Manufacturers' product liability in Australia

The thesis, by examining statute and common law, demonstrates that Australian law is deficient in its endeavour to impose liability on manufacturers for defective products, and also with respect to the provision of compensation to consumers/users who suffer loss or injurty therefrom.

Models for reform : the directors’ duty of care in a modern commercial world

The Australian responses to corporate collapses in the modern commercial world have been
implemented at both judicial and legislative levels over a period of decades. South Africa has lagged behind the reform process, only recently reviewing its company laws with a view to legislatively incorporating, inter alia, its directors’ duties. The consequence of such review of the duty of care is found in subsection 76(3)(c) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. This article critically evaluates the existing South African common law and the new legislative directors’ duty of care in light of the equivalent duties in Australia and the United States. The analysis ultimately aims at determining whether the approach taken in any of these jurisdictions provides useful guidance in regard to reform options for the duty of care. While the Companies Act contains features that are preferable to the Australian Corporations Act 2001, the impact of the Companies Act on crucial features, such as the objectivity of the duty of care, is unclear and will have to await judicial review. It is concluded that while the South African measures at times echo Australian law in a positive manner, the Australian legislative regime is not without legitimate criticism as it can be unnecessarily complicated. Ultimately it is the United States and Australian common law duty of care that provides the best model for legislative reform.

A comparative analysis of directors' duty of care, skill and diligence in South Africa and in Australia

The South African and Australian law regarding directors' duty of care, ski ll and diligence were influenced considerably by English precedent of the late 1800s and early 19005. Originally both jurisdictions adopted a conservative approach towards directors' duty of care, skill and diligence. This resulted in very low standards of care, skill and diligence expected of directors. In Australia, the standards of care and diligence expected of directors changed drastically with the case of Daniels v Anderson, where objective standards were used to determine a breach of directors' duty of care and diligence, and when objective standards of care and diligence were introduced in Australian corporations legislation. In this article it is submitted that if the opportunity arose for a South African court to consider whether a director is in breach of his or her common law duty of care, skill and diligence, the form of fault that will be required will be negligence as judged against the standards of a reasonable person. This means that in actual fact objective standards of care and diligence are expected of directors in South Africa. Although section 76(3) of the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 does not introduce purely objective standards of care, skill and diligence, the section is defended in this article. It is pointed out that encouraging emerging entrepreneurs to become directors of South African companies provides justification for keeping subjective elements as part of the test to determine whether a director was in breach of his or her statutory duty of care, skill and diligence.

IP in Asia

This presentation will start with a brief review of the first phase of this project, which focused largely on the impact on innovation of legal and institutional IP reforms in Asia triggered by the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and by subsequent bilateral or multilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). The presentation will then show the emerging issues relevant for the second phase of the project, which in an increasingly diversified IP landscape will lie at the intersection of IP with other disciplines and other areas of law, such as competition law, media law, criminal law, human rights, environmental law and constitutional law.

The legal recognition of same-sex unions in Australia : a constitutional analysis

The Marriage Equality Amendment Bill 2010 (Cth) currently before federal Parliament amends the present legislative definition of marriage to include same-sex unions. This article provides a constitutional analysis of the scope of the marriage power, s 51(xxi) of the Australian Constitution , through examination of the Bill and other existing and proposed legislation. It argues that if the High Court considered "marriage" to be a constitutionalised legal term of art, it could accommodate post-federation development at common law and in statute to the institution of marriage. It also argues that the presumption in favour of constitutionality ought to be at its strongest with federal legislation determining complex and intractable moral issues. The article explores the constitutional vulnerability of current same-sex union legislation and possible future legislation providing for recognition of the functional equivalent of "marriage". In addition, the article considers the constitutional foundation of a national framework to provide official legal recognition of same-sex relationships.

Rejection of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in Australia : a retreat from progressivism

This article canvasses the key Australian exclusionary rules and discretions to exclude evidence under both the common law and its statutory counterparts in the Uniform Evidence Legislation now in effect in the Commonwealth, Victoria, New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania. In examining these exclusionary rules and discretions, an analysis is made as to whether evidence derived from primary evidence excluded under one or more of these rules should also be excluded under an American style 'fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine' - and why or why not. Finally, the article compares the current Australian approach to this doctrine with the present state of the American doctrine and the recognised exceptions thereto. The article concludes with recommendations for applying the doctrine in both countries, subject to suggested changes in the Jaw that take the realities of political correctness and human frailty into account.

The diversification discount and takeovers : some Australian evidence

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the existence of a diversification discount in the Australian takeover market. A sample of 446 Australian publicly-listed firms involved in the market for corporate control was observed between 2000 and 2007. The authors examined two pre-announcement and four post-announcement periods, predominantly around the immediate event date, but also examined activity out to one year following the announcement.
Design/methodology/approach – An event study, in this case, is used to examine abnormal returns around the announcement of a merger or acquisition. The timeframe this study intends to focus on is the period from announcement date to a time one year down the track which, although some studies may deem it “long-term”, is still a relatively short-term measure of performance.While many variables in acquisitions have been looked at in depth over the years, such as outcome, nature, payment method and size of deal, one area which has had considerably less attention is the area of specialisation and diversification. That is, do focus increasing (or non-diversification) deals have different return patterns relative to focus decreasing (or diversification) deals?
Findings – The overall findings of this paper are fairly mixed, barring a few exceptions, and there does not appear to be a great deal of variation in return patterns based purely on whether the announced acquisition is non-diversifying or diversifying in nature.
Originality/value – The paper is of particular value in Australia. Most of the research of diversification to date has taken place in the USA. Australia is similar to the USA in that it has a well-developed economy based on common law principles and an active equity market, however, the existence of institutional and regulatory differences suggests that US results may not hold in Australia.

Professional legal education reviews : too many 'what's, too few 'how's

Former colonies of the British Empire, Hong Kong and Australia inherited the common law system and the basic structure of legal education and training from England and Wales and remain the closest siblings in terms of proximity in distance and the high degree of similarity between their respective frameworks for legal education and training. This article first summarizes the major reviews of legal education and training in these three jurisdictions: England and Wales, Australia and Hong Kong over the last four decades and argues that while these reviews are keen on investigating ‘what’ is lacking in the curriculum and ‘what’ needs to be changed to equip graduates for the challenges of the day, they do not seem to have shown the same level of enthusiasm in identifying ‘how’ the intended outcomes prescribed can be achieved. Nevertheless, law schools in these jurisdictions recently began to tap on, and combine with the improved classroom pedagogy, clinical legal education and internship, innovative teaching tools and solutions in an attempt to deliver more enhanced learning experience to students. The article examines the role ascribed to technology in legal education and training with a particular reference to SimPLE, a e-learning platform developed in England and Wales which has been put to use in Australia as well, and the reform initiatives taken, and planned to be taken, by the Department of Professional Legal Education at the University of Hong Kong in its Postgraduate Certificate in Laws programme. This article concludes by pointing out the importance of collaboration among stakeholders including teachers, university administration and the legal profession in effecting a more active role of technology in legal education and training of today.

Thabo Meli revisited : the pernicious effects of results-driven decisions

Despite the hackneyed expression that ‘judges should interpret the law and not make it’, the fact remains that there is some scope within the separation of powers doctrine for the courts to develop the common law incrementally. To this extent, the courts can effectively legislate, but only to this limited extent if they are to respect the separation of powers doctrine. On occasion, however, the courts have usurped the power entrusted to Parliament, and particularly so in instances where a strict application of the existing law would lead to results that offend their personal notions of what is fair and just. When this occurs, the natural consequence is that lawyers, academics and the public in general lose respect for both the judges involved as well as the adversarial system of criminal justice. In order to illustrate this point, attention will focus on the case of Thabo Meli v United Kingdom in which the Privy Council, mistakenly believing that it could not reach its desired outcome through a strict application of the common law rule of temporal coincidence, emasculated the rule beyond recognition in order to convict the accused. Moreover, the discussion to follow will demonstrate that not only was the court wrong in its belief that the case involved the doctrine of temporal coincidence, but the same result would have been achieved had the Council correctly identified the issue as one of legal causation and correctly applied the principles relating thereto.

The Queen v Getachew : rethinking DPP v Morgan

In The Queen v Getachew, a recent decision of the High Court of Australia that was soon followed by the Victorian Court of Appeal, the High Court correctly noted that there is a fine line between the mens reas of belief and knowledge which turns upon the degree of conviction with which a belief is held. In particular, the court emphasised that a belief in the existence of a fact or circumstance that contemplates a real possibility or perhaps a higher degree of doubt as to the existence of that fact or circumstance is tantamount to knowledge or awareness that such fact or circumstance may not exist. When applied to the principle enunciated in DPP v Morgan, that type of belief would not be mutually exclusive with the alternative mens reas that require the Crown to prove that the accused was aware that the complainant was not or might not be consenting to the penetration at issue. In Getachew, the High Court merely pointed out that the mens reas of knowledge and belief, though similar in certain respects, are separate and distinct mental states that were incorrectly and inexplicably treated as though they were identical in Morgan and innumerable decisions that have followed and relied upon Morgan since it was decided by the House of Lords in 1976. In the aftermath of Getachew, therefore, the principle that an accused can act with a mental state that is mutually exclusive of the mens rea for rape remains intact. What has changed is that it is knowledge, rather than a mere belief that the complainant is not or might not be consenting, that is mutually exclusive of the requisite mens rea for rape.

PLT practitioners : soldiers For “vocationalism”, or double agents?

This presentation extends on some previous work around my PhD research.
I question ways in which social structures are inscribed into legal education practices, and conversely, whether practices can modify those structures. I argue PLT practitioners are not simply soldiers for a “vocationalist” strategy. Instead, I re-imagine PLT practitioners as “double agents” or “resistance fighters”, lamplighters in a still emergent professional trajectory. It is a trajectory catalysed by the 1970s introduction of institutional PLT; just a baby really, in the context of English common law.

In Bourdieu’s terms it is possible, by revisiting past struggles in Australian legal education, to conceptualise institutional PLT as the product of judicial, professional, and academic struggles to produce a vocationalised, non-academic, and critique-free sub-field within the juridical field. Those struggles succeeded, to some extent, in the extra-individual dimension of structures, regulation, and institutions, to collectively inculcate preferred dispositions within individuals about legal education and professional identity.

That account, however, ignores the potential for agency and alterity – the ways in which individuals might appropriate, in Certeau’s terms, the resources of the legal field to explore new professional trajectories. For some, these trajectories involve struggles to enrich, and add texture to, legal education. Drawing on interviews with PLT practitioners, I identify multi-vocal and multi-perspectival themes, including notions of social justice, equality, professional ethics, personal improvement, and indeed, interest in scholarship of teaching and learning.

It is in this sense I re-imagine PLT practitioners as “double agents”, operating betwixt and between dominant domains in law. In my view, PLT practitioners can participate in conceptualising and developing emergent approaches in legal education, and to theorise “practice” as lawyers and educators. Scholarship of teaching and learning has its part to play in this. It provides a means, as lawyers and as educators, to discover information, to reflect, critique, communicate, and conceptualise, insights about “practice” and practices.

Police Misconduct as a Breach of Public trust: the Offence of Misconduct in Public Office

Until relatively recently, the common law offence of misconduct in public office has been regarded as anachronistic. The offence was perceived to have been supplanted by specific statutory offences that could more appropriately deal with criminal conduct by public officials. However, there has been a revival of the offence with successful prosecutions occurring in Australia, England and Hong Kong. Many of these contemporary cases have involved police officers. Examination of these cases reveals that the circumstances in which misconduct in public office has been identified have been diverse, including the unauthorised disclosure of confidential information, the use of false search warrants and the sexual exploitation of vulnerable persons. In many instances, police officers were charged with other criminal offences in addition to charges relating to misconduct in public office. The matters prosecuted as misconduct in public office typically involved matters that were serious and/or could not be adequately prosecuted as other criminal offences or as breaches of police regulations governing conduct. Consequently, despite the proliferation of statutory criminal offences in the 20th century it appears that there continues to be a place for the offence of misconduct in public office. It criminalises misconduct by police officers that may not be adequately dealt with by other offences and recognises the public trust dimension of wrongdoing by these officials. However, a continuing and fundamental challenge is to determine the appropriate definition and scope of the offence.

The intoxication defence: toward a better understanding of current doctrine and reform

This article deals with the contentious issue of the extent to which an intoxicated person, particularly one who has become inebriated of his or her own volition, should be permitted to escape liability on the basis that the degree of inebriation was sufficient to preclude the fact-finder from finding a volitional act or omission on the part of the accused and/or that he or she acted with the required mens rea, if any, as defined by the common law or statutory definition of the offence. In addressing this issue, the article embarks upon a thorough analysis of the House of Lords seminal decision in Director of Public Prosecutions v Majewski (1977) AC 443 which, despite some very harsh criticism of late, continues to be the leading authority on the question in the United Kingdom, United States and Australia. As part of this analysis, the article examines and ultimately attempts to resolve the longstanding controversy over what has proved to be the elusive distinction between crimes of basic or general intent and those of specific intent. The article concludes by rejecting the Majewski principles in favour of those enunciated by the High Court of Australia in R v O'Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; 54 ALJR. In reaching this conclusion, the article notes various legislative and academic proposals for reform as well as statutory reforms in the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Australia.