Well-known trade marks, foreign investment and local industry : a comparison of China and Indonesia

Strengthened protection for well-known trade marks in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement is an important issue for developing countries, which has led to trade pressures from industrialised nations in the past. ‘Trade mark squatting’, referring to the registration in bad faith of foreign well-known marks in order to sell them back to their original owners, is a much discussed phenomenon in this context. This article outlines the history and development of well-known trade marks and the applicable law in China and Indonesia. It looks not just at foreign and international brands subjected to ‘trade mark squatting’, but also at how local enterprises are using the system. Rather remarkably in view of the countries’ turbulent histories, local well-known marks have a long history and are well respected for their range of products. They are not normally affected by the ‘trade mark squatting’ phenomenon and are rarely the subject of disputes. Enhanced protection under the TRIPS Agreement is especially relevant for international brands and the article shows the approaches in the two countries. In China, government incentives assist the proliferation of nationally well-known and locally ‘famous’ marks. In Indonesia, lack of implementing legislation has left the matter of recognition to the discretion of the courts.

Neoconservatism as discourse: virtue, power and US foreign policy

Neoconservatism in US foreign policy is a hotly contested subject, yet most scholars broadly agree on what it is and where it comes from. From a consensus that it first emerged around the 1960s, these scholars view neoconservatism through what we call the ‘3Ps’ approach, defining it as a particular group of people (‘neocons’), an array of foreign policy preferences and/or an ideological commitment to a set of principles. While descriptively intuitive, this approach reifies neoconservatism in terms of its specific and often static ‘symptoms’ rather than its dynamic constitutions. These reifications may reveal what is emblematic of neoconservatism in its particular historical and political context, but they fail to offer deeper insights into what is constitutive of neoconservatism. Addressing this neglected question, this article dislodges neoconservatism from itsperceived home in the ‘3Ps’ and ontologically redefines it as a discourse. Adopting aFoucauldian approach of archaeological and genealogical discourse analysis, we trace itsdiscursive formations primarily to two powerful and historically enduring discourses ofthe American self — virtue and power — and illustrate how these discourses produce aparticular type of discursive fusion that is ‘neoconservatism’. We argue that to betterappreciate its continued effect on contemporary and future US foreign policy, we needto pay close attention to those seemingly innocuous yet deeply embedded discoursesabout the US and its place in the world, as well as to the people, policies and principlesconventionally associated with neoconservatism.