Meeting the challenge of establishing commercial mohair enterprises by building an interactive enterprise management and financial model

To assist in attracting investors into mohair production in Australia, a production and financial model was built as a learning and support tool. The work aimed to reduce search time and thinking costs about the impact of management strategies on financial feasibility. Various management strategies and assumptions applied to a case study with 300 breeding Angora does and eight variations. The results showed an internal rate of return for mohair ranging from 9.3% to 21.2% over 12 years, a median gross margin per effective hectare ranging from $82 to $167, cash at bank in year 12 ranging from $8,700 to $56,800 and net enterprise assets ranging from $69,900 to $155,700. A key benefit of the model was its ability to allow new farmers to explore potential management strategies and their assumptions about a future enterprise before investing.

Interest rate risk management using matching techniques

Explores the technique of matching asset and liability cash flows, including its applicability to the management of a pension fund. Explains a new procedure for interest rate risk management. Incorporates a study of the Metallgesellschaft case.

Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China

This study examines the effect of family control on the cash holding policy in China. We find that family firms with excess control rights tend to have high cash holdings that are tunneled rather than being invested or paid to shareholders. We further show that the incentive for controlling families to hold cash and for tunneling is exacerbated by the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders, i.e., it is weakened after the Chinese Non-tradable share (NTS) reform and strengthened by the presence of multiple large shareholders who probably play no monitoring role in Chinese family firms. Furthermore, family firms’ incentive to hold cash for tunneling is influenced by the unique characteristics of Chinese firms in the following ways: the incentive is stronger when the family founder has one child and face family succession problem, and when the founder has political connections and directly involves in firm’s management; while it is weakened by family founder’s social interpersonal trust with other entrepreneurs through their membership of Chambers of Commerce. Overall, we argue that family firms in China tend to hold high levels of cash for tunneling, which harms firm value, while the severe controlling-minority shareholder agency conflicts and unique Chinese family characteristics only make this situation worse.

Management trading in Chinese entrepreneurial firms on the ChiNext

We examine management trading in Chinese entrepreneurial firms on the ChiNext. We find that management shareholdings are considerably high, and executives tend to sell their shares after the IPOs on the ChiNext. The propensity for executives to sell shares is negatively correlated with the firms corporate governance and current operating cash flows, but the amount they sell is only positively correlated with the level of management holdings. Both the management selling decision and percentage of selling do not associate with firms earnings and sales growth. This suggests that managers are profit makers rather than informed traders in their selling activities on the ChiNext. We also find that the market reaction to management selling is substantially negative, which implies a herding effect of investors following executives to sell shares.