Our place in the Asian century: Southeast Asia as ‘The Third Way’

The report, for Asialink at the University of Melbourne, reports the findings of the Asialink Commission, which examined Australia's relations with Southeast Asia. It argues that, at a time of shifting power relations in the Asia-Pacific region, Australia take a more multilateral approach by orienting its foreign and trade policies towards Southeast Asia. By committing more attention to the Southeast Asia region, Australia will enhance its relationships with the region's two principal powers, the United States and China.

Discovering implicit criteria preferences reflected in tourism journal ranking lists using the Choquet Integral

Variations between journal rankings may cause confusion. As such, prior attempts were made to compare and evaluate journal ranking criteria for obtaining insightful knowledge on how different research communities have ranked journals. However, existing approaches are unable to model the journal ranking process closely enough as they are incapable of considering the relationship between multiple criteria simultaneously. In this paper, we address the challenges by introducing the Choquet Integral (CI) for evaluating journal ranking criteria. The new approach is able to account for interactions between criteria in relation to overall ranking score, using a fuzzy measure in its computation. Its properties, the Shapley value and the Interaction index, allow for good representations of importance and interactions between criteria. We demonstrate the efficiency of the CI through a case study of journal ranking lists in tourism and service journals.

Australia and Japan after the second world war: constructing new futures in Asia

The subject of my lecture is Australian-Japanese relations since the end of the Second World War, but I’m keen to explore these relations in the context of ideas, efforts and practical results in relation to collaborative and other efforts towards regionalism in the Asia Pacific. My general argument is that, on the one hand, Australian-Japanese relations have developed with a strength that would have been hard to imagine in 1945, and with an important focus on regional growth and security. The incremental steps taken may have been small and at a steady pace but, given the legacy of deep scars resulting from the Second World War and given the limitations on the defence aspects of Japan’s postwar involvement in regional affairs (ie the self defence requirement of the Constitution and the practice of spending not more than one per cent of Gross National Product on defence), these have been very successfully negotiated steps. On the other hand, there are some opportunities for greater joint leadership in the region which may or may not be realized. The incremental steps took place in difficult and changing circumstances; and what I would like to do now is remind us of how many unknowns attached to what might happen in Australian- Japan relationships after the Second World War, partly because there were so many unknowns about how the post-war international order would settle, and partly because Australian-Japanese relations started from such a desperately low point. I will try to walk through some of the key features of different periods, as I see the periodisation logically falling out after the war, and draw some thoughts together in relation to more recent initiatives on regional and bilateral co-operation. My training is as a historian, and that shapes the way this lecture works, and for most of my career I have been an Australian historian of international relations, looking particularly at Australia’s changing role in world affairs, and that is also likely to show in what follows－possibly at the expense of greater detail from Japanese perspectives. But I hope you will understand that, and also the limitations involved in trying to paint with a broad brush on a huge historical canvas.

China anxieties in the geopolitical cartographies of the Indo-Pacific

Concepts about space and time, such as the Asia-Pacific and the Asian Century, are not articulated lightly in international relations discourses. When a spatial or temporal term comes into vogue, it often comes with political connotations and policy implications. This is the context in which we ought to consider the making of the spatial term Indo-Pacific, which has recently made it into the lexicon of official speeches, think-tank reports, government white papers and scholarly works. While many pundits and practitioners are embracing this new formulation, others cast doubt on its usefulness or even question its actual existence. Yet, despite its sudden stardom in foreign policy circles and some debate around its policy implications, how the Indo-Pacific as a political spatial concept came about has not been well understood.To address this gap, this chapter will first briefly survey the Indo-Pacific debate and examine how the debate has not paid adequate attention to the issue of the Indo-Pacific as a discursive construct. It then turns to how the United States, Australia, Japan, India and China together contribute to the formation of this concept amid ongoing geopolitical anxieties about the shape and trajectory of future Asian regional order. While acknowledging China's role in this constitutive process, I argue that as a discursive construct the Indo-Pacific has been motivated primarily by geopolitical anxieties about a perceived emerging regional order dominated by China. Driven by such anxieties, the concept is not an innocent description of a natural region out there; it has the potential of fuelling regional rivalries and exacerbating security dilemmas. Given its possible destabilising consequences, the chapter concludes with a call for a critical reimagination of this now increasingly accepted term.