Carbon rights as new property: the benefits of statutory verification

This paper examines the different ways in which carbon rights have been verified as property interests. A carbon right is a new and unique form of land interest that confers upon the holder a right to the incorporeal benefit of carbon sequestration on a piece of forested land. Carbon sequestration refers to the absorption from the atmosphere of carbon dioxide by vegetation and soils and the storage of carbon in vegetation and soils. Innovative legislation has been introduced in each state seeking to separate the incorporeal benefit of carbon sequestration from the natural rights flowing from land ownership. The fragmentation of land ownership in this way is a constituent of broader climate change strategies and is particularly important for an Australian emissions trading scheme where carbon rights will acquire value as tradable offsets. This paper will explore the different legislative responses of each state to the proprietary characterisation of the carbon right as a land interest. It will argue that verifying the carbon right as a new statutory property interest, in line with the approach set out in the Carbon Rights Act 2003 (WA), is preferable to aligning it with preconceived categories of common law servitude. By articulating the  carbon right as a new form of statutory interest, unique in status and form, its sui generis character is more accurately reflected. Further, statutory validation of the carbon right as a new land interest is more efficient as legislative rules are more visible and therefore come to the attention of other market participants more quickly and at a lower cost without the burden and complexity associated with expressing the right through the prism of pre-conceived and non-responsive common law forms.

Status of tailings dumps : let D5s go working in the past?

It was decided in the De Beers v Ataqua Mining (Pty) Ltd that ''tailings dumps'' created by mining companies before the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 28 of 2002 ("the MPRDA") came into operation are not governed by its provisions because such dumps are not "residue stockpiles" or "residue deposits" for purposes of the MPRDA. Ownership of tailings dumps is determined by the common law principles of accession. Ownership of a movable dump has to be transferred by one of the recognised forms of delivery of movables. Processing of these dumps will, however, still be subject to compliance with South African environmental, health and safety laws in general. It is submitted that mine dumps or tailings dumps created upon the exercise of "old order mining rights" before the commencement of the MPRDA and even after commencement of the MPRDA until eventual termination of the "old order mining rights" are not subject to the extensive, mining, environmental, empowerment provisions of the MPRDA. Termination of "old order mining rights" takes place upon: (i) refusal of an application for conversion of a mining right during (or even after) the period of transition, (ii) conversion into and registration of new order mining rights during (or even after) the period of transition or (iii) termination of unconverted "old order mining rights" on 30 April 2009. To the extent that this decision has made it possible to embark on a shorter and less cumbersome route in the reprocessing and eventual disappearance of most tailings dumps, it is to be welcomed from an economical, environmental, job creation and aesthetic perspective. Proposed amendments to the MPRDA to undo the impact of the De Beers decision should be carefully considered against these mentioned benefits and a possible finding that it may amount to an expropriation without compensation.

Statutory verification of water rights: the 'insuperable' difficulties of propertising water entitlements

The abolition of riparian entitlements in the early stages of colonial Australia and the vesting of these rights in the Crown represented a turning point for the evolution of private water rights. The extinguishment of common law rights connected to vested land interests and the introduction of new, unaligned statutory entitlements provided a new and fundamentally different system for the creation and regulation of private water entitlements. Unlike riparian entitlements, in the absence of express definition, statutory water entitlements may only be verified as property where such a construction is consistent with the nature and scope of the entitlement. In this respect, the statutory framework has disaggregated the propertisation of water rights from land ownership and linked the process to broader statutory interpretation principles. The shift away from institutional property has generated concerns about the interpretive approaches appropriate for the verification of legislative water entitlements. This article examines the existing interpretive approaches and argues that the blurring of the propertisation process with the separate issue of whether any change or modification of such water rights attracts s 51(xxxi) of the Commonwealth Constitution has produced a situation where core property indicia is increasingly overshadowed by legislative defeasibility. In the recent High Court decision of ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth, the focus of the majority judgements upon the inherent susceptibility of legislative entitlements to variation or extinguishment acted as a catalyst for the non-propertisation of statutory bore water licences in New South Wales. The emphasis the majority judgements gave to legislative defeasibility precluded a full and balanced assessment of other highly relevant property indicia, in particular the expectation interests of the holders. Conflating property and constitutional evaluation in this way is inappropriate in an era where entitlements to natural resource interests are increasingly statute based and the verification process has significant social and economic repercussions. Determining whether a statutory entitlement constitutes property requires a careful balancing of legislative intent, social and environmental context and individual expectation and the vicissitudes of a regulatory context should not eclipse this process.

Succession and Indigenous Australians : addressing Indigenous customary law notions of 'property' and 'kinship' in a succession law context

The purpose of this article is to critically evaluate the existing capacity of Indigenous people to exercise succession rights against their estate. This article begins with a discussion of the sources of the general succession laws in Australia, noting that they have derived from UK law, where the common law notions of property, property rights and family, including the expectational right to succeed to property, are all important factors. These common law notions do not easily fit within the spectrum of Indigenous customary law. Generally, many Indigenous Australians will die without executing a valid will (ie, they die intestate) and it is here that this article undertakes an examination of the general intestacy laws in all Australian jurisdictions noting the inadequacy of the provisions to recognise Indigenous persons’ spiritual and cultural obligations to property, land or otherwise, together with a failure to distinguish extended Indigenous kinship relationships under Indigenous customary law. It is argued that Indigenous people who die intestate should be supported by a flexible and adaptive intestacy framework, responsive to the full customary and cultural responsibilities of the deceased, thus promoting an organic and developmental approach to succession entitlements.

The nature and scope of rights of removal

The rationale underlying the fixtures and accession presumptions is the need to protect the value of the chattel as well as the need to protect third-party interests. The destruction of the independent legal status of an attached chattel is generally deemed appropriate where the value of the co-mingled asset will be diminished if the chattel retains a separate legal title and this would generate unfairness because third parties have dealt with the co-mingled asset on the basis of its overall value. Rights to remove have evolved under both common law and equity to moderate the scope of these presumptions. Common law will uphold the right of a tenant to remove chattels that have been attached to leased premises during the currency of the lease. Equity on the other hand will uphold the right to remove affixed chattels in circumstances where the enforcement of such an entitlement is consistent with contractual intention and transactional fairness. This article examines the different rights of removal that have evolved under Australian law to date and the emergent statutory framework supporting these rights. It discusses the historical purpose and structural utility of these entitlements within a land framework that supports fixtures presumptions. Rights of removal, whether validated at law or in equity, confer positive entitlements upon the holder to access and remove affixed goods in circumstances where, because of the fixtures and accession presumptions, those goods no longer retain any separate legal status. The capacity of the holder to enforce this right against third parties is illustrative of their distinctive proprietary perspective.

Constitutionalism, good faith and the doctrine of specific performance: rights, duties and equitable discretion

This article will explore the European roots of the doctrine of specific performance and the influence of transformative constitutionalism on these in recent times. The question whether specific performance is available as of right (as in the civil law), or only subject to judicial discretion (as in the common law), will be investigated. The demonstrated impact of constitutional rights on contract law in the mixed system of South Africa will be contrasted with developments in English and Australian contract law, where the common-law rules are more deeply entrenched and the potential scope for human rights-based development of these is arguably smaller, though still important. The article will argue, using comparative rules on specific performance as an example, that the concept of a duty of good faith or contractual fairness is likely to play a greater role in future in all three of the countries under consideration, reducing the common/civil/mixed legal systems divide.

Privacy law in Australia

This book begins by examining the nature and scope of the right to privacy and the moral basis and status: What is privacy? What interests does it affect and protect? Is there a justification for the right?
It discusses the relevant legal regime in all Australian jurisdictions. It covers the extent to which privacy has been protected under common law and equity and then weaves these principles into the statutory discussion of privacy. It focusses specifically on the most important areas of privacy protection - medical records, communications, criminal investigations and DNA, employment, territory, etc. Finally, it examines how the law may develop in the future.

General practitioners' perspectives regarding competence and confidentiality in an adolescent with suspected anorexia nervosa: legal and ethical considerations

In Victoria, Australia, the legal position regarding young people's competence to make medical treatment decisions has not been clarified in legislation, and a number of often vague common law decisions must be relied on for guidance. This situation produces a degree of uncertainty about appropriate professional practice, while also potentially impeding young people's rights claims in health care settings. With this in mind, the present research explored general practitioners' competence and confidentiality decisions regarding a 17-year-old female who presented with symptoms of an eating disorder. Questionnaires were sent to a random sample of 500 Victorian general practitioners, of whom 190 responded. After reading a case vignette, general practitioners indicated whether they would find the hypothetical patient competent and if they would maintain her confidentiality. Seventy-three per cent of respondents found the patient competent and most would have maintained confidentiality, at least initially. However, subsequent analysis of the rationales supplied for these decisions revealed a wide diversity in general practitioners' understandings and implementations of extant legal authority. This research highlights the need for general practitioners to be exposed to up-to-date and clinically relevant explanations of contemporary legal positions.

A Look at Corporate Code of Conduct Legislation

Over recent years, there has been a growing perception among civil society in the developed world that multinational corporations are engaged in socially and environmentally exploitative practices that they would never get away with, or even attempt, in their home countries. Whether right or wrong, that perception and its political and economic ramifications have driven a global movement for more responsible corporate behavior. As part of that global movement, three common law jurisdictions—the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom—have seen legislation introduced to enforce standards of practice for multinational corporations based in those countries in respect of their overseas activities. None of those Bills has yet passed into law, but they are worthy of analysis as attempts to transform hitherto amorphous concepts like 'corporate social responsibility' into concrete legislation. This article compares and critically analyses the three Bills, making recommendations as to how they could be improved, with particular emphasis on the need to forge stronger links between the legislative provisions and international human rights law.

The disunity of employment law and sentencing

This article discusses the lack of integration between criminal sanctions and employment deprivations (in the form of being dismissed from employment or disqualified from working in certain industries). Offenders who are employed in certain industries, especially the professions, often suffer a far greater net punishment upon being found guilty of a criminal offence than other offenders, thereby violating the principle of proportionality and the (related) principle of equality in the impact of sanctions. The reason that such a situation has developed is because criminal sanctions and employment deprivations have evolved from different streams of jurisprudence. This article argues that sentencers should impose a ‘net’ sanction for a criminal offence, thereby merging these streams of jurisprudence. This would require courts to be vested with the power to suspend or disqualify people from being employed in certain occupations. The legal analysis in this article focuses on case and statutory law in Australia, however, the same broad principles apply in all common law jurisdictions, including the UK. Hence, the reform proposals suggested in this article are relevant throughout the common law world.

Ambiguities and inconsistencies in relation to the obligations of proxies under corporations law: a model for reform

This article reconsiders the important question which came to light as a result of the controversial 2002 Coles Myer annual general meeting: do directors that are appointed as proxy have an obligation to vote as directed (and indeed should they)? A recent decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court, which was subsequently approved on appeal, stands for the proposition that proxy holders are agents of the shareholders that appointed them. However, currently the Corporations Act only requires a Chairman appointed as proxy to vote as directed — not an ordinary director. This article briefly explains the present state of the law in Australia on this issue, and then explores some interesting recent judicial remarks which may suggest that ordinary directors appointed as proxy must vote as directed in order to satisfy their director’s duties (both common law and statutory) to the company. We finally outline a proposed statutory reform initiative which seeks to remove the present uncertainty in the law by introducing a blanket requirement that all proxy holders must vote as directed.

Feudal tenure and native title: revising an enduring fiction

This article argues that the feudal doctrine of tenure continues to endure as the foundation for Australian land law despite its obvious social and historical irrelevance. The doctrine of tenure is a derivation of feudal history. The article examines some of its historical foundations with the aim of highlighting the disparity between the fiction of this inherited form and the reality of a colonial Australian landscape. Particular attention is given to the fact that Australian feudal tenure was always a passive framework. It was disconnected with the landscape and therefore incapable of responding to the needs of colonial expansion. This resulted in a clear disparity between feudal form and the reality of a land system populated by statutory grants. The article argues that feudal tenure was never truly devised as a responsive land system but rather, adopted as a sovereignty device. In this sense, legal history was utilised with the aim of promoting imperial objectives within colonial Australia. Tenure was equated with absolute Crown ownership over all Australian territory despite the fact that this was inconsistent with the orthodox tenets of feudal tenure.
The article argues that the consequence of adopting feudal tenure and absolute Crown ownership has been the estrangement of indigenous rights, title and culture. The creation and legitimisation of a land framework with a fundamentally Eurocentric perspective completely destroyed indigenous interests during the settlement and colonial era. It created an imperial ideology where colonists silently accepted the denial of indigenous identity. The decision of the Mabo High Court to reassess this historical perspective and accept the validity of proven native title claims clearly disturbed tenurial assumptions. However, the High Courts' reification of the feudal form created a fundamental paradox: indigenous title was accepted as a proprietary right within a framework incapable of and unequipped to recognise the fundamentally different cultural perspectives of customary ownership. The article argues that native title cannot evolve within a common law framework that regards ownership as a derivation of the English Crown. It is suggested that ultimately, a pluralist property culture, where indigenous and non-indigenous title exist as equalised entities, can only be properly nurtured with the full and absolute abolition of the feudal doctrine of tenure.

More? You want more?..of course I do! Transsexualism and birth certificates-changing records or attitudes?

In 2004, the Victorian Government enacted legislation allowing people treated for transsexualism to correct the record of their sex on the Register of Births, Deaths and Marriages and obtain a new certificate reflecting their contemporaneous circumstances. It was the last of all the States and Territories to do so.

The legislation gave effect to some important changes to the law and was generally couched in terms more sensitive than those already in place in the other jurisdictions. In the view of the author, however, its proponents failed to both understand the import of the expert medical evidence adduced in, and to implement the common law position enunciated by, the Family Court in Re Kevin (validity of marriage of transsexual) [2001] FamCA 1074 and subsequently confirmed on appeal two years later by the Full Court.

The author argues that, while a welcome improvement to the human rights record of successive Victorian Governments, the result is still a largely disappointing piece of legislation. Rather than being truly 'beneficial' to all who need security of their personal identities, it perpetuates some of the very worst discrimination directed at people with transsexualism and their families by continuing to portray them as psychologically deluded rather than physiologically atypical and denying a small number of them their rights on the basis of legal reasoning which is no longer regarded as tenable. She asserts the legislation serves as a clear demonstration that prejudices and misconceptions about transsexualism stilI abound and explains much more is needed if real human rights, acceptance and freedom from discrimination are to be eventually obtained by those affected by the phenomenon.

The right to privacy: appealing, but flawed

The right to privacy is not recognised at common law. However, like many  other rights, it has gained increasing prominence and legal recognition  since the explosion in rights-based normative discourse following the  Second World War. Rights-based moral theories are appealing because their language is individualising; promising to expand the sphere of liberty and protection offered to people. It is therefore not surprising that we as  individuals are attracted to such theories - they allow us a vehicle through  which we can project our wishes and demands onto the community. While in abstract the right to privacy sounds appealing, it has many potential  disadvantages. This article examines the justification for the right to privacy. It argues that either the right is illusory (devoid of an overarching doctrinal rationale) or at its highest the right to privacy is an insignificant right - one which should rarely trump other interests. It follows that there is a need to re-assess the desirability of introducing a separate cause of action protecting privacy interests.