Critique and comment: Authorship and fixation in copyright law: A comparative comment

The present comment considers an issue that has received little discussion in the common law world: namely whether fixation and authorship are parts of the same creative act in relation to literary, dramatic and musical works. The importance of the question is that, if authorship does not entail fixation, it should logically be possible for a person independent of the author to reduce the work to material form for copyright purposes. This would significantly expand the range of works protected by copyright and would extend protection to those works which have never been fixed by their authors. The focus of the comment is Australian law, but its discussion is comparative, with particular attention given to UK law.

Addressing the curious black spot that is the separation between the principle of legality and sentencing

The principle of legality has evolved into a clear and entrenchedjurisprudential mechanism for protecting common law rights and freedoms. It operates as a shield to preserve the scope of application of fundamental rights and fre edoms. In recent years it has been increasingly applied by the courts to limit the scope of legislative provisions which potentially impinge on human rights and fundamental freedoms. Yet there is one domain where the principle of legality is conspicuously absent: sentencing. Ostensibly, this is paradoxical. Sentencing is the realm where the legalsystem operates in its most coercive manner against individuals. In thisarticle, we argue that logically the principle of legality has an importantrole in the sentencing system given the incursions by criminal sanctionsinto a number of basic rights, including the right to liberty, the freedom ofassociation and the deprivation of property. By way of illustration, we setout how the principle of legality should apply to the interpretation of keystatutory provisions. To this end, we argue that the objectives of generaldeterrence and specifi c deterrence should have less impact in sentencing. It is also suggested that judges should be more reluctant to send offenders with dependants to terms of imprisonment. Injecting the principle of legality into sentencing law and practice would result in the reduction in severity of a large number of sanctions, thereby reducing the frequency and extent to which the fundamental rights of offenders are violated. The methodology set out in this article can be applied to alter the operation of a number of legislative sentencing objectives and rules.

Putting the spoils of litigation into the shareholders’ pockets: when can shareholders bring a personal action against the directors of their company?

company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other independent person with its rightsand liabilities appropriate to itself”.2 A consequence of this is the “proper plaintiff” principleestablished in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189: the proper plaintiff in an action inrespect of a wrong done to a corporation is the corporation itself.3 It is also a “hallowed rule” thatdirectors owe their duties to the company, not the shareholders,4 and so any loss accruing to thecompany as a result of the directors’ breach of their duties is recoverable only by the company.5An obvious problem with this state of affairs is that a company will be unlikely to initiateproceedings against its directors when the company is controlled by those directors.6 While there aregood economic reasons for this division of management and ownership,7 shareholders are left with acritical question: under what circumstances can they initiate proceedings to recover loss suffered as aresult of company directors’ breach of their duties? Although one writer has referred to the“expansive statutory and common law arsenals” available to aggrieved shareholders,8 it seems ratherthe case that there are few effective remedies. For shareholders have no contractual relationship withdirectors,9 and the personal rights conferred on shareholders by statute or general law are largelyprocedural10 and seem a rather ineffective basis for “scrutinising directorial performance”.

The principle of legality and contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissima in lege

If the principle of legality operates to obscure from Parliament the common law (rights) backdrop against which it legislates, the clarity or rights-sensitivity of that legislation cannot be improved. This undercuts, rather than promotes, the democratic and rule of law values that underpin the modern conception of the principle and its contemporary normative justification. So the courts must strive to give Parliament the clearest possible picture as to the content of the fundamental common law rights it seeks to protect and, depending on the right, freedom, or principle in legislative play, the strength with which the principle will be applied in order to do so. Parliament (and parliamentary counsel) can only ‘squarely confront’ those fundamental rights the existence and content of which was known at the time of legislating. The proposition which, necessarily, follows is that the rule of contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege must be revived when judges apply the principle of legality to the construction of statutes. If the courts are to maintain and take seriously the normative justification for the principle then its application to the construction of statutes can only operate to protect from legislative encroachment those fundamental rights existing at the time the statute was enacted.

Jones -v- Bartlett: landlords` liability to tenants and members of their household in negligence

According to the latest available statistics, in 1997-98, of the total of seven million Australian households, two million were renting their dwelling from a State housing authority or private landlords.Therefore, the decision on the scope of landlords' liability to tenants, members of their households, and guests in the right of the tenant handed down by the High Court of Australia in November 2000 was not only of legal, but also of social and economic significance. This note will discuss the Jones v Bartlett case in the context of the traditional common law approach to landlords' liability and the ground-breaking, if flawed, case of Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris.

Remedies for unfair dismissal under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 - a fair go all round?

Background to unfair termination laws - remedies at common law - remedies for unfair termination under Federal Awards - overview of remedies under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 - compensation - reinstatement.

Black and white is always grey-the power of the police to conduct a strip search in Victoria

The performance of a strip search by a police officer is a serious interference with the liberty and dignity of an individual. However, it is considered by police to be an important part of their law enforcement armory and one that is increasingly necessary to utilise to assist in the investigation and prosecution of drug-related crimes. This article considers the troublesome issue of whether and in what circumstances the common law may extend to police the power to conduct a strip search. In addition, there is an examination of the statutes and regulations that purportedly give police in Victoria the power to strip search with particular attention given to ss 81 and 82 of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 (Vic).

Tip top result goes stale: ACCC-v- Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd(No 2)

Bread, its constituents, its methods of manufacture and its price and availability to consumers can claim to be the leitmotiv of competition law, both ancient and modern. The inelasticity of demand for such a staple food explains laws against monopolies being included in the eighteenth century BC Code of Hammurabi, why corn laws exercised the minds of the Gracchi brothers in second century B.C. Rome, and why ineffective regulation of the price of bread was seen as an important precipitator of revolutions in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the common law the early restraint of trade case, Mitchell v Reynolds saw a parish wide five year non-competition clause in a contract for the sale of a bakery upheld as reasonable. In the post-Shennan Anti-Trust Act (1890) United States, attempts by manufacturers of macaroni to change its constituents because of the prevailing high price of durm wheat were held in National Macaroni Manufacturers Association v FCT) to constitute price-fixing, an offence illegal per se under American anti-trust law.

The times are they a-changin'? Can the Commonwealth parliament legislate for same sex marriages?

This article considers whether the marriage power contained in the Australian Constitution could support a Commonwealth law that recognised same sex marriages. To this end and after outlining the current constitutional meaning according to the High Court, three methods used for interpreting constitutional terms (connotation/denotation, moderate originalism, non-originalism) are examined to ascertain whether they could source such a law to the marriage power. It is submitted that none can do so without betraying their own core interpretative principle or the text and structure of the Constitution. However an alternative method for interpreting [*2] constitutional terms is proffered which may be able to establish a sufficient connection between a law that recognises same sex marriages and the marriage power. It involves recognising 'marriage' as a constitutionalised legal term of art whose meaning can be informed by developments since federation in common law and statute.

The high court on vicarious liability

Vicarious liability (respondeat superior) is a venerable common law doctrine which holds an employer liable for the torts of employees, regardless of the fault of the employer. An employer's liability for the torts of its employees can represent a significant financial obligation and can affect both hiring and operational decisions of businesses. Vicarious liability is a prominent theme in the background of much litigation and is often the reason for litigating the issue of whether or not a worker is an employee. Vicarious liability may also arise through other relationships, such as partnership and agency. Two recent decisions by the High Court of Australia have drawn attention to the issue of vicarious liability. These decisions illuminate the High Court's view of vicarious liability's two main streams: negligence (Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd) n2 and intentional tort (NSW v Lepore). [*2] n3

The right to privacy and corporations

Traditionally the right of privacy has not been recognised at common law. However, recently the High Court has indicated that it may be willing to develop a new tort of invasion of privacy. Several of the justices have stated that the new action would only relate to natural persons, not corporations. This is because the principles said to underpin the right to privacy, autonomy and dignity, are supposedly inapposite to corporations. This article argues that this reasoning is flawed. Neither the right to autonomy nor dignity is capable of underpinning the right to privacy. Hence, no sustainable basis has so far been advanced for restricting the availability of any future tort of invasion of privacy to individuals. This article also questions whether a separate tort is needed in view of the protection already provided to the privacy interests of individuals and corporations under the equitable doctrine of confidence.

RE Kevin and the right of transsexual persons to marry in Australia

This article considers the decision of the Family Court of Australia in Re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of a Transsexual) [2001] FamCA 1074, which was upheld by the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in February 2003. Re Kevin was the first case in Australia to deal directly with the question of whether a transsexual person could marry under Australian law. In the past, Australia had adhered to the judgement of Ormrod J in Corbett v Corbett [1971] P. 83, which set the benchmark for what is ‘male’ and what is ‘female’ under the common law. Prior to Re Kevin the question of what is a man and what is a woman for the purposes of marriage in Australia mirrored the strict biological test established in Corbett. In other words, the Australian courts relied upon biological factors, as espoused by Ormrod J, when determining a person's true sex. In Re Kevin, Chisholm J examined in detail what it is to be a man or woman, but unlike Ormrod J considered ‘brain sex’ to have a significant impact on a person's view of their own innate sexual identity. The Full Court of the Family Court agreed with the powerful and well-reasoned judgement of Chisholm J at first instance.

Excessive force used in making an arrest: does it make the arrest ipso facto unlawful?

The purpose of this article is to consider whether or not the use of excessive force in effecting an arrest makes the arrest ipso facto unlawful at common law. With a dearth of appellate court authority on point in either Australia or the United Kingdom, the question is presently open. It is my argument that as force is not a minimum condition of an arrest, its excessive use will not, therefore, make unlawful an otherwise lawful arrest. This conclusion is a matter of some import. It exposes an arrester to civil and possibly even criminal liability for assault but not to an action for false imprisonment. It may also have practical repercussions for the possible discretionary exclusion of evidence on public policy grounds. In theory, it should not matter whether excessive force made an arrest unlawful or not, for the public policy discretion permits a judge to exclude evidence illegally or improperly obtained. But common sense suggests that a judge may not be so likely to exclude evidence when the relevant conduct amounts only to police impropriety not illegality.

Disinterested truth: legitimation of the doctrine of tenure post-Mabo

This article argues that it is time for the complete abolition of feudal tenure in Australian land law and its replacement with an allodial model better able to promote proprietary independence, equality and cultural neutrality. The article considers the questionable constitutional legitimacy of adopting strict feudal tenets in a territory already inhabited by indigenous occupants. It goes on to examine the various legitimation devices that the courts have utilised to sustain the feudal construct and the effect that Mabo has had upon feudal orthodoxy. In particular, the article outlines why post-Mabo tenure is incapable of embracing a pluralist land system; it is suggested that the Eurocentric character of feudal tenure and the structural impediments associated with the acceptance of a non-Crown title prevent it from ever being able to effectively integrate native title into the structure of property law. In light of this, the article argues that post-Mabo tenure lacks both legal and social legitimacy and the 'disinterested' perpetuation of this system must be brought to an end. The article argues that the time has well and truly come to replace feudal tenure with an allodial model based broadly on the system that has developed in the United States but with particularised adaptations. The removal of the Crown and its associated cultural assumptions from the land framework would, it is argued, allow land interests to develop according to their individual cultural origins. This would create a more responsive and balanced system better equipped to embrace the developments of contemporary common law jurisprudence.

General practitioners' competence and confidentiality determinations with a minor who requests the oral contraceptive pill

The right of minors to make medical treatment decisions is an issue that is not explicitly addressed in the legislation of most Australian jurisdictions. While recent common law decisions allow competent minors to consent to treatment, current legislation in Victoria does not provide adequate guidelines on how competence is to be measured. It is also unclear whether the duty of confidentiality is extended to competent minors. The current study explored general practitioners' competence and confidentiality decisions with a hypothetical 14-year-old patient who requests the oral contraceptive pill (OCP). Questionnaires were sent to 1,000 Victorian general practitioners, 305 of whom responded. General practitioners were asked to determine whether "Liz" was competent to request the OCP, and whether they would maintain her confidentiality. A total of 81% of respondents found the patient competent, while 91% would have maintained her confidentiality. Results indicate that the majority of general practitioners used rationales that generally did not conform to current legal principles when making competence and confidentiality determinations regarding this patient.