Models of scientific community: Charles Sanders Peirce to Thomas Kuhn

Scientific community' is common currency in the study of science, largely due to Kuhn's use of the term in his highly influential book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. As this article explains, however, 'scientific community' was not of Kuhn's coining. It was hinted at by Peirce, and expressly designated by Royce. On a few occasions Fleck affirmed a scientific community, while Polanyi studied it in some detail. The article concludes by comparing these thinkers' 'communitarian' interpretations of science.

Realism and idealism in the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce

The thesis argues that there is a conjoining of realism and idealism in the mature thought of American philosopher Charles S. Peirce. Concludes that realism and idealism function together as a unit as they are both founded on an evolutionary conception of continuity and potentiality.

Public relations and the rhetoric of civil society

The intention of this paper is to build on a book by Anne Surma (2005). It takes some of Surma’s ideas probably beyond what was originally intended in order to suggest their logical conclusions for the practice of public relations. Surma argues that writing and reading of every type enables or otherwise facilitates or restricts imagination. Further, this shaping or inflection of the imagination leads to the shaping or the inflection of the type of ‘ethic’ which we are able to hold in our heads about the world which surrounds us. If this is the case then public relations writing, which has the very raison d’etre of influencing thought, must lend itself to important analysis in this regard. This paper presumes the reader has a basic understanding of Charles Saunders Peirce’s notion of semiotics.

"Appear as crucified for me" : sight, suffering, and spiritual transformation in the hymns of Charles Wesley

Early Methodist laypeople often described their conversion experiences in terms of seeing the suffering of Christ. This article considers this theme within early Methodist culture by examining the relationship between sight, suffering, and spiritual transformation in the hymns of Charles Wesley. Many of Wesley's hymns depict the suffering of Christ in evocative detail, encouraging the singer or reader to imagine and respond to this suffering in particular ways. I argue that Wesley presents the sight of Christ's suffering as having profound transformative power, at the heart of Christian experience. In doing so he constructs Methodist spirituality in a way that draws upon both the ancient Christian tradition of Passion devotion and contemporary eighteenth-century convictions about the power of the sight of suffering.

'The suffering members sympathise' : constructing the sympathetic self in the hymns of Charles Wesley

For the first time in history, this timely landmark volume brings together contributions from the leading scholars working on the life and work of Charles Wesley.

Pain, passion and faith : revisiting the place of Charles Wesley in early Methodism

Pain, Passion and Faith: Revisiting the Place of Charles Wesley in Early Methodism is a significant study of the 18th-century poet and preacher Charles Wesley. Wesley was an influential figure in 18th-century English culture and society; he was co-founder of the Methodist revival movement and one of the most prolific hymn-writers in the English language. His hymns depict the Christian life as characterized by a range of intense emotions, from ecstatic joy to profound suffering.

A semiotic view of Dewey's times and Habermas's lifeworlds

John Dewey (1859-1952) explained how life was ‘corporatised’ at the time of rampant, laissez faire capitalism in early 20th century America. This paper refers Dewey’s observations to Habermas’s notions of the colonisation of the lifeworld. The semiotic and pragmatist approaches of Charles Saunders Peirce are then enlisted to look further into these lifeworld changes. The
paper suggests modifications to Habermas’s schema to bring it more in line with Dewey’s empirical account. It puts together a theoretically and empirically informed picture of the contemporary disruption to ways of living and the accompanying social and political instability. The paper then goes on to suggest how that instability appears to have been quelled by communicative means. These stages of: (1) stability; (2) disruption/instability; and (3) the regaining of stability are compared to Habermas’s notions of: (1) an original lifeworld; (2) colonisation of that lifeworld by the consequences of purposive rational activity; then (3) communicative action which ‘rebuilds’— that is which replaces or modifies or reforms or repairs—the disrupted lifeworld in order to create a new lifeworld. ‘Colonisation’ could be said to have provoked social instability. Notions of building a new ‘lifeworld’—a new cultural and psychic reference—could be said to correspond with attempts to resume social and political stability. The implication is that whatever the degree of purposive rationalism there is always a need for a return to some level of shared values and
understandings which imply communicative rationality. This ‘return’ or ‘counter-colonisation’ can be thought of as operating via a ‘lifeworld negotiation’ which might best be understood with reference to a Peircean based pragmatism-semiotic theory of human subjectivity. This paper
has been criticised for discussing “arguments” which: “would justify those who accommodated themselves to Nazism.” What this paper in fact tries to do is to use the concepts of the above three philosophers to try to account for the ways people think. This paper is not about justifying what philosophies people should hold. It is presumed that most readers are sensible and ethical and can make their own minds up in that respect. Rather it attempts to draw from Dewey, Habermas and Peirce to offer a characterisation of what philosophies might be argued to be held and to offer an explanation about how these modes of thinking might be said to have come into existence.
This paper rejects the notion that ones ‘will’ and thus the way one is able to think, is totally free and beyond the formative influences of the social-cultural context—including the influences of public relations and other persuasive discourse industries.