Contemplation as philosophical practice : "reason in the sphere of understanding"

This essay seeks to explore the practice of contemplation as a method to cultivate insight into some of the key concerns of philosophy. In our discussion, philosophical contemplation is understood as a phenomenological method that instigates dynamic patterns of understanding(s) of an issue or object. Seen in this light, contemplation involves the cultivation of certain introspective qualities that are central to widening the parameters of attention. It is the contention of this paper that a contemplative approach to philosophical inquiry generates a basis for multi-dimensional understandings that can facilitate the possibility of “doing conceptual justice to the world in all its variety” (Sanders 207). In line with the idea of philosophy as a way of life, contemplation as philosophical practice envisions philosophy not simply as a system of propositions but also as an existential practice that both offers ways of gathering knowledge and that can provide epistemic justification for multiplicity, diversity, and seemingly contradictory modes of thought. From the beginning it is important to note that we are not positing a philosophy of contemplation but, following Russell (1912) and Sherman (2014), we are exploring a contemplative conception of philosophy that is predicated on the classical understanding of philosophy as a way of life with an integral practice component that instigates a mutually enriching union of theory and praxis.

Resilience as a double-edged health promotion goal : examples from Lao PDR

Individual and community resilience are undoubtedly important targets for health enhancement and invaluable aspirational outcomes in the health promotion endeavour especially in disaster contexts. However, overreliance on resilience as a proxy for positive well-being has serious personal and political implications in many contexts, as illustrated in research findings on women's quality of life in southern Lao PDR. Case studies derived from focus group interviews with ethnic minority Lao women about their quality of life are used to exemplify how overt signs of resilience may mask, rather than mirror, covert existential reality leaving women without a voice. The political implications of this silencing are profound. Private troubles remain hidden rather than being identified as public issues subject to public policy. This conundrum is not confined to third world countries. Structural limitations to achieving profound fulfilment abound in affluent countries also, yet neo-liberal governments rely heavily on the resilience of populations to minimize public spending. The challenge for health promotion researchers, policy makers and practitioners is to explore the nexus between individual agency and structural change in each specific context to ensure that health promotion initiatives do not inadvertently perpetuate disparities in access to power and resources.

Merleau-Ponty's conception of dialectics in phenomenology of perception

Although the fact that Merleau-Ponty has a dialectical approach in Phenomenology of Perception has been discussed in recent Anglophone readings, there has not been an explicit clarification as to how his varying usages of the term hang together. Given his repeated references to Hegel and to dialectics, coupled with the fact that dialectics are not part of the Husserlian phenomenology or Heideggerean existentialism from which Merleau-Ponty draws so much, the question of just what he does with the idea of dialectics presents itself. In this paper I argue that, in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty saw Hegel as providing a model for the conception of rationality and meaning that must underpin the existentialist response to the problems bequeathed him by Husserlian phenomenology: namely, the problems of embodiment, perception and the constitution of the world. In connection with this, I suggest an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's “existential dialectics” that focuses on his three principal uses of the term: 1) a “dialectic of objective thought,” 2) a set of existential-dialectical categories intended to capture the ontological structure of the “body-subject” as “being-in-the-world,” and 3) a dialectic at the cultural level concerning others and history.