“Critchley is Žižek” : in defence of critical political philosophy

In an ironically Žižekian manner, this paper argues that Simon Critchley and Slavoj Žižek's apparent political disagreement (ludic reformist versus strident revolutionary) conceal a common set of preconditions and presuppositions. These presuppositions can be summed by the slogan “the forgetting of political philosophy”, which more specifically means the forgetting of the difference between philosophy and political life, and the reflective need to find mediations between the two. Critchley's turn to humour honours the notion that politics is about the realm of appearances, while Žižek's frank avowal of the “diabolical evil” of the subject of the death drive makes patently clear the dangers posed by a “politics of Truth”.

Gregory Palamas on the relationship between philosophy and theology

The relationship between philosophy and theology has rarely been a harmonious and fruitful one. The two disciplines are often segmented into mutually exclusive compartments. On the one hand, philosophers, particularly contemporary philosophers working within the Anglo-American analytic tradition, widely agree that the claims made by theologians – such as the claim that there is a God and that God is a trinity of persons – are meaningless, or false, or irrational, or unsupported by evidence, or in some other way epistemically below par. On the other hand, it is not unusual to find theologians following in the footsteps of writers such as Tertullian, Kierkegaard and Barth in arguing that, when it comes to theology, faith suffices and reason merely perverts.

The philosophy-theology dispute was no stranger to fourteenth-century Byzantium, particularly in the writings of the most prominent spiritual and intellectual figure of this period, viz., Gregory Palamas (c.1296-1359). In his debates with Barlaam of Calabria (c.1290-1348), Gregory Akindynos (c.1300-1348) and Nikephoros Gregoras (c.1290-c.1358), the issue of the appropriateness of employing philosophical terms and modes of reasoning in theology occupied a central place.[1] But before looking at how Palamas tackled this issue, it will be helpful, firstly, to briefly outline how the Christian world (especially in the East) prior to Palamas tended to see the relationship between secular learning (including philosophy) and theology; and secondly, to ascertain what exactly was Palamas’ conception of philosophy.

Meta-philosophy of religion : the analytic-continental divide in philosophy of religion

How is the philosophical study of religion best pursued? Responses to this meta-philosophical question tend to recapitulate the analytic-Continental divide in philosophy in general. My aim is to examine the nature of this divide, particularly as it has manifested itself in the philosophy of religion. I begin with a comparison of the stylistic differences in the language of the two traditions, taking the work of Alvin Plantinga and John Caputo as exemplars of the analytic and Continental schools respectively. In order to account for these stylistic divergences, however, it is necessary to delve further into meta-philosophy. I go on to show how each philosophical school models itself on different theoretical practices, the analytic school mimicking the scientific style of inquiry, while in Continental philosophy it is the arts and humanities rather than the sciences that provide the model for philosophical discourse. By situating themselves in such different genres,  analytic and Continental philosophers have developed contrasting, if not mutually exclusive, methods for pursuing the philosophy of religion.

Whither morality in a hard determinist world?

What would the world be like if hard determinism were true, that is, if all events were determined in such a way as to render all our decisions and actions unfree? In particular, what would morality be like? Indeed, could there be anything distinctively moral in such a world, or would we be left with a moral nihilism in which nothing of moral significance remains? In this paper I explore the ethical implications of hard determinism, focusing on the consequences that our lack of free will would have for moral responsibility (and thus praise and blame), moral obligation, moral rightness and wrongness, and moral goodness. I argue that the truth of hard determinism would compel us to significantly revise our commonsensical understanding of these moral categories. I add, however, that this change in moral outlook would not have dire practical consequences, for we would retain the attitudes and emotions that are essential to forming good interpersonal relationships and to developing morally. In fact, far from being a threat to human flourishing, hard determinism offers the prospect of a life that is morally deeper and more fulfilling than in a world in which we are free.

Emptiness and becoming : integrating Madhyamika Buddhism and process philosophy

Beginning with a comparison of process philosophy and Madhyamika Buddhism -focussing in particular on Charles Hartshorne and Nagarjuna - which seeks to find points of similarity and difference, this thesis goes on to ask whether the differences are disagreements or complementary insights that may be integrated by means of a hermeneutical framework which can facilitate the enrichment of both systems. It is argued that process philosophy's method of creative synthesis and Madhyamika's method of negative dialectics are complementary rather than rival methods, because: (1) the Madhyamika bi-negation of symmetrical internal and external relations is complemented by process philosophy's argument that asymmetrical relations have primacy, which can be integrated into a theory of 'asymmetrical interdependence'; (2) the Madhyamika bi-negation of being and non-being is complemented by process philosophy's argument that becoming has primacy; (3) Madhyamika's emptiness (or openness) and process philosophy's creativity are complementary ideas that can be integrated into a ‘creative emptiness’; (4) Madhyamika's deconstruction of theism and acceptance of a conventional (and thus empty) ‘Cosmic Buddha-Bodhisattva’ and process philosophy's panentheism are complementary and can be integrated in the idea of an ‘empty God’; (5) The creative emptiness and the empty God are two different but complementary ultimates - the ultimate activity and the ultimate actuality; (6) Madhyamika’s two truths -conventional (empty world) and ultimate (emptiness) - can be enriched by expanding the conventional to include ultimate actuality (empty God), and not subordinating the conventional to the ultimate; (7) process philosophy can be similarly enriched by meditating on creative emptiness, which reveals the empty God-world, which is not dominant vis-a-vis creative emptiness. An attempt is made to develop a hermeneutical framework for the comparison and integration of Madhyamika and process thought, which can also be used to construct a general theory of worldviews and a theory of interreligious dialogue. Finally, the practical applications of the integration of process thought and Madhyamika Buddhism are explored, focussing on ethical and socio-political issues and how the integration of the two systems can be used to advantage in these contexts.