Tourism and economic development in a cash-in-advance economy

This paper examines the impact of tourism on welfare in a cash-in-advance economy. As a result of the expansion in tourism, the price of the non-traded good increases. This gives rise to a terms-of-trade improvement. However, the cash-in-advance constraint causes a distortion in consumption. For tourism demand, where the gain from the terms-of-trade improvement dominates (does not dominate) the loss from the consumption distortion, tourism is welfare-improving (welfare-reducing). A similar condition for welfare improvement (deterioration) holds for a model of capital inflow and endogenised tourism.

A-Reit price responses to cash rate changes

With the rapid increasing number and assets of A-REITs, there has been an urgent need to study the relationship between the changes of cash rates and the A-REITs returns. This study investigates whether there were relationships between Australian-Real Estate Investment Trusts stock returns and policy interest rate changes in the past decade by using event study with a multivariate regression model. The findings indicate that cash rate changes have no significantly positive or negative influence on the equity A-REIT stock prices. A series of successive cash rate changes do not take a continuous and dramatic effect on the equity A-REIT stock prices in each economic cycle. Moreover, the A-REITs with relatively smaller assets show more significant fluctuation to the changes of cash rates, and the A-REITs owning more than $ 10 billion in capital assets have relatively steady stock prices. Overall, the findings from this research lead to a call for comprehensive research into various areas in order to ascertain the determinants of A-REIT price changes.

ATM (cash machine) SFX

ATM (Cash Machine) sound effect.

The effect of financial constraints, investment policy, product market competition and corporate governance on the value of cash holdings

This study empirically investigates the value shareholders place on excess cash holdings and how shareholders’ valuation of cash holdings is associated with financial constraints, firm growth, cash-flow uncertainty and product market competition for Australian firms from 1990 to 2007. Our results indicate that the marginal value of cash holdings to shareholders declines with larger cash holdings and higher leverage. However, firms that are more financially constrained, that have higher growth rates and that face greater uncertainty exhibit a higher marginal value of cash holdings. These findings are consistent with the explanation that excess cash holdings are not necessarily detrimental to firm value. Firms with costly external financing and that also save more cash for current operating and future investing needs find that the market values these cash hoarding policies favourably. Finally, there is limited evidence of an association between various corporate governance measures and the value of cash holdings for a shorter sample period.

Does cash flow predict returns?

In this paper, we propose the hypothesis that cash flow and cash flow volatility predict returns. We categorize firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange into sectors, and apply tests for both in-sample and out-of-sample predictability. While we find strong evidence that cash flow volatility predicts returns for all sectors, the evidence obtained when using cash flow as a predictor is relatively weak. Estimated profits and utility gains also suggest that it is cash flow volatility that is more relevant as a source of information than cash flow.

Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China

This study examines the effect of family control on the cash holding policy in China. We find that family firms with excess control rights tend to have high cash holdings that are tunneled rather than being invested or paid to shareholders. We further show that the incentive for controlling families to hold cash and for tunneling is exacerbated by the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders, i.e., it is weakened after the Chinese Non-tradable share (NTS) reform and strengthened by the presence of multiple large shareholders who probably play no monitoring role in Chinese family firms. Furthermore, family firms’ incentive to hold cash for tunneling is influenced by the unique characteristics of Chinese firms in the following ways: the incentive is stronger when the family founder has one child and face family succession problem, and when the founder has political connections and directly involves in firm’s management; while it is weakened by family founder’s social interpersonal trust with other entrepreneurs through their membership of Chambers of Commerce. Overall, we argue that family firms in China tend to hold high levels of cash for tunneling, which harms firm value, while the severe controlling-minority shareholder agency conflicts and unique Chinese family characteristics only make this situation worse.

Default probability for the Jordanian companies: A test of cash flow theory

Abstract
This paper aims to investigate the effect of cash flow and free cash flow on corporate failure in the emerging market in particular Jordan using two samples; matched sample and a cross sectional time-series (panel data) sample representative of 167 Jordanian companies in 1989-2003. LOGIT models are used to outline the relationship between firms’ financial health and the probability of default. Our results show that there is firm’s free cash flow increases corporate failure. The result also shows that the firm’s cash flow decreases corporate failure. Firms’ capital structures are fund a mental in predicting default. Capital structure is seen as the main factor affecting the probability of default as it affects a firm’s ability to access external sources of funds. Jordanian firms depend on short-term debt for both short and long term financing.

Cash holdings and bond returns around takeovers

Using a large sample of 2712 unique U.S. domestic takeovers over the period 1993 to 2014, we show a negative relation between the level of cash holdings and post-announcement corporate bond returns. Our findings support the agency cost of cash holdings view and show that bondholders and shareholders share the same interests with respect to cash policy around takeovers. We further find that cash holdings are viewed less negatively by bondholders in firms with strong shareholders. This paper is the first to document the role of cash holdings on bondholder wealth around takeover announcements.