The role of leverage in cross-border mergers and acquisitions

We examine the relationship between leverage and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Using a sample of 85,560 cross-border mergers and acquisitions in 57 countries over the period 1990 to 2010, we find that firms with higher leverage are less likely to acquire foreign targets, whereas firms with lower leverage tend to be targets acquired by foreign firms. These effects are more pronounced in Asian countries than North America. Acquisition premium, the likelihood of all-cash offer and the percentage of cash in the acquisition offer decrease with leverage in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Foreign targets gain positive abnormal returns in the both short run and long run, while acquirers earn positive abnormal returns in the short-run, but negative returns in the long run. We also find that firms adjust their capital structure after the acquisition by issuing more equity if they were overleveraged, or issuing more debt if they were underleveraged before the acquisition. Our results provide international evidence on how leverage affects managerial decision to acquire foreign targets, payment method and acquisition premium in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. This study shows that the interdependent relationship between investment decision and financing decision exists worldwide.

Cross-border insolvency law and multinational enterprise groups: judicial Innovation as an international solution

The Article argues that courts confronting the effects of multinational enterprise insolvency must undertake a pragmatic incursion into the separate entity doctrine. This argument is premised on gaps in the current Model Law which confers significant discretion on the courts. Our research shows that courts have fashioned innovative solutions to fill the gaps and thatgreater recognition of the legitimacy of these judicial incursions into the separate entity doctrine would facilitate the reduction of transaction costs in the case of multinational group insolvencies. We identify criteriawhereby a court would be able to determine that the inherentseparateness of the corporate structure should be disregarded andthe group regarded as one.