Insuring for a crisis: deposit insurance and the GFC, the Australian and New Zealand experience

Deposit insurance schemes were an important element in policy responses to the global financial crisis (GFC). There has been considerable debate about the nature and efficacy of such policy measures in alleviating the fallout from financial crises. The GFC highlighted problems associated with deposit insurance schemes including moral hazard, coverage limits, co-insurance, cross border issues and market distortions. Despite these shortcomings, deposit insurance schemes were able to ameliorate the financial panic experienced and reduce contagion. This paper evaluates the Australian and New Zealand experience with deposit insurance introduced in response to the GFC, and compares this to the OECD experience. It reflects on the performance of deposit insurance schemes considered against the attributes of good policy design, and evaluates the specific problems and strengths encountered during the GFC.

Thai hedging practices post-Asian financial crisis

This paper provides survey evidence captured from a sample of 113 respondents to a 2008 questionnaire sent to 344 companies in Thailand. The study examines Thai hedging practices following the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. Thai companies, like their international counterparts, rely predominantly on matching and forward contracts to hedge transaction exposure. Thai companies, however, appear to be less rigorous when it comes to internal control and supervision of derivative activity. It is recommended that Thai companies improve their risk management practices by putting into place a documented hedging policy, which includes a requirement that senior staff be actively engaged in the risk management activities of the firm.