Targeting the cultural history of Iraq : implications for national identity and democracy

Since its inception in 1921, a number of successive regimes have sought to politicize Iraq’s cultural history in order to build nationalistic sentiment and social cohesion across this rich and complex nation. Foremost among these were the Baath party, particularly under the rule of Saddam Hussein, who used much of the nation’s Oil wealth to undergo an extensive nation-building campaign. However, with the invasion of Iraq by the US in 2003 came the deliberate destruction and blatant negligence of the occupying forces. In addition, Iraqi civilians targeted the cultural landscape of their nation with wanton looting and arson, as well as systematic attacks on sites of archaeological or ethno-religious significance. More recently, the Shia and Kurdish dominated Iraqi Government have organised the “Committee for Removing Symbols of the Saddam Era” and plan to purge the state of its Sunni dominated past. This paper argues that the destruction of Iraq’s cultural history has played a part in eroding the national identity that many of these symbols and institutions were designed to promulgate. In turn, this has brought about the rise of ethno/religious sectarianism in Iraq which has had particular implications for the nation’s fledgling democratic order.

Read all about it : the free press, the public sphere and democracy in Iraq

Despite a wealth of recent research which has detailed the impact that new media outlets and technologies have had on the Middle East’s nascent public sphere and its role in promoting democracy, there has been little investigation into the re-emergence of the free press in Iraq following the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the corresponding end to his tight control over the nation’s media sector. This paper begins by reviewing Iraq’s long relationship with the written word and its corresponding public sphere. It traces the introduction of the printing press to Iraq by the Ottomans and details those periods when the Iraqi press was truly free, fostering the emergence of a civil society and democratic reforms (such as under the Young Turks, the early Hashemite era and following the Second World War). It also examines those periods when the Iraqi media was most restricted and did little else than praise the regime at hand (such as under Ottoman rule and most recently under the Ba†th regime, especially under Saddam Hussein). Following on, this article reviews the developments since the fall of Saddam Hussein and, despite the extensive interference in Iraq’s media sector from governmental entities both outside and inside Iraq, it concludes by arguing that these papers have been central to the re-emergence of an Iraqi public sphere which has openly debated and discussed the issues pertinent to post-Saddam Iraq.

The whats, whys and wherefores of home education and its regulation in Australia

This paper presents a unique summary of Australian research on home education, and an evaluation of current regulation in an Australian context. It begins with the recognition that home education is a legal alternative to school education in Australia. However it argues that legal definitions of home education do not properly reflect the practice of home education. This is illustrated by an examination of different educational approaches taken by home educators and research on the socialisation of home educated children in Australia. Research on who chooses home education, why people choose home education and the educational outcomes for home educated children is also discussed. Home educating families represent all family types, are found in rural, suburban and city locations, and choose home education for a variety ofreasons. Research indicates that Australian home educated children have positive educational and social experiences and outcomes. The question of whether and ifso the extent to which, home education should be regulated by the state is examined. The authors argue that whilst regulation is acceptable to protect a childr right to education, a more consistent regulatory framework is needed across Australia. It is argued that such aframework should facilitate and encourage children who are being home educated and should be flexible enough to accommodate the variety ofeducational approaches taken to home education.

The diffusion of policy in contexts of practice : flexible delivery in Australian vocational education and training

Significant changes have occurred over the last decade within the Australian Vocational Education and Training (VET) system. Not least amongst these has been a shift from a predominantly traditional face-to-face classroom model of programme delivery to more flexible models informed by the needs of clients. To lead this revolution, in 1991 the Australian Commonwealth and State Ministers for Training established the Flexible Delivery Working Party. A series of reports followed that sought to develop a policy framework, including a definition of flexible delivery, and its principles and characteristics. Despite these efforts, project funding and national staff development initiatives, several difficulties have been experienced in the ‘take-up’ of flexible delivery; problems that we argue are related to how the dissemination of innovative practice is conceived. Specifically, the literature and research on the diffusion of innovations points to the efficacy of informal social networks ‘in which individuals adopt the new idea as a result of talking with other individuals who have already adopted it’ (Valente, 1995, p. ix). Following a discussion of these issues, the article concludes by arguing the need for research of innovative practice transfer within VET in Australia, using qualitative case study in order to develop an in-depth and rich description of the process, and facilitate greater understanding of how it works in practice.

Manipulating Islam and democracy in Iraq’s ‘Pluralised Authoritarianism’

With the realisation that the initial motives for the 2003 invasion of Iraq – Saddam’s alleged stockpile of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and his links to Al-Qaeda – were grievous intelligence errors the Bush administration, with varying degrees of success, were able to spin the war’s rasion d’etre and redefine the parameters of victory. A central tenet of this approach was to begin speaking about democracy as if it had always been one of the aims of the war itself. For the first few years, the effort to democratise Iraq appeared to gain some credible momentum: a complex array of political, religious and ethno-sectarian factions formed political parties and civil society movements; uncensored news was enthusiastically consumed across the nation; Iraqi citizens took to the streets to protest key government decisions; and millions of Iraqis voted in relatively free and fair national elections (Davis, 2004, 2007, Isakhan, 2008, 2011b). Central to each of these developments were various Iraqi religious establishments – but especially those of the Shia Arab population of Iraq – who saw no distinction between their Islamic faith and the notion of democracy. Not surprisingly, a body of literature has emerged which has been very optimistic about Iraq’s engagement with both ‘Islam’ and ‘democracy’ in the post-Baathist period, while acknowledging the challenges it faces in creating a stable, egalitarian and democratic society (Al-Musawi, 2006, Cole, 2006, Davis, 2005, Dawisha, 2009, Isakhan, 2011a, Stansfield, 2007).

However, there have been virtually no studies which have sought to question this optimism in the light of more recent events. Addressing this lacuna, this paper documents the last few years (2006- 2011) which have seen many elements within the Iraqi political elite – most notably the Maliki government and his State of Law Coalition (SLC) – demonstrate what has been referred to in literature on other Arab states alternatively as ‘liberalised autocracy’ (Brumberg, 2002), ‘semi-authoritarianism’ (Ottaway, 2003) or ‘pluralised authoritarianism’ (Posusney and Angrist, 2005). That is to say, that these states consolidate their incumbency while putting in place measures that can be considered more or less liberal. To do this, the regime actually utilises (and controls) nominally democratic mechanisms such as elections, media freedoms, political opposition and civil society as part of their strategy to retain power. Of particular interest here are the ways in which the Maliki government – and Shia Arab Iraqi political factions more broadly – have manipulated both ‘Islam’ and ‘democracy’ towards such ‘pluralised authoritarianism’.