Equivalence and relational thinking: opportunities for professional learning

In this article an argument for the use of collaborative professional learning teams to improve teaching and children's achievement is presented together with an explanation of how this can be done. The case provided in this article concerns children's understanding of equivalence and the way in which teachers together can explore children's conceptions and misconceptions held by children in their classroom. An effective teaching strategy using a number talk about a true/false number sentence is also described.

The common law principle of legality

In this age of statutes and human rights the common law principle of legality has assumed a central importance. The principle holds that '[u]nless the Parliament makes unmistakably clear its intention to abrogate or suspend a fundamental freedom, the courts will not construe a statute as having that operation.' This development has occurred throughout the common law world most relevantly in New Zealand and the United Kingdom where its re-emergence coincided with the enactment of statutory bill of rights. It is however the aim of this article to outline the nature and scope of the principle of legality in contemporary Australian law.

The principle of legality as clear statement rule: significance and problems

In Australia, the common law principle of legality has hardened into a strong clear statement rule that is applied when legislation engages common law rights and freedoms. It has transformed a loose collection of rebuttable interpretive presumptions into a quasi-constitutional common law bill of rights. However, these developments are not without controversy or issue. The analysis undertaken in this article suggests that the principle of legality as clear statement rule -- as mandated by the High Court in Coco v The Queen -- can only work legitimately if Parliament has clear and prior notice of the rights and freedoms that it operates to protect. But it is problematic if what a common law right, such as freedom of speech, requires or guarantees in any given legislative context is unclear and contested, and so must be judicially divined at the point of application. In these cases, the principle operates to enforce a (post-legislative) judicial approximation of what best protects and promotes an abstract legal value or principle. It amounts to the illegitimate judicial remaking of prior legislative decisions on rights. This undercuts the normative justifications for the principle of legality as it obscures from Parliament the common law (rights) backdrop against which its legislation is enacted and interpreted.

The Psychometric Equivalence of the Personal Wellbeing Index for Normally Functioning and Homeostatically Defeated Australian Adults

Understanding subjective wellbeing (SWB) at the population level has major implications for governments and policy makers concerned with enhancing the life quality of citizens. The Personal Wellbeing Index (PWI) is a measure of SWB with theoretical and empirical credentials. Homeostasis theory offers an explanation for the nature of SWB data, including the distribution of scores, maintenance and change over time. According to this theory, under normal conditions, the dominant constituent of SWB is Homeostatically Protected Mood (HPMood), which is held within a genetically determined range of values around a set-point. However, in extreme circumstances (e.g., financial hardship, chronic illness), HPMood may dissociate from SWB, as cognitive/emotional reactions to the cause of homeostatic challenge assume control over SWB. This study investigates two groups as people scoring in the positive range for SWB and people who are likely to be experiencing homeostatic defeat/challenge. We test whether the reduced influence of HPMood on SWB due to homeostatic defeat has implications for the validity of SWB measurement. Participants were 45,192 adults (52 % female), with a mean age of 48.88 years (SD = 17.35 years), who participated in the first 23 surveys of the Australian Unity Wellbeing Index over the years 2001–2010. Multiple regression analysis, multiple group confirmatory factor analysis, and Rasch modelling techniques were used to evaluate the psychometric performance of the PWI across the two groups. Results show that while the PWI functioned as intended for the normal group, SWB in the challenged group was lower across all PWI domains, more variable, and the domain scores lacked the strength of inter-correlation observed in the normal, comparison group. These changes are consistent with predictions based on homeostasis theory and one major implication of the findings is that SWB measures may not function equivalently across the entire spectrum of possible domain satisfaction scores.

Training of interval type-2 fuzzy logic system using extreme learning machine for load forecasting

Extreme learning machine (ELM) is originally proposed for single- hidden layer feed-forward neural networks (SLFN). From the functional equivalence of fuzzy logic systems and SLFN, the fuzzy logic systems can be interpreted as a special case of SLFN under some mild conditions. Hence the fuzzy logic systems can be trained using SLFN's learning algorithms. Considering the same equivalence, ELM is utilized here to train interval type-2 fuzzy logic systems (IT2FLSs). Based on the working principle of the ELM, the parameters of the antecedent of IT2FLSs are randomly generated while the consequent part of IT2FLSs is optimized using Moore-Penrose generalized inverse of ELM. Application of the developed model to electricity load forecasting is another novelty of the research work. Experimental results shows better forecasting performance of the proposed model over the two frequently used forecasting models.

Addressing the curious black spot that is the separation between the principle of legality and sentencing

The principle of legality has evolved into a clear and entrenchedjurisprudential mechanism for protecting common law rights and freedoms. It operates as a shield to preserve the scope of application of fundamental rights and fre edoms. In recent years it has been increasingly applied by the courts to limit the scope of legislative provisions which potentially impinge on human rights and fundamental freedoms. Yet there is one domain where the principle of legality is conspicuously absent: sentencing. Ostensibly, this is paradoxical. Sentencing is the realm where the legalsystem operates in its most coercive manner against individuals. In thisarticle, we argue that logically the principle of legality has an importantrole in the sentencing system given the incursions by criminal sanctionsinto a number of basic rights, including the right to liberty, the freedom ofassociation and the deprivation of property. By way of illustration, we setout how the principle of legality should apply to the interpretation of keystatutory provisions. To this end, we argue that the objectives of generaldeterrence and specifi c deterrence should have less impact in sentencing. It is also suggested that judges should be more reluctant to send offenders with dependants to terms of imprisonment. Injecting the principle of legality into sentencing law and practice would result in the reduction in severity of a large number of sanctions, thereby reducing the frequency and extent to which the fundamental rights of offenders are violated. The methodology set out in this article can be applied to alter the operation of a number of legislative sentencing objectives and rules.

Excessive criminal punishment amounts to punishing the innocent : an argument for taking the parsimony principle seriously

Punishing the innocent is incontestably repugnant. Punishing offenders more harshly than is justified is a form of punishing the innocent, yet this practice is commonplace in the United States. This Article sets out a normative argument in favor of less severe penalties for many forms of offenses. There is already an established principle, which limits punishment to the minimum amount of hardship that is required to achieve the objectives of sentencing. The principle is termed “parsimony” and is widely endorsed. Yet, in reality, it is illusory. It has no firm content and in its current form is logically and jurisprudentially incapable of grounding a persuasive argument for more lenient sentences. This Article gives content to the principle of parsimony. It is argued that application of the principle will result in a considerable reduction in the number of offenders who are sentenced to imprisonment and shorter sentences for many offenders who are jailed. The recommendations in this Article will enhance the fairness and transparency of the sentencing system. The argument is especially important at this point in history. The United States is experiencing an incarceration crisis. The principle of parsimony, properly applied, is an important key to ameliorating the incarceration problem. The Article also examines the operation of the parsimony principle in Australia. Unlike sentencing courts in the United States, Australian judges enjoy considerable discretion in sentencing offenders. Despite the vastly different approach to sentencing in Australia, it too is experiencing a considerable increase in the incarceration rate. It emerges that the courts in a tightly regimented sentencing regime (the United States) and a mainly discretionary system (Australia) effectively ignored the parsimony principle. It is not the strictures in the United States that curtail the imposition of parsimonious sentences; rather, it is the absence of a forceful rationale underpinning the principle and a lack of clarity regarding the attainable objectives of sentencing. This Article addresses these shortcomings. In doing so, it paves the way for fundamentally fairer sentencing outcomes in the United States and Australia.

The principle of legality and contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissima in lege

If the principle of legality operates to obscure from Parliament the common law (rights) backdrop against which it legislates, the clarity or rights-sensitivity of that legislation cannot be improved. This undercuts, rather than promotes, the democratic and rule of law values that underpin the modern conception of the principle and its contemporary normative justification. So the courts must strive to give Parliament the clearest possible picture as to the content of the fundamental common law rights it seeks to protect and, depending on the right, freedom, or principle in legislative play, the strength with which the principle will be applied in order to do so. Parliament (and parliamentary counsel) can only ‘squarely confront’ those fundamental rights the existence and content of which was known at the time of legislating. The proposition which, necessarily, follows is that the rule of contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege must be revived when judges apply the principle of legality to the construction of statutes. If the courts are to maintain and take seriously the normative justification for the principle then its application to the construction of statutes can only operate to protect from legislative encroachment those fundamental rights existing at the time the statute was enacted.