability (respondeat superior) is a venerable common law doctrine which holds an employer liable for the torts of employees, regardless of the fault of the employer. An employer's liability for the torts of its employees can represent a significant financial obligation and can affect both hiring and operational decisions of businesses. Vicarious liability is a prominent theme in the background of much litigation and is often the reason for litigating the issue of whether or not a worker is an employee. Vicarious liability may also arise through other relationships, such as partnership and agency. Two recent decisions by the High Court of Australia have drawn attention to the issue of vicarious liability. These decisions illuminate the High Court's view of vicarious liability's two main streams: negligence (Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd) n2 and intentional tort (NSW v Lepore). [*2] n3

University marketing and the law: applying the trade practices Act to universities` marketing and promotional activities

Application of the Trade Practices Act and its State equivalents to the  marketing by universities of the courses they teach - ramifications of the Act  are not understood within the wider university community, importantly by   those responsible for marketing courses - the Act prescribes many forms of  conduct not instantly recognised as morally reprehensible and are not  automatically avoided on the ground that they are inconsistent with  acceptable behaviour - the Act creates significant proscriptions, applicable to universities and their staff, which can have serious consequences.

Does the tendency to act impulsively underlie binge eating and alcohol use problems? An empirical investigation

The co-occurrence of problem drinking and binge eating and purging has been well documented. However, there has been relatively little investigation of etiological models that may influence the development of this  co-occurrence. This study tests the hypotheses that impulsivity is heightened in eating disordered women compared with controls, and that women with comorbid bulimia and alcohol use disorders show higher impulsivity than bulimic-only women. The Impulsivity scale, BIS/BAS scales, State Anxiety Inventory, and a behavioural measure of reward responsiveness (CARROT) were administered to 22 women with bulimia, 23 women with comorbid bulimia and alcohol abuse/dependence, and 21 control women. As hypothesised, eating disordered women scored higher than controls on several self-report measures of impulsivity and sorted cards faster during a financially rewarded trial on the behavioural task. Also, as predicted, comorbid women scored higher than bulimic women on the Impulsivity scale. These findings suggest that individual differences in impulsiveness and a tendency to approach rewarding stimuli may contribute to developing these disorders.

Introducing personal liability under the continuous disclosure regime : The essentials and non-essentials

Under the Federal Government's CLERP 9 legislation, expected at the time of writing to come into force in July 2004, personal liability will be introduced for the first time under the continuous disclosure regime. Individuals who are 'involved' in a failure to immediately disclose materially price sensitive information to the market will be subject to a civil penalty, in addition to the company being liable. According to the author, the introduction of personal liability per se is not contentious and indeed is a favourable change; what is questionable, however, is whether 'involvement' in a contravention is the appropriate test for imposing personal liability in relation to breaches of the continuous disclosure provisions. Based on the case law to date on the meaning of 'involved', there is particular uncertainty as to whether an individual would need to have actual knowledge that non-disclosed information is 'materially price sensitive' in order to satisfy the test of 'involved' in the context of continuous disclosure, or whether mere knowledge that the information has not been disclosed would be sufficient. This uncertainty arises due to the vague concept of 'essential matters' which the courts have developed as a test for what degree of knowledge a person needs to have in order to be 'involved'. The author argues that all the confusion as to what 'involved' means could be addressed by removing the word 'essential' from the dialogue, so that the test of 'involvement' would simply be based on whether the particular person had actual knowledge of each of the factual elements constituting the offence.