Reconsidering the scope of the equitable mortgage arising from deposit of title documents

This article examines the underlying fairness of applying equitable security presumptions to the deposit of title documents belonging to third parties. It argues that within such transactions, the focus of the equitable jurisdiction must be upon the intention of the owner of the title documents rather than presumptions arising from the fact of the deposit. It suggests that there is no logic in applying equitable presumptions, founded on the principles of part performance, to infer a security intention in transactions involving third party title documents. The fact that the parties to a loan advance may have intended to create a mortgage between themselves does not mean that the third party owner of the title documents also intended to create a mortgage. In third party transactions, the objectives of the equity jurisdiction are best achieved through a comprehensive assessment of the intention of all parties and the abolition of presumptions based upon the bare fact of title deposit.

Insuring for a crisis: deposit insurance and the GFC, the Australian and New Zealand experience

Deposit insurance schemes were an important element in policy responses to the global financial crisis (GFC). There has been considerable debate about the nature and efficacy of such policy measures in alleviating the fallout from financial crises. The GFC highlighted problems associated with deposit insurance schemes including moral hazard, coverage limits, co-insurance, cross border issues and market distortions. Despite these shortcomings, deposit insurance schemes were able to ameliorate the financial panic experienced and reduce contagion. This paper evaluates the Australian and New Zealand experience with deposit insurance introduced in response to the GFC, and compares this to the OECD experience. It reflects on the performance of deposit insurance schemes considered against the attributes of good policy design, and evaluates the specific problems and strengths encountered during the GFC.

Reluctant relaxation: The end of the iron ore export embargo and the origins of Australia's mining boom, 1960-1966

The Australian government embargoed any export of iron ore between 1938 and 1960. Joseph Lyons’s government imposed the ban on the eve of World War II for a strategic reason: to prevent the Japanese from importing ore from Yampi Sound in Western Australia. Another consideration, which underpinned the retention of the ban for more than two decades, was the Commonwealth of Australia's perception that Australia's iron ore reserves were limited. In the space of a few years after the partial lifting of the embargo in 1960, world-class reserves of iron ore, mainly in Western Australia, were discovered. Mined and exported from the mid-1960s, iron ore would become, in time, Australia’s best export earner. This article explores the reasons behind the lifting of the ban and how the relaxation of the embargo in stages between 1960 and 1966 shaped the emerging iron ore industry and therefore Australia’s mining boom.

The pricing of deposit insurance in the presence of systematic risk

Based on the Merton (1977) put option framework, we develop a deposit insurance pricing model that incorporates asset correlations, a measurement for the systematic risk of a bank, to account for the risk of joint bank failures. Estimates from our model suggest that actuarially fair risk-based deposit insurance that considers only individual bank failure risk is underpriced, leaving insurance providers exposed to net losses. Our estimates also capture the size premium where big banks are priced with higher deposit insurance than small banks. This result is particularly relevant to the current regulatory concerns on big banks that are too-big-to-fail. Above all, our approach provides a unifying framework for integrating risk-based deposit insurance with risk-based Basel capital requirements.