Singh v The Queen: A Path Toward Confusion, Redundancy and Doctrinal Inconsistency

In Walkington v The Queen, the English Court of Criminal Appeal enunciated criteria fordetermining whether a building contains parts thereof for purposes of ss 76 and 77 of the CrimesAct 1958 (Vic): burglary and aggravated burglary respectively. In Singh v The Queen, the VictorianCourt of Appeal was confronted with a situation in which a trespassory entry had been made into abuilding that, according to the principles enunciated in Walkington, did not consist of any part orparts. Recognizing that there was scant evidence with which to prove that the accused’s entry hadbeen accompanied by an intention to commit one of the crimes specified in ss 76 and 77, the courtnonetheless affirmed the applicant’s conviction for aggravated burglary under s 77. In so doing,the court reaffirmed its earlier decision in The Queen v Chimirri which held that a trespassoryentry into a building results in continuing trespass for as long as the accused remains in thebuilding. In Chimirri, it was further held that if an accused forms an intention to commit one ofthe specified crimes subsequent to the initial trespassory entry and enters a part of the buildingwith that intention, he or she has committed burglary, aggravated burglary, or both by virtueof the continuing trespass doctrine. The discussion to follow will demonstrate that the court’sreasoning in both Chimirri and Singh is not only flawed, but flies in the face of the very passagesfrom the judgment of Lane LJ in Walkington that were quoted with apparent approval in Singh.The discussion will further demonstrate that the continuing trespass doctrine adds nothing of valueto the law of burglary as it existed prior to Chimirri and Singh; rather, its only effect is to addconfusion and uncertainty to what had been a settled area of the law.

A non-stationary panel data investigation of the unemployment–crime relationship

Many empirical studies of the economics of crime focus solely on the determinants thereof, and do not consider the dynamic and cross-sectional properties of their data. As a response to this, the current paper offers an in-depth analysis of this issue using data covering 21 Swedish counties from 1975 to 2010. The results suggest that the crimes considered are non-stationary, and that this cannot be attributed to county-specific disparities alone, but that there are also a small number of common stochastic trends to which groups of counties tend to revert. In an attempt to explain these common stochastic trends, we look for a long-run cointegrated relationship between unemployment and crime. Overall, the results do not support cointegration, and suggest that previous findings of a significant unemployment–crime relationship might be spurious.

Skilling’s martyrdom: The case for criminalization without incarceration

This paper restricts itself to crimes involving corporate fiduciaries taking bad decisions at the expense of shareholders (corporate governance offenses). The arguments do not apply to fraud as moral wrongfulness exists in that case. To the extent that the actions covered by this paper are blameworthy, I argue that this determination must be disentangled from punishment. Disentanglement of blame from deserts suggests a via-media between criminalization and decriminalization - criminalization without incarceration. Accordingly, the legal process stops at the determination of guilt. The paper advances the criminalization debate because it does not get bogged down in the irreconcilable quarrel about whether corporate governance misbehavior ought to be criminalized for deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation reasons, and whether it achieves any of these purposes. For these offenses, I argue that whichever theoretical justification underpins the decision to criminalize, imprisonment must not follow conviction. The conviction, despite the lack of incarceration, and the consequential sanctions likely to be imposed on the wrongdoer are sufficient to satisfy the three main justifications for criminalization. In appropriate cases, disgorgement of the offender’s gains will aid in the achievement of these objectives. The model proposed by this paper would yield significant savings by reducing prison costs. It would also allow the state to take advantage of the disproportionate cost/burden of conviction on corporate governance offenders. Owing to the offenders’ high earning potential, deterrence can be achieved at lower cost by conviction alone because the cost of incarceration does not have to be borne by the state whereas the destruction of capacity to generate similar (or indeed, any) income has to be suffered by the offender even without going to jail. If the cost of incarceration is the same for offenders with different earning capacities, imprisoning those with very high earning capacities is a waste of social capital if the objectives sought to be achieved by incarceration can be achieved through other means. Further, the cost of a conviction can be predicted with sufficient certainty in the case of white-collar criminals by looking at their earnings history, and in many cases this can be a significant sum. Unlike the common criminal who may not have a similarly predictable earning capacity and therefore suffer the same extent of monetary loss from a conviction, this loss ought to serve the deterrence function without the need for the state to spend money imprisoning the offender. In addition to loss of earning capacity, clawing back ill-gotten gains significantly adds to disutility. The paper is set out as follows: Part II briefly outlines the scope of the wrongs tackled as stemming from the principal-agent relationship in corporate law, and the inability of the law to overcome effectively problems resulting from the collectivization of the principal in that relationship. In Part III, I argue that conviction without imprisonment is a second-best alternative to decriminalization in cases where the conduct is blameworthy, and results in non-consensual harm. Part IV demonstrates the disutility caused by conviction alone to show that the objectives of criminalization can be satisfied without the need for imprisonment. Part V asserts that consequential sanctions like shaming add to the disutility of conviction. Part VI ties the thesis to Skilling’s conviction for bad business judgment devoid of moral wrongfulness to illustrate the problems with conflating blame and punishment. Part VII concludes.

Indelible shame? News reporting of non-convictions in digital space

This paper examines the role of media in publicising the names of people who receive a non-conviction for a minor crime. It positions the news media’s ability to “name and shame” people who appear before the courts as a powerful cultural practice, rather than adopt a widely celebrated Fourth Estate view of the press as a watchdog on the judicial process. The research draws on interviews conducted in two regional centres of Victoria, Australia, with those involved in news coverage of very minor crimes where non-convictions were imposed. Their spoken words reveal a range of tensions linked to reporting non-convictions in the digital age. In the eyes of the law, a non-conviction means that an offender has an opportunity to rehabilitate away from the public gaze. However, the news media ‘s ability to name such offenders online has the potential to impose a lasting “mark of shame” in digital space that can prevent them gaining employment or housing, and damage their social standing and relationships. We live in a media-saturated culture in which the vast majority of people rely on news media for information about judicial proceedings and in turn, the news media constructs public understanding of the law through the way it represents crime and court processes. This paper argues that traditional understanding of the nexus between the judicial system and the Fourth Estate fails to acknowledge the news media’s considerable power outside the officially recognised operation of the open justice relationship, and that this deserves attention in the digital age

The intoxication defence: toward a better understanding of current doctrine and reform

This article deals with the contentious issue of the extent to which an intoxicated person, particularly one who has become inebriated of his or her own volition, should be permitted to escape liability on the basis that the degree of inebriation was sufficient to preclude the fact-finder from finding a volitional act or omission on the part of the accused and/or that he or she acted with the required mens rea, if any, as defined by the common law or statutory definition of the offence. In addressing this issue, the article embarks upon a thorough analysis of the House of Lords seminal decision in Director of Public Prosecutions v Majewski (1977) AC 443 which, despite some very harsh criticism of late, continues to be the leading authority on the question in the United Kingdom, United States and Australia. As part of this analysis, the article examines and ultimately attempts to resolve the longstanding controversy over what has proved to be the elusive distinction between crimes of basic or general intent and those of specific intent. The article concludes by rejecting the Majewski principles in favour of those enunciated by the High Court of Australia in R v O'Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; 54 ALJR. In reaching this conclusion, the article notes various legislative and academic proposals for reform as well as statutory reforms in the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Australia.

Sober assessment of the link between substance abuse and crime-eliminating drug and alcohol use from the sentencing calculus

The relevance of drug and alcohol involvement to sentencing law and practice is one of the most perplexing and unsettled areas of sentencing law and practice.1 It is also one of the most important issues in the criminal justice system. Most crimes are committed by offenders who are substance involved, and nearly half of all crimes that are committed are done so by offenders who are intoxicated at the time of the offense. Substance involved individuals are grossly over-represented in the criminal courts. Addiction and intoxication impair sound judgment, and hence, it intuitively appears that intoxicated offenders are less culpable for their crimes. Moreover, there is often a sense that addiction and intoxication causes aberrant behavior and that curing the substance involvement will lead to more prudent (law-abiding) conduct.