The market for financial report audits : regulation of and competition for auditor independence

The independence of auditors and the quality of financial report audits generally are rarely tested except in circumstances of corporate failure when alleged sub-optimality is present. Often auditors have good defences as to their expertise or competency, but rarely do they have equally convincing defences for the independence of their audit. A major issue for the regulation of auditor independence is that the threats to independence are often subtle and difficult to measure. This paper argues that firms undertaking financial report audits need to be transparent and competitive in respect of auditor independence. Two models that adopt this premise are proposed.

Auditor independence: regulation, oversight and inspection

Much of what auditors do is unobservable. Indeed, what goes on in an audit has been described as ‘secret audit business’. Audits in this context are of financial reports and those financial reports are the representations of the management of those companies, not the auditors. The audits of financial reports are of value in that they provide a competent and independent (of auditee management) attestation of the validity of those management representations. This attestation lowers the ‘information risk’ for the users of these financial reports. There has been a marked increase in activity to regulate matters relating to independence. The proposals outlined in CLERP 9 are one example of this. The requirements in the United States under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are a further example.

Audit firms operate in a highly regulated yet highly competitive market. Evidence exists to suggest that audit firms are active competitors in respect of audit pricing and competency, including specialist industry expertise. Until recently, there has been little or no observable evidence that audit firms compete in respect of independence. The issues as they relate to audit independence are complex. One issue is that threats to independence are frequently subtle and difficult to observe and measure. Hence, controlling the decisions that relate to them cannot rely solely on regulation which itself inevitably relies on crude definitions and imprecise measures. Additionally, further regulation may not achieve the desired end without other processes being but in place in tandem.

This paper argues that:

1. auditors of certain classes of companies (in particular, those that are publicly traded) should be provided with incentives or requirements to have observable processes on independence
2. the means of observability should be in the form of an inspection and review process focussing on issues critical to the audit, such as independence
3. expert persons not having a current or past financial interest in the firm or in the commercial outcomes of the review should be used in the inspection and review process
4. the review process should have wide-ranging powers of inspection to examine the policies, processes, structures and ‘culture’ of audit firms
5. the report of the inspection and review should be made public, unedited and in full, and in a timely fashion. The primary objectives of this proposal are to (1) make more transparent to the market for information the characteristics of the audit firms and their process to ensure audit independence, and (2) provide a rigorous oversight of independence decision-making by persons who have no commercial interest in the outcome of the decision.

Auditor independence and the nexus with corporate governance-quo vadis?

"Where were the auditors?" Yet again, the independence of the auditor has come under close, critical scrutiny with ongoing collapses of large listed companies, which have global implications for the proper functioning of investment markets. The most recent collapse being that of ENRON in the United States of America, (USA).

"Who are the auditors?" The nexus of auditor independence with corporate governance is examined drawing on Foucault's notion of the relationships between power I knowledge and ethics in the construction of ethical identity. In the face of declining public confidence and demands for more stringent regulation, the tensions between greater self-regulation of auditors by the accounting profession and moves by governments to impose more stringent legislation I regulation, including the creation of public oversight bodies is apparent. This paper presents a comparative analysis of recent developments internationally, with particular reference to South Africa and Australia, intended to more rigorously enforce auditor independence and improve corporate governance. Five key areas identified by various Commissions and regulatory bodies that are regarded as posing significant threats to auditor independence are highlighted. Recommendations for changes to independence requirements in professional codes of ethics and corporate legislation, intended to safeguard auditor independence and to enhance investor protection, are critically examined. It is argued that the "new" independence recommendations while providing more detailed guidance for dealing with the independence threats fail to introduce any new concepts and may be found as ineffective as the plethora of earlier regulations. (This paper represents work in progress, which is intended to spark debate, and accordingly, the authors invite comment from readers to develop further aspects of research into this critical area).

Auditor independence : shared meaning between the demand and supply sides of the audit services market?

Purpose – The purpose of the paper is to examine the extent to which there is shared meaning of the concept of auditor independence between the three major groups of parties on the demand and supply sides of the audit services market – auditors, financial report preparers and financial report users.

Design/methodology/approach – The paper utilises the measurement of meaning framework (semantic differential analysis) originally proposed by Osgood et al. in 1957. The framework is used to investigate the extent to which there is shared meaning (agreement in interpretations) of the independence concept, in response to alternative audit engagement case contexts, between key parties to the financial reporting communication process. The study's research data was collected in the period March 2004-May 2005.

Findings – Findings indicate a robust and stable single-factor cognitive structure within which the research participants interpret the connotative meaning of the auditor independence concept. An analysis of the experimental cases finds similarities in connotations (interpretations) of an audit firm's independence for the participant groups for most cases, with the exception of cases involving the joint provision of audit and non-audit (taxation) services.

Research limitations/implications – The usual external validity threat that applies to experimental research generally applies to the study. That is, the results may not be generalisable to settings beyond those examined in the study. An important implication of the study is that it emphasises the continuing problematic nature of the joint provision of audit and non-audit services, even in situations where the non-audit services comprise only traditional taxation services.

Originality/value – The study is the first to examine the concept of auditor independence by means of the Osgood et al. measurement of meaning research framework using, as research participants, the three major groups on the demand and supply sides of the audit services market.

Review of Post-CLERP 9 Australian auditor independence research

The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform & Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (CLERP 9) added substantial new provisions pertaining to auditor independence, and followed in the wake of financial reporting scandals during 2000 to 2003. Many of the regulatory changes were framed in the earlier Ramsay Report, which drew on independence concerns raised in the academic literature. This review paper reviews Australian academic research investigating auditor independence, framed by our conceptual understanding of auditor independence, to assess what we have learned about the impact of CLERP 9 on auditor independence. Our review of Australian auditor independence research published post-CLERP 9 reveals little evidence of the impact of the regulatory changes on auditor behaviour (independence in fact) and perceptions (independence in appearance). We conclude there are substantial needs for further research on the impact of the CLERP 9 amendments on auditor independence and any enduring independence issues. We identify particular areas for future research that may better inform policy development and argue that the prospect of high-quality relevant research will increase if regulatory agencies, the accounting profession and audit practitioners engage more with academics in the research process. We identify several ways in which this might occur.

Auditor disaffiliation program in China and auditor independence

SUMMARY: This study examines whether the disaffiliation program introduced by the Chinese government improved auditor independence and whether auditor quality affects this relationship. Auditor independence is measured in terms of the likelihood of receiving a qualified report and the level of earnings management (measured by noncore operating income). The results show that the likelihood of receiving qualified audit opinions for listed companies significantly increased, and noncore operating earnings significantly decreased, after auditors were disaffiliated. However, companies audited by auditors without any affiliation also showed an increase in the likelihood of receiving qualified opinions and a decrease in noncore operating earnings, possibly because of the increased surveillance by the regulatory bodies that accompanied the act of disaffiliation. The results also show that the association between the disaffiliation program and the likelihood of receiving qualified audit opinions is stronger for small auditors than for large auditors, possibly because of the initial lower audit quality of small auditors. Auditor size, however, did not significantly affect the association between the disaffiliation program and noncore operating earnings.

Partner-scale economies, service bundling and auditor independence in the Australian self-managed superannuation (pension) fund industry

Using proprietary Australian Taxation Office (ATO) data, this study examines audit pricing, service bundling and independence issues in the self-managed superannuation fund (SMSF) sector, the fastest growing and largest segment of the Australian $2 trillion retirement savings industry. We consider the impact of partner-level scale effects for a large sample of SMSF audits for the three years to June 2010. After controlling for factors known to determine audit fees, we find evidence of fee discounting by partners with large client portfolios. However, when the dependent variable is redefined to the total 'bundle' of services (including audit and non-audit fees), the firms of partners with larger client portfolios are shown to earn bundling fee premiums. This finding suggests industry specialists price strategically using audits as a conduit to supply higher margin non-audit services (NAS) to clients with more resources. Last, we find no evidence the supply of NAS impairs auditor independence, alleviating joint supply concerns raised in the Cooper Review.

Non-audit services, auditor quality and the value relevance of earnings

This paper tests the hypothesis that there is an inverse relation between non-audit services (NAS) provided by a firm auditor and the value relevance of earnings(measured as the earnings response coefficient) and that this relation is weaker for firms with Big 6 auditors. The hypothesis is based on anecdotal evidence and previous research that suggests that the provision of NAS by the external auditor is likely to adversely affect investors’ perceptions of the credibility of financial reports, and that Big 6 auditors, because of reputational capital and litigation costs,are likely to mitigate the adverse effects of NAS. Results using 840 firm-year observations of Australian companies document a statistically significant inverse relationship between NAS and the value relevance of earnings, and this inverse relationship is weaker for Big 6 auditors, therefore supporting the hypothesis.

An introduction to CLERP 9

An Introduction to CLERP 9, as its title suggests, is aimed at providing legal practitioners and students with an overview of Australia’s corporate governance reforms, but more than that, it also analyses the events that led to the reforms and provides practical examples of how the amendments will change corporate practices.

The book begins by defining what is generally meant by good corporate governance. It then outlines the relevant recent events that led to introduction and commencement of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (CLERP 9) on 1 July this year. The corporate failures of Enron and HIH – and subsequent Royal Commission – in 2001, and the failure of private auditing firms to warn of their client’s problems are well summarised.

As well as the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, the US equivalent to CLERP 9, the establishment of the ASX Corporate Governance Council and the release of its Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations are examined in detail.

The book covers all the chief changes, including the new rules for audit independence, financial disclosure, whistleblowing, remuneration for directors and executives and continuous disclosure.

Throughout, the book provides a comprehensive and easy to understand commentary on how the CLERP 9 Act alters the Corporations Act 2001 and the ASIC Act 2001, as well as highlighting important changes that affect present practice. For example, the author notes that under the auditor independence rules, when an audit firm contravenes an independence requirement, liability is placed on all members and directors of the audit firm, not just the lead auditor responsible for a particular audit. This, he says, is aimed at introducing a “culture of compliance”.

As well as providing a quick reference guide to how the CLERP 9 Act amends the Corporations and ASIC Acts at the beginning of the book, the table at the end of the book comparing the corporate governance reforms in the US, UK and Australia will be very useful for practitioners trying to make sense of how multinational clients might be liable across different jurisdictions.

Enron. Con : “He that filches from me my good name … makes me poor indeed”

This critique functions as an introduction to this special issue of Critical Perspectives on Accounting; an edition that embraces themes pertaining to the catastrophic collapse of Enron. In an effort to place the research published in this edition in context, I provide a critical analysis of the accounting and corporate governance implications of the demise of Enron, the subsequent public outcry, and the legislative reforms to date. I conclude with an exploration of how the studies in this special issue contribute to understanding the myriad of forces behind major events such as this.

Corporate governance failure and its impact on National Australia Bank's performance

The National Australia Bank (NAB) is the largest financial services institution listed on the Australian stock exchange and is within the 30 most profitable financial services organisation in the world. In January 2004, the bank disclosed to the public that it had identified losses relating to unauthorised trading in foreign currency options amounting to AUD360 million. This foreign exchange debacle was classified as operational risk, the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed processes, people, or systems and reiterated the importance of corporate governance for banks. Concurrent issues of National Australia Bank’s AUD4.1 billion loss on US HomeSide loans in 2001, the degree of strength of their risk management practices and lack of auditor independence, were raised by the US Securities and Exchange Commission in 2004, reinforcing the view that corporate governance had not been given the priority it deserved over a number of years. This paper will assess and critically analyse the impact of corporate governance failure by management and Board of Directors on NAB’s performance over the years 2001-2005.

Corporate governance failure and its impact on National Australia Bank's performance

The National Australia Bank (NAB) is the largest financial services institution listed on the Australian stock exchange and is within the 30 most profitable financial services organisation in the world. In January 2004, the bank disclosed to the public that it had identified losses relating to unauthorised trading in foreign currency options amounting to AUD360 million. Thisforeign exchange debacle was classified as operational risk, the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed processes, people, or systems and reiterated the importance of corporate governance for banks. Concurrent issues of National Australia Bank's AUD4.1 billion loss on US HomeSide loans in 2001, the degree of strength of their risk management practices and lack of auditor independence, were raised by the US Securities and Exchange Commission in 2004, reinforcing the view that corporate governance had not been given the priority it deserved over a number of years. This paper will assess and critically analyse the impact of corporate governance failure by management and Board of Directors on NAB's performance over the years 2001-2005.